Perhaps I may add at this moment....
I would just point out that the provision in subsection 77(2) of the Bill relies on a summary of the evidence, which would give the injured party an opportunity to be adequately informed of the case against him. Here, the assumption is that you have a summary of the evidence, evidence gleaned from a number of different sources, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
Let's take another completely hypothetical example, which we haven't seen in the media for a number of years now. An individual, whom we will call Arar, for the purposes of our discussion, gave information under torture in a given country, and that information was used against another individual, here in Canada, with a view to deporting him. Are we talking here about information, evidence and intelligence that is credit-worthy, based on the test that appears further on in the legislation? That is the fundamental question we should be asking.
When you are dealing with real evidence, the question does not arise, because the Criminal Code explicitly states “beyond a reasonable doubt”. However, when you have information or intelligence obtained through association or in a variety of manners, including under torture, can you conclude that such information is truly credit-worthy and can be relied upon to arrive at the kind of conclusion that is sought here?
That is the caviat the Barreau du Québec feels is important—namely that the information obtained in that manner is not valid, or not sufficiently valid. So, as far as we are concerned, that simply is not enough to take steps to deport someone. We must not forget that there is a danger that we will be sending people back to a country where they will be subject to torture and capital punishment. For that reason, there is a need to be extremely cautious when assessing the evidence. Although such individuals may be considered undesirable, the burden of proof should be no less than what is acceptable in a free and democratic society.