Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and I'll begin by thanking you for inviting me to appear today. I'm delighted to be here as chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, along with Susan Pollak, our executive director. We have a number of our senior staff with us as observers, and in case we forget something, we have our director of research, Steve Bittle, and our senior legal counsel, Sylvie Roussel, as well as a number of our research analysts.
I would like to take the opportunity to go through a brief introduction about SIRC and its mandate and responsibilities. The last time representatives of SIRC appeared before this committee was in 2009. The membership has changed somewhat, so I think we'll take the opportunity to give an introductory view of SIRC, and then we'll be very happy to answer questions.
Let me say first that having served on SIRC for nearly nine years, during which time I have been in regular contact with many organizations with similar mandates, I'm confident that Canada's model is, and is recognized to be, one of the strongest review functions in the world. This is not to say that changes and improvements are not possible, but simply that we have in SIRC an effective tool for helping to ensure the accountability of Canada's security intelligence agency, CSIS.
As I'm sure you are aware, SIRC came into being at the same time that Canada created CSIS, its civilian security intelligence service. With the passage of the CSIS Act in 1984, Canada became one of the first democratic governments in the world to establish a detailed legal framework for the operation of its security service. It is equally significant that the CSIS Act created a framework to make CSIS accountable in exercising its powers, a framework that by and large has stood the test of time.
Specifically, the CSIS Act defines the mandate and limits of state power to conduct security intelligence. It also spells out how the service's work is to be monitored through a rigorous system of political and judicial controls, including two review bodies, each with a distinct mandate, to watch over the new agency.
I will not describe in detail the role of the inspector general of CSIS, but will simply say that it's an internal body that provides the Minister of Public Safety with a knowledgeable set of eyes and ears on CSIS operations. SIRC, on the other hand, is an external review mechanism that does not report to any minister, but directly to you, as parliamentarians, and through you, ultimately, to all Canadians. SIRC's role is relatively easy to describe, although somewhat complex to execute. The committee has two basic functions: first, to conduct reviews into CSIS operations; and second, to investigate complaints against CSIS. SIRC has, in law, the absolute authority to examine all of the service's operational activities and has full access to all of its files, no matter how highly classified that information may be, the sole exception, of course, being cabinet confidences.
Our reviews are done by assessing the service's past activities and operations against four instruments that together form the legislative and policy framework for the service. These are, first, the CSIS Act; second, ministerial direction; third, national requirements for security intelligence; and finally, CSIS's own operational policies.
In each of its reviews, the committee examines certain fundamental questions, such as: Did CSIS have reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada? Was the level of investigation proportionate to the seriousness of the threat? Did exchanges of information between CSIS and domestic and foreign partners respect the agreements and caveats that govern information-sharing? And finally, did the service's investigation respect the rights of the individuals who were involved in lawful activities, such as protest or dissent?
Normally, our reviews take several months to complete and involve SIRC staff examining thousands of pages of documents, as well as having numerous discussions with CSIS personnel. Once a review is completed, copies are sent to the director of CSIS and to the inspector general; in some special cases, we send our reviews directly to the Minister of Public Safety. Declassified summaries, with any national security and privacy concerns removed, are also included in SIRC's annual report to Parliament.
Although SIRC's annual report is our main communications vehicle for informing Parliament and the public about our work, SIRC does carry on a modest communications program as well. We respond to media inquiries and participate in domestic and international symposia with relevance to our work. We also address seminars at Canadian universities to explain SIRC's role to students pursuing studies in this or other related areas. SIRC's website is another useful source of information for the public. There, you can find all of SIRC's annual reports, speeches and presentations, backgrounders and other publications, as well as descriptions of who we are and what we do.
Moving now to the subject of complaints, you are no doubt aware that SIRC investigates complaints about CSIS brought by individuals or groups. These complaints fall into one of four categories. They can be about any act or thing done by the service; denials of security clearances to federal government employees and contractors; referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission in cases where the complaint relates to the security of Canada; and, very infrequently, ministers' reports in respect of the Citizenship Act.
When SIRC accepts jurisdiction, the complaint is investigated through a quasi-judicial hearing presided over by a committee member, whose role is similar to that of a judge. At the conclusion of the investigation, the member issues a decision containing findings and recommendations to the minister, the director of CSIS, and, in cases concerning security clearance, the deputy head of the government department involved. We also provide a declassified report on our investigation to the complainant, in which we provide to that individual as much information as we can without breaching our obligation to protect national security.
As far as SIRC is concerned, having review and complaints under one body has proven advantageous. Our reviews give us the expertise to evaluate and investigate complaints more fully. At the same time, complaints give us another window on CSIS's operations, particularly their impact on the lives of ordinary Canadians. In some jurisdictions, these functions are kept separate, but Canada's experience suggests that there are real benefits to having them under one roof.
Whether we are speaking about reviews or complaints, SIRC's recommendations are non-binding. The scheme of review that Parliament created was not meant to have SIRC substitute for either the director of CSIS, who is accountable to the minister, or for the minister, who is answerable to Parliament. Nevertheless, CSIS has implemented the majority of SIRC's recommendations and has publicly acknowledged that SIRC has made it a better organization over the years. In late 2003, then CSIS Director Ward Elcock said at a major public conference, and I will quote:
Twenty years of constant review activity have resulted in many recommendations on how we could run things differently, and many of these recommendations have mirrored adjustments that have been made to the Service's management procedures. SIRC's comments have extended into the heart of how the organization is run, including matters of source-handling, investigative methods, targeting decisions and other core functions ... Do we always share SIRC's views? No in some cases, yes in some. But that is not the point. The point is that the review process remains an ongoing debate on ways to ensure that the principles of the legislation are sustained as we evolve and adapt to new threats. That is what the legislators intended.
Having given you a very brief overview of SIRC, I'd now like to take a few more minutes to address some of the issues that are preoccupying committee members, as well as ourselves, in the context of CSIS's foreign operations.
First, I do wish to reiterate the point that I and all members and staff of SIRC are persons permanently bound to secrecy, as stipulated in the Anti-terrorism Act of 2001. For this reason, although I am free to talk about what SIRC does and what our overriding concerns and observations are, I am not at liberty to divulge any operational details or any classified information. Even with this constraint, I believe I can offer you some helpful comments to guide you in your own examination of the issue of CSIS operating abroad.
I begin by noting that both the government and CSIS itself have indicated clearly that the service has in recent years been expanding its foreign operations in pursuit of its security intelligence mandate, in order to protect Canada's national security. This is hardly surprising, given the global character of the terrorist threat and the borderless flow of information and assets in our modern world. There is no question in my mind that the law permits CSIS to work in this way and that it is appropriate to do so in order to fulfill its mandate, as specified in section 12 of the CSIS Act.
That said, the shift in CSIS's role overseas from one of strictly liaison to one that allows for operational activity of a clandestine nature is a significant change from CSIS's longstanding focus on domestic security principally conducted from within Canada. From SIRC's perspective, there are a number of criteria that come into play in order for the service to operate effectively overseas in its security intelligence function.
First, CSIS needs appropriate direction from the government to carry out this expanded function effectively and in a way that reflects government priorities.
Second, CSIS should be adequately resourced to conduct its increased overseas operations. This would include not only funding but also training.
Third, the scope and pace of the shift from predominantly domestic to global operations should be proportionate to, as well as reflective of, the threat. Furthermore, the benefits should be measurable.
Finally, the bifurcation of CSIS's investigative function should be monitored so as to assess whether it is creating a perceived or real two-tier system within the service's intelligence officer cadre, those who operate overseas versus those who work on the domestic front, and whether this in itself could lead to long-term problems.
In concluding, I would say that for over 24 years SIRC has strived to carry out its work in an objective, fair, and balanced way. We recognize that in a free society we have to use every available resource to counter threats to our national security, the most significant today being terrorism. At the same time, we must uphold the principles of accountability, fairness, adherence to the rule of law, and respect for individual rights.
I will admit that this task has become more challenging since 9/11, as allegations of human rights abuses in the name of fighting terrorism have surfaced in many countries. Canada has not been immune to such controversy, and the case of Maher Arar, which SIRC reviewed prior to the government appointing a separate commission of inquiry, serves as a case in point.
The committee and SIRC staff believe that we have helped to make CSIS a more professional organization since 1984, and we remain as committed to this objective as we were then.
Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.
