Public Safety Committee on Nov. 1st, 2006

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

The only reason I ask is that they gave a black and white answer yesterday. They said no, they had zero to do with the entire affair; there was no fault on their part. What I'm saying is that really, I walked into the day feeling quite comfortable that things were okay and I walked out not having that same degree of confidence. So I'm asking you, as an oversight body, do you share that same belief, that they made no mistakes in this affair?

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Mr. Holland, your time is up.

Let's give Mr. Filmon a chance to respond.

[Gary Filmon]

I don't think it's a matter of whether or not people made mistakes. We found no evidence that they were involved in his arrest or apprehension and deportation, that's for sure. We do know that, on the request of the Syrian intelligence officials, they did go to interview the Syrian officials. As I understand it, that was supported by not only DFAIT, but Justice O'Connor, who said they had reason to do that.

If you want to talk about whether their actions caused him to be detained longer, again, I don't think that's a conclusive thing in either Justice O'Connor's report or in any other investigation that we've done. So the question I have to get to is what you're saying specifically. Was there error of operation or did they make a contribution to it? There was nothing that we found in our report that was inconsistent with what Justice O'Connor has concluded. The question is where you are placing the blame.

I can tell you that they have made some changes as a result of a variety of things that we have investigated. Among them, in terms of what they do with information they get from countries that may be suspected of human rights violations and how they conduct themselves with respect to meetings with countries and agencies that are suspected of human rights violations, changes are already taking place to try to ensure that they're on top of these kinds of issues in future.

In terms of the actual issue of their ability to know whether the information obtained from him was by torture, I don't think we knew that until Stephen Toope did his report, nor do I think anybody else did. You had reports coming from DFAIT personnel who were in face-to-face contact. CSIS was never in face-to-face contact with Mr. Arar. Two parliamentarians, Ms. Catterall and Mr. Assadourian, went and saw him face to face, and they didn't come back reporting that they suspected that the information was obtained by torture.

So there was a great deal out there that made this a very difficult environment. Let's be fair about that. And on the other matters, we certainly had no indication from Justice O'Connor's report that it was inconsistent with our report and our investigation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you very much.

For this round, the last question goes to Mr. MacKenzie, please.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

I just wanted to clarify with the members of SIRC, as they are always right. I did check on the Internet. There is a 1-800 telephone number and they are accessible.

The bigger part of my equation was that it sometimes is difficult to sort out police responsibility and CSIS responsibility on the ground level. People wouldn't tend to perhaps do what I did to find the phone number for CSIS, but when they do have an issue, I think we have to appreciate that Canadians will sometimes not have the resources to sort out what's intelligence and international security versus what is a criminal act. When they call, they'll call 9-1-1, so the police are frequently involved first.

I just didn't want to leave the impression with Canadians that CSIS is inaccessible. You can find them on the Internet, and they do have a 1-800 phone number.

[Gary Filmon]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

I don't detect a question there. Are you sharing your time with anyone?

Mr. Hawn.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you. I'm certainly glad we cleared that up.

On your ability to disagree with CSIS, you oversee CSIS. In answer to one of the questions way back at the beginning, I detected some chat about when there's a disagreement. When there's a fundamental disagreement between Mr. Judd and this committee, how do you go about disagreeing, and who wins in the end?

[Gary Filmon]

I think Canadians win.

We have a job to do. It has to be a professional relationship, and he has a job to do and I'm sure he takes it very seriously.

We have a job to do, and that's to hold them accountable for their responsibilities and mandate and adhering to it under the CSIS Act, ministerial direction, and obviously their own policy framework that they have to work with. We hold them accountable to always being consistent with all of those things.

From time to time we find that they haven't been, that they haven't measured up, and we're very direct about that. On a complaints process from time to time we've found in favour of the complainant and against CSIS. That doesn't mean to say that they're not a professional organization and that they aren't taking their responsibilities very seriously. It just means that they seem to have slipped up from time to time, and that's what we're there for, to ensure that Canadians are always as well served as they can possibly be.

I think it's a relationship of creative tension. They have their job; we have our job. From time to time we'll disagree, and that's what our reports will indicate.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

This may be an unfair question, but do you think there's a place for an organization similar to SIRC that works with the RCMP?

[Gary Filmon]

Essentially, that's what our submission to O'Connor said. We laid out about ten areas that we believed were really, really important--transparency, access to the information, the credibility and the trust of the review body, and all those things. We laid them out as what we believed was required.

We said at the same time that there may be a case to be made for not replicating all of the information and capability in terms of having top-secret-rated staff and individuals who have the familiarity with doing the kind of investigation into their files and their actions that we have to do with respect to CSIS. A lot of these skills and knowledge are transferrable, and there may be a case to be made to say that we could do the job. We're not trolling for more work. We're not looking for expansion of our mandate, but if we were called upon, we believe SIRC has the capability to do it. But this will be up to Mr. Justice O'Connor. I know he has consulted many, many people far and wide on this.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

You oversee or review CSIS to ensure compliance. Who sets the standard of compliance, or is that part of the creative tension that goes on between you and CSIS?

[Gary Filmon]

We hold them to their own standards across the act, obviously--the act, ministerial direction, and their own policies and practices--and if they don't meet those tests....

They have all of these different relationships, as we've just been talking about, memoranda of understanding with so many different organizations worldwide and domestically, and they have to abide by all of the requirements, and that's what we hold them to.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

I'll just go back to a previous question. You probably haven't had this situation, but if you did come to a point of intractability between SIRC and CSIS, who would you go to?

[Gary Filmon]

You're right, it hasn't happened. But I would imagine we would have to go to the minister and just lay the issue of difference on the table and report that we were unable to resolve a matter of importance between us, and there would have to be, obviously, some action taken.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

That takes us now through the entire rotation.

I remind the committee that we had three orders before us. We haven't dealt with some of them, and I'm sure those people who are watching on television are learning a lot more about how our security services function and about how our democracy in Canada oversees these institutions and holds them accountable. I'm sure this is a very educational time for them, and if some of you want to focus on some of these other orders in our next round, I think that would be very helpful as well.

I think we'll have time for one more rotation through the various political parties.

Mr. Cotler, would you like to lead off, please?

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the matter regarding the torture of Maher Arar during his imprisonment, I just want to say that at the time of his rendition to Syria by the United States it was a matter of public record, it was on the U.S. State Department's annual report at the time, that Syria was a country that routinely tortured its detainees--apart from the fact that Syria was listed as a country that was a state sponsor of terrorism.

I'm saying that because that should have set off alarm bells in our own intelligence community with respect to what kind of treatment Maher Arar might have been experiencing during imprisonment in Syria.

Now let me, if I may, follow up on a pattern of questions from before, which is, what did CSIS know and when did they know it, or when did they not know it? I know CSIS to be a serious and professional body, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that takes its security and intelligence-gathering functions seriously. I know that in the context of taking those responsibilities seriously they engaged, by their own acknowledgement, in regular contact with counterpart intelligence agencies, including those in the United States.

I would have to assume, therefore, that they were--and indeed are--in continuous contact with American intelligence agencies, and that therefore the intelligence allegations respecting Maher Arar, or the false and misleading intelligence allegations regarding Maher Arar, would have been the subject of discussion between the American intelligence agencies and CSIS at some point either before his detention, during his detention, after his rendition, or during his imprisonment.

In other words, is it not surprising that CSIS would not have known about the false information, the misleading information that was initially conveyed, particularly when it was on an intelligence-related topic, when they had continuous discussions with American intelligence agencies during that entire period? Isn't it disturbing, therefore, that they have to acknowledge that they found out about this only four years later, when Commissioner Zaccardelli came before this committee?

So my question is, how were they able to carry out their security and intelligence mandate--over which you have oversight--in relation to the Syrian government, in relation to the American government, in relation to the Canadian government, in relation to RCMP officials, in the absence of this crucial bit of intelligence information regarding Maher Arar?

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Your question has taken up quite a bit of time, so there are a couple of minutes for an answer.

[Gary Filmon]

I believe it's clearly a question that should be asked to CSIS, but if I may, I'll just go back to you about the heads up, that you say everybody should have known about Syria and its reputation for torture.

Well, clearly, people all over the world knew that, and the U.S. State Department knew that, yet.... CSIS did not have anybody in that entire period of time face to face with Mr. Arar. They were not a lead agency with respect to the matter on which, as I understand it, there was an exchange of information, which was Project A-O Canada, in which the RCMP was the lead agency.

But that said, you know, there were DFAIT officials who had face-to-face meetings and access to him. There were two members of Parliament who had face-to-face meetings with him. Yet this information didn't become a conclusive matter until Dr. Toope did his investigation. We were all very upset, obviously, to learn that, and I'm sure many other people were. But there were many things along the way that were going on. It's a very sad state.

Why? I can only speculate, because you're putting me in a position where I have to speculate, basically, as to why CSIS was never made aware of it, and that is only to say that they weren't the lead agency in the investigation and the file that was being put together on him. That Project A-O Canada was one that the RCMP was the lead agency in; therefore, as I understand it, they were having the direct relationship with the Americans on this.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

I understand they weren't the lead. It's just that we're talking about a security and intelligence-related function, that's all.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Your time is up, Mr. Cotler.

[Gary Filmon]

Yes, I understand that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Okay, thank you.

Monsieur Ménard, do you have a question?

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to have more information on the means at your disposal to implement your mandate which is nearly unlimited. How many staff do you have?

[Gary Filmon]

Twenty.