Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, today I am representing the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, a broadly based Canadian coalition that came together after September 11, 2001, to monitor the impact of the new anti-terrorism legislation on human rights and to advocate against abuses. We were also intervenors before the Arar and the Iaccobucci commissions.
I come to this issue having spent 31 years as a member of Parliament, four years as a solicitor general, and five years as president of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.
Today I will focus on the recommendations set out in the first and second Arar reports.
In his first report, Judge O'Connor reported on his investigation into the case of Canadian citizen Maher Arar to determine how and why he was detained in New York on September 26, 2002, and then surreptitiously sent to Syria, where he was imprisoned and tortured for approximately one year.
Judge O'Connor, after examining all of the evidence, both in camera and public, found that the RCMP had falsely labelled Mr. Arar and his wife as, and I quote, “Islamic extremists suspected of having links to al-Qaeda”. Judge O'Connor said there was absolutely no evidence to support this label. This was in addition to other inaccurate, misleading, and damaging information, all of which the RCMP irresponsibly shared with American authorities.
At page 19 of his report, O'Connor said: “Labels have a way of sticking to individuals, reputations are easily damaged and when labels are inaccurate, serious unfairness to individuals can result.”
Then at page 24 he said, “Project A-O Canada”, which was the RCMP special investigation unit, “supplied the American agencies with a good deal of inaccurate information about Mr. Arar, some of which was inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial to him.”
In his general analysis with respect to the Arar evidence, Judge O'Connor came to the following conclusions. First, the RCMP had not properly checked the information relating to Arar for relevance, accuracy, and reliability. Second, the sharing of this inaccurate information with the United States was contrary to existing policies and without the proper caveats. Third, there was inadequate direction and oversight of the investigating team by senior levels in the force. Fourth, the RCMP investigation unit lacked the training and experience required for this security and intelligence work. Fifth, the RCMP had been thrust back into security and intelligence operations, contrary to the recommendations of the 1981 McDonald commission report.
As a result, in his part one report, O'Connor made 23 recommendations to correct the above-mentioned deficiencies so that cases like Arar would not happen again. These are very specific recommendations dealing with, among other things, mandate, sharing arrangements, training, centralized oversight, policy guidance, screening for accuracy and relevance, joint operations, and racial profiling. As a result, what is required from the government is a specific answer to each one of these 23 specific recommendations.
The general comment by Stockwell Day, who was then the minister, on October 21, 2008, that all the recommendations were implemented tells us nothing about the implementation measures and is unacceptable.
Nor is the letter of March 9, 2009, from Minister Peter Van Loan to Alex Neve in which he states that the government has implemented 22 of the 23 O'Connor recommendations. It is unacceptable that his examples of implementation in the letter do not relate directly to O'Connor's numbered recommendations and they are general rather than specific.
The minister speaks of formal processes, changes to policies and common frameworks, but there is no detail. In the circumstances, how can parliamentarians and the public judge whether or not these responses are germane to the recommendations and whether they are adequate or not?
If Parliament is really serious about correcting the abuses suffered by Mr. Arar, it is imperative that the minister be asked to appear before this committee to give a specific accounting in writing to each and every one of the recommendations in the first Arar report. Only then can you and the public judge whether what was done was consistent with O'Connor's recommendations, or whether more has to be done.
This leads me to O'Connor's second report, of December 12, 2006, in which he proposed a new review agency for the RCMP and a new review process for five other federal agencies carrying on security and intelligence activities. As a result of his inquiry, Judge O'Connor discovered that there were 24 federal agencies in Canada involved directly or indirectly in the security and intelligence business, the principal ones being CSIS, RCMP, Communications Security Establishment, the CBSA, Transport Canada, Foreign Affairs Canada, Department of National Defence, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, the PCO, the Department of Justice, and the Coast Guard.
He also found that there were 247 agreements by which intelligence information was shared internationally and within Canada. In addition, he found that there were an increasing number of joint intelligence operations, known as “integrated national security enforcement teams”, or INSETs, made up of CSIS, the RCMP, the OPP, and Ottawa Police Service. Those are just examples, but there were others as well.
With all this sharing and all these joint operations, it's easy to understand how errors and mistakes by the RCMP and other agencies might escape review and go undetected. The problem is that the existing review bodies--the CPC, SIRC, and the CSE commissioner--have different limited powers and mandates, and in each case are only directed at a single agency. For example, CPC can only deal with the RCMP, and SIRC can only deal with CSIS. Therefore how do you get at joint operations and sharing arrangements?
Some of these review bodies have the power of subpoena; some don't. Some have the right to audit; some don't. Some, such as the Canadian Border Services Agency, have no review body whatsoever. This leaves us with an impossible situation, where issues can easily fall between the cracks.
In chapter 10 of the second report, O'Connor asks if the status quo is adequate. He absolutely and categorically says no. Judge O'Connor says that the RCMP internal controls are not adequate. Ministerial controls are not adequate. Judicial controls are not adequate. The CPC's existing powers are not adequate, and the powers of other accountability bodies are not adequate. He therefore proposes a new body to replace the RCMP's CPC to review the RCMP and the Canadian Border Services Agency, with increased powers to audit and investigate complaints. He also proposes that SIRC be given additional powers to review the security and intelligence operations of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, DFAIT, Transport Canada, and FINTRAC, in addition to CSIS. He leaves the CSE commissioner as is to review the activities of the CSE. However, to coordinate these three bodies, review all national security practices, and make sure that nothing falls between the cracks, he proposes an integrated national security review coordinating committee that would also receive all complaints and then refer them to the appropriate review agency.
After more than two years since the report's presentation, parliamentarians and the public have the right to know the government's intention with respect to this important proposal and have it, as a bare minimum, implemented as soon as possible.
Again, the answer given by Minister Van Loan in his letter of March 9 tells us nothing. He says, and I quote: “In regards to Commissioner O'Connor's Part II Report, the government is moving forward to enhance security and intelligence review measures.” After two years, it is moving forward to do what? We all have the right to know.
In conclusion, let me emphasize the following. Judge O'Connor spent almost three years on the Arar case. Judge Iacobucci spent almost two years on his mandate, at a cost of millions of dollars to the taxpayers of Canada. These commissions dealt with critical issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms of great concern to all Canadians. They should not be put on the back shelf or be brushed under the rug; they should be enacted as soon as possible so that no one else will suffer the fate of Messrs. Arar, Almalki, Elmaati, and Nureddin.
Thank you very much.