Thank you.
What I'm going to speak of this morning is primarily dealing with risk management. I have some questions and considerations about the approach and its potential inappropriateness for the function of public safety and specifically border security. I think it follows well on what's been said. It's not by any means to throw the baby out with the bathwater here but perhaps to put some question marks over some of the strategies currently used, given what has happened at the border.
I'll raise concerns in three general areas when it comes to Canadian border security. First is the use of risk management itself and its potential appropriateness or inappropriateness as a model. Second is associated problems with the use of biometric surveillance, RFID, and the whole host of technologies that are used with risk management. Third is tendencies in both Canada and the U.S. towards a centralization of authority in border security, which is often at the cost of borderlands and the stakeholders who reside therein.
Underpinning many of these concerns are some serious reservations over any border security strategy that focuses more on prediction, predicting potential risks—what I at times refer to as the needle-in-the-haystack approach, which is clearly motivated by avoiding a 9/11—rather than approaches to border security, many of which have been mentioned already, that focus more on resilience. Effective strategies for resiliency in the face of potential failure are obviously less popular, but more necessary. Simply, I'll argue for a shift towards models that evaluate risk that is based on public values.
Risk management has rapidly emerged as a strategy of choice in managing border security. Essentially, it requires a risk assessment, an assessment of the frequency and severity of risks, which as we've heard already is not always agreed upon. Then it provides a four-pronged strategy of mitigation, avoidance, transfer, or acceptance. Although in Canada it's mandated by the Treasury Board and makes sense from a fiscal perspective, its capacity for public safety—specifically border security—is questionable. When applied to public safety and security, avoiding or transferring risk is not a viable option, and thus the efficacy of the application as a whole is worth questioning.
Furthermore, the reliance on catastrophic failure is highly problematic, either the absence or presence of failure being the only measure of success. Issues such as the Robert Dziekanski incident in the Vancouver airport can be perceived as such an event.
In any application of risk assessment, the imagination of the potential risk is crucial. A clear lineage from the insurance industry suggests assessing risk is sensible and obvious in the case of things such as floods and earthquakes. Simply applying these techniques to public safety, and specifically border security, can lead to profound problems, where entire policies become preoccupied with the pre-assessment of risk further and further away from the border. This pre-assessment is carried out through the panoply of programs we have, such as NEXUS, FAST, passenger pre-screening programs such as CAPPS, and the no-fly list under Passenger Protect.
These approaches contribute to what is often referred to as a thickened border, but can also be understood as a proliferation of borders. These have the effect of treating all those crossing borders as potential risks of relative similarity. As was suggested this morning, when one is enrolled in trusted traveller programs, be it NEXUS or FAST, the rate of checks at the border actually increases. You're far more likely to be pulled aside, which, as has been pointed out, is a disincentive. To actually enrol in these programs is not being rewarded.
Put very simply, risk management cannot estimate the frequency of terrorist or criminal penetrations of the border, nor what the impact is, so it simply appears to be an inappropriate tool. It is perhaps worth reminding those focused on the panoply of trusted traveller programs and pre-screening and pre-assessment tools that such viable risk-driven solutions would not have hindered 9/11. Hijackers had frequent flyer cards, in some cases booked first-class tickets, and did not infiltrate a supposedly weak Canada-U.S. border.
The reliance on various technologies in contemporary border security is also steadily rising. The use of biometrics has become prolific. Various surveillance systems and RFID technologies are all but ubiquitous at land borders and the virtual borders in airports.
It is important to recognize that the introduction of these technologies alters how the border functions, is experienced, and how those crossing it are perceived. It is simply naive to assume that technology itself is neutral and that the intentions behind its application will trump other logics already present in the technology design itself. One example of this is the tests on facial recognition done in Florida last year, where they found that the entire system does not work on African Americans.
The use of these technologies not only intensifies the logic of pre-emption inherent in these applications of risk management; it also introduces the problem of social sorting. The non-transparent processes, databases, and programs that serve the interests of the risk assessment categorize and sort individuals in ways that the individuals themselves are rarely aware. Although consideration of any technology's fallibility is relevant, this is not my question. The differing logic that technology introduces is the focus, and the extent to which it broadens suspicion is worthy of question. One's meal choice can be linked to travel history, ethnic background, and credit score--all without one's knowledge--to create a profile that may or may not be a fitting approximation of the individual.
As with risk management strategies that create favourable conditions for the introduction of these technologies, failure or its absence is the only measure of success. Having no more 9/11s is equated with successful border strategy and is not a sufficient argument for continued or ever-increased resources. Failure can also be framed as a rationale for increased resources.
In the case of border security, false positives or false negatives tell us little about the efficacy of the systems employed, and they tend to be connected to wait times, which have little to say about actual security. Since the events of 9/11 in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, it is obvious that North American border security has undergone transformations, many of which have been noted today. The logic and strategies used in the institutions responsible for managing the border have changed to reflect a greater emphasis on security and surveillance, as opposed to visa, immigration, and customs.
What has been lost to a certain extent is a border that functions according to the needs, demands, and interests of those who regularly cross it, such as those residing in the borderlands where the predominant percentage of the Canadian population lives. It is also important to realize that the majority of the American population does not inhabit these borderlands. Indeed, a far greater number of Americans inhabit borderlands along the southern U.S. border with Mexico as opposed to northern borderlands.
It is no surprise that this contributes to what are now almost ubiquitous comments that misrepresent the Canada-U.S. border, Canadian border security, and Canadian immigration policy. This is unfortunately not only propagated by tabloid media, but often by the current Secretary of Homeland Security herself. This most definitely acts as an impediment to any sort of empowerment of borderlands on both sides of the border and tends to rationalize--however misguided and misinformed--the necessity of increased centralization and more homogenous strategies at both southern and northern U.S. borders.
I am suggesting that some care and attention be paid to regional borderland stakeholders, many of whom are successful in integrating a range of interests, both governmental and non-governmental, when considering effective strategies to manage and secure the border. One example of this is the international mobility and trade corridor project in Whatcom County in Washington State.
A border that functions well, inhibiting the movement of illegal persons and goods and facilitating the movement of tourists, business and commerce, goods, and casual shoppers, is what such organizations struggle to achieve. Yet they are increasingly disempowered through centralization, rising dependence on technology, and specific applications of risk management. Indeed, under current conditions we cannot evaluate how close or how far we are from this goal.
A border strategy motivated by perpetual risk and pre-emptive logic, which deems nearly all those who cross the border as potential risks of equal quality--even enrollees in trusted traveller programs--renders the sort of border these regional stakeholders envisage, one that evaluates risk based on public value, an impossible dream and thus an insecure border.
Thank you very much.