Public Safety Committee on Dec. 5th, 2006

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

Thank you very much for that question.

Yes, we have gone outside the RCMP. In particular, as I stated earlier, we have renewed our memorandum of understanding, for example, with CSIS such that we now are much more in tune and work with them much more closely in the work we do, in understanding our mandates much more clearly, in making sure that our work is synchronized. We have learned from them their best practices in terms of managing sensitive information—how you exchange sensitive information.

We've also gone outside of Canada. We've gone to Great Britain, for example. As you know, Great Britain has been challenged in a lot of ways relative to national security issues. We've talked to the Met in England and we've talked to people from MI5. We've gone to other countries; we've talked to Australia, New Zealand, and other countries that are facing the same types of challenges in terms of terrorism and how you bring security agencies and law enforcement agencies together in a seamless integration to work on these files. We've exchanged information.

We've looked at best practices. I sent a team around the world, literally, to look at best practices. We've incorporated that work, along with Justice O'Connor's recommendations, in what we have done in policies, practices, training, and so on.

Again, I can't guarantee anything in this business. Justice O'Connor said that our policies were actually very good even before 9/11. I believe we have a very good system now that would stand the best scrutiny of Justice O'Connor or anybody else and is comparable to if not better than those of a lot of countries. It has to be, because we've learned a lot of lessons from here. A lot of people have been hurt in this situation. I myself have gone through some not easy weeks since my last testimony. If there is anybody who has taken some serious hits because of information that wasn't precise, it has been me.

So we've all learned. This is what I'm trying to do. I'm looking forward, not forgetting the past, but trying to correct those mistakes, and we've gone around the world looking for those best practices.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

There are a couple of small questions in here. When I say “small”, they may be short questions, but they sure aren't small in scope.

In your testimony here today, you said that you cannot, the RCMP cannot, afford the diminution of the faith of the people of Canada that Canada's most senior police force is not 100% pure, as much as this can be expected of any group of men and women.

My question would be, as a police officer of some 36 or 37 years, when you see the repercussions resulting from the testimony you made before this committee, on both the institution of government and in particular on the relationship that your police force has with it, do you think that perhaps organizationally there need to be additional changes—in fact, as the top officer, you did make some changes—as far as personnel and their current responsibilities, and going further with that, and carrying on from what Mr. Ménard—

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Joe Comartin]

Could you wrap up? Your time has run out.

Commissioner, could you give us a short answer?

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Yes, but going further regarding what Mr. Ménard said, when one realizes that they've done something that results in something having gone wrong, should they not go directly to the people they've misinformed? In other words, perhaps when you noticed that you had misinformed this committee, would you not have thought of an immediate memorandum to the committee chair, so we wouldn't get the news from another public function that you were at?

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

As you know, sir, my office started calling the clerk and the ministry immediately to get in contact with the committee, but the committee had other work and so on. We were hoping to get on before other witnesses, and I wrote a letter, dated November 2, which was more than a month ago.

We tried everything we could, but we were working closely with the committee to accommodate each other. I believe I did everything I could. I recognized that the matter needed correction immediately, and we took all the steps we could.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Mr. Chan, please.

[Raymond Chan, Liberal, Richmond, BC]

Mr. Zaccardelli, on September 28 you made some statements that had huge implications. You are so sure of what happened in this case. I believe there must be some circumstances that made you make those statements, because of the implications. And things wouldn't just appear, just happen. There must be some circumstances that made you make those kinds of statements.

Now I want to get down to the motive and the circumstances under which you make those statements that you are now trying to deny as facts.

First, between September 18 and September 28, you were recounting your meeting with Minister Day. You went as far as meeting Minister Day on Friday September 22. Can you tell us who was at that meeting and what was talked about? What was being discussed at that meeting and at any other meetings you had with Minister Day?

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to answer the first part of the question.

[Raymond Chan, Liberal, Richmond, BC]

Mr. Zaccardelli, we don't need an answer to that. We need an answer to what was discussed with Mr. Day, who was there, and about any other meetings you had with Mr. Day before the testimony.

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

Mr. Chairman, as part of that question, certain things were said that I believe I need to address.

The first part is in terms of the September 28 testimony that is in question. I've thought a lot about it. The consequences have been severe for me. I don't think I would have done it on purpose.

As I've said, I tried to give the best explanation I could, and I tried to absorb the best information. But I clearly made a mistake in transferring what I learned and what I was driven by in 2006 from the report. I implied and stated that I may have had it in 2002, which I clearly did not.

It has been very difficult for the last few weeks because of that. I'm the only one who has suffered as a consequence.

[Raymond Chan, Liberal, Richmond, BC]

No.

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

Mr. Chan, I appreciate the question.

When I met with the minister on the Friday, the only other person who was in the room was the Deputy Minister of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Madam Suzanne Hurtubise.

The only thing that was discussed was the appearance before this committee. On Thursday we knew the committee was possibly going to meet, and on Friday we knew the committee would probably meet on Tuesday. We therefore said it was the appropriate venue for us to respond to this matter.

It's why I did not go public through the media, and it's why I was severely criticized by the media, because they said I should have responded. They asked me questions at the memorial service on Parliament Hill.

We both decided on the best venue.

[Raymond Chan, Liberal, Richmond, BC]

Mr. Zaccardelli, in the discussions with Minister Day, did you talk about any communications strategy for what you were going to talk about at this meeting?

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

Absolutely none.

[Raymond Chan, Liberal, Richmond, BC]

Okay. Thank you.

Between September 18 and September 28, did you meet or communicate in any way with senior department officials from PSEPC or any other government department concerning the report or your statements concerning the report to either the media or this committee?

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

I don't know if I can be exact here. I believe I talked to the Deputy Minister of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and I expressed a desire to try to find a venue as soon as possible for me to speak on this matter. I am not sure if there was any correspondence or a dialogue with anybody at the PCO, the Privy Council Office.

But I said to a number of my friends and to some other people that I was very anxious to deal with the matter. It was a very high-profile matter and I wanted to appear to speak about it. None of those people in any way said anything to me or gave me any direction or advice, because they don't give direction or advice to the Commissioner of the RCMP.

In my discussions with the minister, he in no any way indicated that I should do anything or say anything, nor did he direct me in any way.

[Raymond Chan, Liberal, Richmond, BC]

Between September 18 and—

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

I'm sorry, your time is up, Mr. Chan. We'll come back to you, but we want to give everybody a chance.

Mr. Hawn.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Zaccardelli, today you said that on October 5 and October 7, 2002, respectively, RCMP staff advised the FBI that the RCMP could not link Mr. Arar to al-Qaeda.

On October 11, you were formally briefed that Mr. Arar had been removed to Syria by U.S. authorities, that the RCMP had shared investigative material with them, and that Mr. Arar was considered a person of interest.

Surely the fact that the U.S. deported him to Syria would have suggested that they certainly considered him to be more than a person of interest. It would have behooved you or somebody in the RCMP to have taken action at that time, either on your own authority or in coordination with government authorities, to try to protect the rights of a Canadian citizen or to intervene on behalf of a Canadian citizen. Would that not have twigged him as someone who was more than a person of interest in somebody's mind?

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

Well, as you correctly stated, we provided the best analysis of the information, intelligence, or evidence that we had relative to Mr. Arar. They asked for it. We told them what our situation was. We gave them the information. They subsequently took action to remove him.

We don't exactly know what they relied on, and Justice O'Connor said they most probably relied on some Canadian information. We tried to find out from the Americans how they came to make this decision. We did not get any response from American officials.

One of the solicitors general—I'm not sure if it was Mr. Easter or Mr. MacAulay—had discussions with Attorney General Ashcroft subsequent to that, and Mr. Ashcroft stated to the minister that they used various sources of information to make their decision.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Surely you obviously knew before the O'Connor report in 2006 that something else had gone on back there. I'm a bit incredulous that a police officer with 36 years' experience could make such a mistake of transferring knowledge gained in 2006 to a situation in 2002 in a matter that serious. I have not been a police officer, but I would think that I would have gone back and checked my notes, which surely I or somebody else under my authority would have kept at the time, to verify whether the knowledge gained in 2006 was really knowledge they had in 2002. I have a hard time accepting the fact that you could make such a mistake of transferring knowledge to four years previously.

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

As I said, as soon as I came back, I absorbed myself in the report and I read the report completely. When I walked into this room on September 28, I had as much knowledge as I was able to absorb. I obviously did state certain things that were not accurate, so I said I apologize for that.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Police officers keep very good notes--I know that--and on a matter this serious, were it me, I would have certainly gone back to my notes from that period and found out whether the knowledge I had just gained was knowledge I had really just gained or I was transferring back.

I'm sorry, I'm just a bit incredulous that a police officer with your experience would make that kind of mistake.

[Commr Giuliano Zaccardelli]

But I didn't have any notes back then. The only information I had was in the report. Back then, at the time, when I involved myself, once Mr. Arar was in Syria, I asked what had taken place, who was Mr. Arar, and I was told he was a person of interest. I was told that we'd exchanged investigative information with the Americans. I was told that we advised them that we couldn't charge him. That is what I was told, and that is what we subsequently told the minister and briefed up.

It's only when I read the report that I found out, besides that, that there were some errors that had been made previous to his detention in New York by investigators. Justice O'Connor said those mistakes were honest mistakes, and that's why they weren't briefed up. So they never came to me or to my senior officials.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

I think you can appreciate why, on both sides of this committee, we find that a little hard to believe.