Public Safety Committee on May 11th, 2010

[Shelly Glover, Conservative, Saint Boniface, MB]

Bearing in mind applicable laws and human rights, what is your impression of CSIS? How do you think they are doing?

[Gary Filmon]

That's difficult for me to say, because I think our primary role is to find fault, to be a watchdog, to be very assertive in attempting to find out information, and from time to time to be critical. Having said that, I think it's a very respectful relationship, and we certainly respect their integrity and their professionalism. At the same time, you only have to review our annual reports to know that we do find fault with them and criticize when we believe criticism is due.

[Shelly Glover, Conservative, Saint Boniface, MB]

I'm going to ask you for another comparison, based on what you've just said.

Very briefly, can you compare how security intelligence agencies of other nations are doing compared with how ours is doing?

[Gary Filmon]

I can't really. As a general term, I think the service is admired by its peers, though.

[Shelly Glover, Conservative, Saint Boniface, MB]

Very good.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming before the committee today. It's been an abbreviated session, and our next session will be shorter yet.

We'll suspend for a moment and have our next witness come forward.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

We'll continue with our study today on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

We welcome now the director, Mr. Richard Fadden; and Mr. Michel Coulombe, assistant director for foreign collection.

We welcome you, gentlemen, and we look forward to an opening statement, if you have one, of approximately ten minutes. Then we'll have questions and comments.

Go ahead any time you're ready, sir.

[Richard Fadden, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm very pleased to be here today to speak to the role that CSIS plays abroad in support of Canada's national security interests.

As I approach my first anniversary as the director of CSIS, I want to underscore how important it is that we have an informed and flowing dialogue about national security in Canada. There's no better setting than Parliament in which to advance this dialogue, so I'm very pleased to have been invited here today.

As you know, my assistant director of foreign collection, my colleague Monsieur Coulombe, spoke last week to the Commons' Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. There will no doubt be some overlap in content and interest with today's proceedings, and to the extent that I can, I'll answer any questions you might have on that.

I would like to structure today's remarks in the following manner. First, I would like to briefly summarize to you what CSIS is allowed to do outside of Canada, because I don't believe that those functions have always been well understood, even by commentators in the national security community; second, I will advance to you an argument on why I think CSIS must be active outside of Canada as part of its overall mandate to protect Canada's national security; and last, I will give you a sense of what CSIS is doing abroad so that today's proceedings are strongly grounded in real-life issues and circumstances.

The central duties and functions of CSIS are defined in section 12 of the act. We are to “collect...analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that” could reasonably be suspected of being security threats to Canada. We call this security intelligence. We are then to “report to and advise the Government” on that intelligence.

Based on those general powers, CSIS collects intelligence on a variety of specific threats to Canadian security, defined broadly in our act and refined by directives from cabinet and the Minister of Public Safety. These include terrorism, espionage, and foreign-influenced activities.

Most relevant to today's proceedings is the fact that the CSIS Act does not place any territorial limitation on where the service can collect security intelligence. In short, if it's a threat to Canada's security, we can collect intelligence on it, in Canada or outside Canada. This is a crucial point, because as I will explain later, threats are rarely conveniently confined in the discrete geographic space called Canada. Threats, much like air pollution or migrating species, rarely stay put for long and tend not to respect borders. They move; therefore, CSIS has to move.

The framers of the CSIS Act recognized this essential fact. The notion that CSIS must be able to operate overseas has always been recognized as necessary. Indeed, the McDonald Commission, which provided an exhaustive report in 1981 on what a Canadian security intelligence agency should look like, found that:

...we do not think that the agency should be required to confine its intelligence collecting or countering activities to Canadian soil. If security intelligence investigations which begin in Canada must cease at the Canadian border, information and sources of information important to Canadian security will be lost.

Similarly, then-Solicitor General Robert Kaplan, speaking in support of the passage of the CSIS Act, said in an appearance before a Commons committee in April 1984:

There is no statutory requirement that the entire activities of the Security Intelligence Service be performed in Canada. I think that would be unduly inhibiting....

The SIRC, whom you have just spoken to, has also recognized our mandate to collect intelligence. In its 2003-04 annual report, SIRC reported on a review of a CSIS investigation abroad and “determined that CSIS has a clear mandate to conduct...investigative activities outside Canada, and concluded that such operations will undoubtedly increase as the threat posed by international terrorism grows”.

The situation is similar for many of our international counterparts, who, like CSIS, recognize that the collection of security intelligence must be defined thematically by the threat and must be indifferent to the source or locations of those threats. Quite simply, the service's functions extend beyond Canada's shores because Canada has interests beyond those shores and threats can and do find us anywhere we are.

There are several key reasons why CSIS must focus a growing amount of its resources on foreign collection. First of all, as I alluded to earlier, threats move. The globalized world is interlinked and intertwined. International affairs is no longer the sole domain of states and of foreign affairs departments. An explosion of political, commercial and social ties has knit the globe together and made us more interdependent than ever before. And while that interdependence can be a great source of strength, it is also presents to us new challenges. Numerous global forces are pushing on our borders, softening them. If we are to protect our national security, we have to toughen them up and push them out.

This is not political science theory. It is a stark reality and can be illustrated by a few key examples.

The Internet has allowed terrorists to use social networking technology as a force multiplier, which permits them to gather in a virtual world to recruit, plan, and execute acts of terror. However, as the Internet spreads its tentacles into every society, computer, and home, the implications are enormous. Never before have so many ill-intentioned people had instant global access to every corner of the globe. It has become much easier for those abroad to plan and organize attacks on Canada or on its allies. But it's also easier for young Canadians, excited by a perverse call to action, to become radicalized and to develop into a security concern either in Canada or abroad. I don't, however, want to leave you with the impression that I'm against the Internet. It's only that we have to deal with the consequences of its use.

Of those security concerns, confronting the threat from al-Qaeda, its affiliates and its adherents, remains our number one priority. Naturally we are most concerned with those within Canada who ascribe to such movements and who advocate violence as a means to achieve their ends. In that regard, I can say that as of this month, CSIS is investigating over 200 individuals in this country whose activities meet the definition of terrorism as set out in the act.

In addition to the work that CSIS does to counter the threat that these individuals represent to Canada, CSIS also plays an important international role in protecting others from threats emanating from Canada. For example, the involvement of Canadian citizens with foreign terrorist organizations, many of them listed as such in the Criminal Code, is a relatively new phenomenon. Some Canadians even play senior roles in such organizations. I think Canada has an international obligation to work with partners to ensure that our citizens do not plan or execute terrorist acts abroad.

It may surprise some to hear that CSIS maintains an investigative interest in a disturbing number of Canadian citizens or permanent residents who have travelled abroad to engage in terrorist activities. The suspected whereabouts of these individuals span the breadth of the globe, involving countries primarily in the Middle East, parts of Africa, and South Asia, but also in Europe and the Americas.

It is also worth mentioning that the service maintains an active interest in the threat-related activities of a number of non-citizens who have ties to Canada, whether through former residence here or family links.

In a much more general sense, of course, the movement of people in and out of Canada is enormous. As the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism notes in his 2009 annual report, Canada has a proud history of openness to newcomers from around the world. Canada has the highest relative immigration rate of any major western country. In 2010, we expect to welcome about 250,000 permanent residents. This connection to the world is a Canada hallmark, a central facet of our identity.

Increasingly, however, Canadian citizens have strong links to homelands that are in distress, are failed states, or that harbour terrorist groups. Canada is therefore increasingly implicated in a more complex, turbulent world. If we are to protect our national security, we have to know that world, and we can't do that by simply reading scholarly articles. We have to collect intelligence outside of Canada to have a true grip on what is transpiring. Just as we have solid diplomatic, commercial and social relations, we need solid intelligence links.

The recent spate of terrorist kidnappings provides perhaps the most tangible example of why our work abroad is necessary. It is an unfortunate reality that many of these incidents have taken place in parts of the world where Canada has little diplomatic presence or even where diplomatic ties of any kind may be minimal.

Our lack of diplomatic engagement in some very turbulent countries should not, however, be allowed to hinder us when one of our citizens is in distress. We must find ways to engage with foreign entities in such situations. This is where CSIS can be and has been effective.

Over the past three years, an alarming number of Canadian citizens have been kidnapped by extremist elements in some of the most dangerous regions of the earth. In many of these cases, key intelligence services are given the lead for efforts to secure the release of foreign hostages. It is not unusual for them to insist that Canada's exclusive point of contact be CSIS.

Although our arrangements with certain foreign agencies have sometimes been criticized, this trust that our foreign counterparts place in the service has led directly to the safe and secure release of Canadian citizens held hostage abroad. In specific cases such as terrorist kidnappings, the Government of Canada, through CSIS, has little choice but to engage with foreign intelligence agencies, wherever they may be, if it is to protect Canadians. This is why CSIS must continue to cultivate and maintain such a large network of intelligence relationships, which currently involves over 275 agencies in approximately 150 countries around the world.

To shy away from such engagement, in my view, would be a form of unilateral disarmament in a dangerous world. It would render us extremely ineffective. It would be like sitting in a non-smoking section of a tiny restaurant, feeling proud about how we have advanced our health, as the blue haze drifts towards us. In a dangerous world, I argue that this approach is not a realistic option.

CSIS officers overseas collect information and manage and leverage relationships with foreign intelligence agencies to protect Canada, and others, against threats to their security. This is a vital part of an ongoing, international system of intelligence sharing. With major allies, this allows Canada—

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Can I interrupt for a minute? Do you think you could summarize the remainder of this in your own words? We have a copy of what you have to say, and people can read that. You're over time and--

[Richard Fadden]

Sure, I'll be happy to do that.

Mr. Chairman, our officers abroad are also charged with providing security screening advice to Citizenship and Immigration Canada regarding screening. Last year, we received 329,000 immigration-related security screening requests. The program focuses on visitors, and refugee claimants. It is important for Canada to be able to push out its borders.

Before concluding, I would like to say a few words about Afghanistan.

The news that CSIS is operating in Afghanistan has often been greeted with relative surprise and even in some quarters a bit of bewilderment. I don't quite understand this, because it seems logical that a government committing itself to a project as complex, dangerous, and ambitious as routing al-Qaeda and helping to stand up democratic institutions would wish to take full advantage of all of its available resources.

There seems to be a general sense among--

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

I think members are already reading the rest of your report, so--

[Richard Fadden]

Okay, that's fine.

Thank for that, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you very much. We appreciate that you've gone to all the work in preparing this, but we have a very short session here.

We'll go immediately to questions and comments.

Mr. Holland, please.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing today.

I'll go right to the question of Afghanistan.

Mr. Coulombe, you confirmed that it's possible that information received from Afghanistan secret police might have been extracted by the torture of Canadian transferred detainees.

Further, you say, and I quote:

When we receive information from any agency where there is a doubt with respect to human rights, what we need to understand is that it doesn't mean that all information received from that agency has been obtained by means of torture.

I want to know how you ascertain that line. How do you divide out what's obtained by torture and what isn't, specifically when there's a ministerial directive against sharing information obtained by torture?

[Michel Coulombe, Assistant Director, Foreign Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that, on certain occasions, it is impossible to know whether the information has been obtained by torture. On other occasions, however, it's obvious from the nature of the information. For example, we can know whether information has been obtained through technical intercepts or other investigation techniques, by shadowing, or whether it's information that was already in the files of the service in question. When there are any doubts, we can also try to find out a little more about the manner in which the information was obtained, by going back to the service and asking some questions. However, it may be impossible at times to determine with any certainty whether the information was obtained by torture.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

If it's impossible in many circumstances to draw that line--and let me specifically take the cases of Mr. Arar, Mr. Nureddin, Mr. Almalki, and Mr. El Maati.... These are Canadian citizens, where both Justice O'Connor, in one case, and Justice Iacobucci, in the other, said that Canada was complicit in their detention and torture specifically because they found we didn't watch those lines.

If you're telling me it's impossible to know in many cases whether or not we're sharing information with groups or with governments that exchange any information on torture, when it's impossible to know whether or not what you're getting is extracted from torture, when in the opinion of reports you've been told--or probably a Google search would tell you--there's a good chance torture is going on, to get that information, in your opinion, is it appropriate to be violating that ministerial directive? Or do you feel the ministerial directive, which has a sort of escape clause written by the minister saying “not knowingly relying upon information”...in your opinion does “not knowingly relying on information” include when it's impossible to know? Is it okay to use information obtained by torture in those circumstances?

[Michel Coulombe]

No. When there is a doubt, we don't rely on the information, as far as--

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Okay. You can understand my hesitation in believing that, when we have reports by justices who say that excuse has been used, and you just told me sometimes it's impossible to know and sometimes it is.

Let's take Afghanistan specifically. How can you know when that information is obtained by torture or not? How could you possibly know that? You're dealing with the secret police, an agency that is well known to be engaging regularly in torture, and you're saying there's information being exchanged. How could you possibly draw that line, particularly when we know that Justice O'Connor and Justice Iacobucci have said that line has been so improperly drawn in the past?

[Michel Coulombe]

Mr. Chairman, in the case of Afghanistan, there are allegations of torture, but these aren't just allegations. Earlier I explained how we try to confirm the origin of information or the manner in which it has been obtained. What I was explaining applied to Afghanistan. Sometimes it's obvious that it comes from other investigation techniques where we request more information, but it isn't always possible to confirm the origin of the information or the manner in which it was obtained.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Let me ask you a very direct question, then, with respect to the secret police in Afghanistan. Do you think it's appropriate to exchange information? Should CSIS be exchanging information with an agency like that, well known to be engaging in torture?

[Michel Coulombe]

Mr. Chairman, my answer is yes, given the parameters in place, ministerial directives, acts and internal service policies.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Okay. We're going to have to come back to that later. Obviously I think that's a clear violation of the ministerial directive when you are saying you know they engage in that. But we'll come back to that in a minute.

Mr. Coulombe, you said it here again today, that you feel CSIS has full legal authority to operate overseas. Can you touch on that in a little more detail and explain the specific nature of CSIS's work in dealing operationally with countries overseas?

[Michel Coulombe]

With regard to the legal mandate, section 12 of the act defines the service's mandate. There is no geographic restriction. The service gathers information when it has reasons to suspect that activities are related to a threat, in accordance with the definition contained in section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. However, that act imposes no geographic limit for the gathering of security intelligence. Our overseas activities consist, among other things, in the gathering of security intelligence, that is information on activities that pose a threat to the security of Canada.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Just a last question then, if i could. Justice Iacobucci's report concluded that Mr. Nureddin, Mr. Almalki, and Mr. El Maati were detained and tortured abroad and that Canada was complicit in their torture. The government has refused to issue an apology and refused to follow up. These men still have to live with the cloud of suspicion over their heads. CSIS and the RCMP have not apologized. I'd like to give you the opportunity today, if you so wish, to acknowledge that those individuals were mistreated and help clear their names.

[Michel Coulombe]

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to clarify a point. Commissioner Iacobucci clearly stated

that no actions of Canadian officials directly resulted in the mistreatment of any individual.

In addition, I think it would be inappropriate for me to comment on those three cases.