If I may, I'd respond to your concern about information provided by allies that may not be countries practising torture and the concern that it will squelch information-sharing. Our response to that would be that there's nothing wrong with the information flow per se. It can indeed still be protected, but it need not be used to mount a case against a person. In other words, there's nothing to prevent Canadian government agencies from still receiving that information and assuring their allies that the information won't be shared. When they choose to proceed against someone in a criminal context, they must have corroborating open-source information. I would suggest that in cases in which there really are threats, there's no reason why evidence can't be gathered through a process of monitoring, surveillance, or whatever, that won't breach the undertakings to allies, and that allies wouldn't have any reason to worry.
I hope I'm being clear. In other words, you can use all that information at the investigative stage, but when it comes to actually initiating a procedure, that procedure must be based on evidence that should be open-sourced and that you don't need to worry—