Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am pleased to be here today and to have the opportunity to review and discuss with you a number of matters arising from my appearance here in September to discuss Justice O'Connor's report of the events relating to Maher Arar.
My last appearance before this committee occurred, as you know, within a fairly short time of the release of the report. I know that the committee shared my desire to hear the response of the RCMP as soon as possible, and I personally believed it was important to extend an apology to Mr. Arar and his family without delay. I also looked forward to sharing with the committee details on the important work the RCMP is doing to implement the recommendations.
As a result, I believe that some aspects of my prior testimony could have been more precise or more clearly stated. A number of misconceptions have resulted, and, as I indicated in my letter to the committee, I have been anxiously awaiting the opportunity to set the record straight, both for the committee and the Canadian public.
At this point I believe it would be helpful for me to outline a number of key facts, including what I personally knew and when, what was included in ministerial and other briefings, and the matter of our organizational response.
The following facts are itemized and confirmed within Justice O'Connor's report.
In the fall of 2001, Mr. Arar was legitimately identified as a person of interest in the post-9/11 RCMP counter-terrorism investigation known as Project A-O Canada. At that time, Mr. Arar and Ms. Mazigh, as part of a request to U.S. Customs, were included in a list that resulted in their being inaccurately described as “Islamic Extremist individuals suspected of being linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist movement”.
After this, Mr. Arar moved in and out of the United States on two occasions without incident. Indeed, Justice O'Connor concludes that he could not ascertain with any certainty what steps were taken by the Americans as a result of the request.
I think it is important to note here that Justice O'Connor states that senior officers were generally aware that the U.S. Customs request had been made, but not of its specifics, nor, I can tell you, would they ever receive that level of detail in the reporting relationship.
In the spring of 2002, the RCMP shared information with their American counterparts in the form of three CDs containing extensive documentary information collected during the investigation to date. Of these documents, 94 made reference to Mr. Arar, and some inaccurate factual information was later found in them by Justice O'Connor.
In July, Project A-O Canada learned that Mr. Arar and his family had left Canada for Tunisia. The investigators later referred to this departure as “sudden”. They also characterized the conditions placed by Mr. Arar's lawyer on an interview as a refusal. Justice O'Connor found that these were two instances that contributed to an incorrect and potentially inflammatory picture of Mr. Arar. However, during this time period there was no recognition within Project A-O Canada that such an incorrect portrayal was emerging.
In September 2002, Mr. Arar was detained by American authorities while travelling through New York. In discussions with the Americans at this time, the RCMP were clear that Mr. Arar could not be linked to al-Qaeda. They informed their U.S. colleagues of this in both written and personal communications. Staff involved were consistent in their approach and continued to tell the Americans that the RCMP had no basis to detain Mr. Arar, to charge him with a criminal offence, or to prevent him from re-entering Canada.
On October 5 and 7 respectively, RCMP staff advised the FBI that the RCMP could not link Mr. Arar to al-Qaeda. Here, Mr. Chairman, I will refer to my letter that I sent to the committee on November 2. In the letter, I state:
Nevertheless, the fact remains that RCMP investigators clearly informed U.S. officials that there was no evidence to support criminal charges against Mr. Arar in Canada, that he could not be prevented from entering Canada and that we were unable to link him to Al Qaeda.
This should have had the effect of correcting any inaccurate information that had been provided previously. When I stated on September 28, 2006, that we had corrected the record, this is what I was referring to. While my remarks could have perhaps been clearer, I think Mr. Easter recognized the unfounded basis for some of the committee's questions when he cautioned against reading too much into what I had said.
On October 11, 2001, I was formally briefed that Mr. Arar had been removed to Syria by U.S. authorities, that the RCMP had shared our investigative material with them, and that Mr. Arar was considered to be a person of interest.
Again, as Justice O'Connor clearly states, it is important to reiterate that no senior staff--including myself--were told of the inaccuracies in the information provided to the Americans.
Over the fall of 2002 and spring and summer of 2003, the RCMP continued to interact with Canadian agencies, such as PSEPC, DFAIT, CSIS, and PCO, to ensure that ministers were appropriately briefed on the circumstances relating to Mr. Arar.
Deputy Commissioner Garry Loeppky was the primary lead for the RCMP. When representing the RCMP at numerous and regular interdepartmental meetings, he expressed what was known to us at the time: that the RCMP had shared investigative material with the U.S., that the RCMP had told U.S. officials that it could not charge Arar criminally or refuse his entry into Canada, and that the RCMP could not indicate links to al-Qaeda.
Deputy Commissioner Loeppky periodically and regularly briefed me, and Minister Easter was also briefed, regarding the situation as I have described it. Specifically, in November 2003, Minister Easter was given a comprehensive operational briefing, which included that Mr. Arar was deported to Syria unilaterally by American authorities, that the RCMP had shared investigative information, and that Mr. Arar remained a person of interest.
I think it is important to note that for the RCMP, Mr. Arar remained a person of interest during the whole period I have outlined. This is what I knew--all that I knew--during the three years from Mr. Arar's deportation until the release of Justice O'Connor's report.
On this key question of what was known by whom and when, I think it is helpful to really reiterate two statements from Justice O'Connor's report.
The first statement, with regard to the inaccurate information that was contained in the 2001 U.S. Customs request, Justice O'Connor states that “senior officers...were not apprised of the fact that Project A-O Canada had described Mr. Arar and Dr. Mazigh as Islamic extremists in its border lookout request to U.S. Customs.”
Second, with regard to the questions the RCMP sent to the American authorities while Mr. Arar was detained in New York, he states:
...I note that the senior officials at “A” Division and in the Criminal Intelligence Directorate (CID) were unaware that the communication was being sent....
It was during the inquiry that the compilation of all facts related to the events surrounding Mr. Arar were painstakingly pieced together by Justice O'Connor. But it is important to remember that Justice O'Connor confirms what I, too, believe: that no bad faith could be attributed to members of Project A-O Canada. This is made even more evident by the fact that Project A-O Canada staff did not identify or report any inaccuracies to senior staff, believing that any information used by the U.S. would be verified and that Mr. Arar would be subject to due process, as is standard operating procedure for police.
As I've noted before, the decisions made by senior officers, which I support, have been to accept these problems at an institutional level and to put into place corrective measures that focus on, first, strong central governance; second, information sharing; third, extensive training; and fourth, effective integration. Such measures are designed to increase our organizational effectiveness in the very challenging arena of national security and terrorism and to ensure that similar problems never reoccur.
As former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety, Anne McLellan, told this committee just last week:
Accountability takes very many forms, and we have to get past the notion that heads must roll to have accountability. Sometimes maybe they should.
It may mean that you change the procedures that you had in place that led to the mistake, to make sure that it doesn't happen again.
In other cases it will be something else that is perhaps more important in terms of the culture of that organization.
Mr. Chairman, I want to be very clear about the significance of what I have said here today. For a government official, nothing is more fundamental than ensuring that the information they provide to ministers is accurate and complete. To improperly withhold information or to misrepresent facts is a cardinal sin. If I had been guilty of such actions, no one would have to ask for my resignation, Mr. Chairman. The facts of the matter are, however, that due to circumstances I have described, we were unaware of some important information until the completion of Justice O'Connor's inquiry this year. My colleagues and I deeply regret that mistakes were made, but it is important to recognize that at all times we acted in good faith.
Finally, before we move to questions, I would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak with you today. As I stated on September 28, it is such steps that assure all Canadians of the existence of transparent, accountable, and responsible leadership within the Canadian democratic system that is the very bedrock of a safe and civil society.
Thank you. Merci.