Public Safety Committee on Dec. 1st, 2011

[Don Head]

If we were too powerful, we could be shutting them down as well.

[Francis Scarpaleggia, Liberal, Lac-Saint-Louis, QC]

Yes, I see.

We visited a couple of penitentiaries, and I must say that after what I saw, with the sniffer dogs and the ionizers and the right that you have, if the visitor signs a waiver, to do a cavity search, I'm astounded that any drugs can get in, to be honest with you.

Then the point was made that they can be thrown over the fence. But you talked about how the personnel in all your institutions are now equipped with goggles and infrared cameras—or are the infrared cameras only in certain institutions?

[Don Head]

They're in just two right now.

[Francis Scarpaleggia, Liberal, Lac-Saint-Louis, QC]

But once they are implemented, that plus the fact that there are goggles for personnel to use would mean it is almost impossible for something to come in over the walls at that point, would it not?

[Don Head]

That's what we're hoping for. Again, as I mentioned, when we find one avenue and choke it off, there's always somebody who's a little smarter than me or my staff who finds a new way.

One of the challenges we had at one of the institutions when we put in some of these measures was that somebody got smart and decided they could stand out from the highway and use a bow, putting the drugs either in the shaft of the arrow or around it, and shoot it from a distance. So there are always different approaches. What it means, though, is that my staff, who are truly vigilant in their work, have to do a thorough search of the outside areas before we let the inmates out, to make sure that the drugs aren't there, and in the case of arrows, which can be used as weapons inside, that they aren't there as well.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

We'll move into the second round of questioning.

Mr. Chicoine, you have five minutes.

[Sylvain Chicoine, NDP, Châteauguay—Saint-Constant, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I also want to thank both witnesses who came to give us more information about the issue we are concerned about, that is drugs in prisons.

Since Mr. Head was able to answer many questions, I will ask Mr. McLauchlan to talk to us about the chart we received and to describe his role as a security intelligence officer. I would love to know more about that.

[Christer McLauchlan]

I don't have the IT schematic in front of me, but that was just one example of how a sophisticated network can do a drug transaction. One of the duties of the security intelligence officer is to deal with drug interdiction. Each item that I deal with can be unique. In some cases, it's as simple as an inmate knowing that he has violated his parole and putting a small amount of drugs into his rectum, so that when he's returned to the institution, he'll have something for his personal use.

Sometimes the things we're dealing with are as complex as the chart you have before you, which can involve a middleman. It can involve multiple people buying drugs, drugs coming from multiple sources going into different areas, being packaged by different individuals, and then distributed to other individuals to bring into the institution. Once they come into the institution, there's a distribution network within the institution. A drug transaction can sometimes be very simple and sometimes it can be very complex.

We use the tools and the training we've been provided to try to.... If we can get a line on one aspect—perhaps we intercept a communication with regard to one person—then we'll start an investigation, which can expand from there, and perhaps we'll be applying for authorization to intercept additional conversations. Perhaps we'll monitor some individuals by video. It could involve liaising with our partner agencies in the criminal justice system: for instance, involving the police forces with regard to things that are going on in the street.

What you're seeing before you is an example of a very complex transaction, and sometimes it's everything in between.

[Sylvain Chicoine, NDP, Châteauguay—Saint-Constant, QC]

I understand. It is indeed very complex.

The commissioner told us about all the new tools you have to prevent the introduction of drugs in prisons. There are several tools. Can you tell us how effective they are?

In the past five to ten years, the equipment you have at your disposal has substantially increased. We heard about the BOSS chairs. I did not know about this new drug detection tool.

We also learned that there are a lot of drugs in prison. Can you talk to me about the effectiveness of all these tools? You have been using dogs for some time, as well as radar/infrared systems and, as Mr. Head mentioned, night vision goggles and the BOSS chair.

How is it that there are still a lot of drugs in prison? You seem to have many interdiction tools to stop drugs from entering prisons. However, they still get in. Can you tell us more about that?

Why are there so many drugs in prison when you have all of these tools at your disposal?

[Christer McLauchlan]

First, it's speaking from Stony Mountain Institution's perspective. The tools we have, including our drug-detector dogs, the increase in our security intelligence staff, and things of that nature, have resulted in an increase in the number of interceptions we're making.

As an example, this year the drugs we've intercepted have an institutional value of around $201,000, compared to their value in the same amount of time in our last fiscal year, which was approximately $104,000. So simply put, we are intercepting more drugs using these tools.

But we're talking about extremely motivated individuals. We're also talking about the fact that you have to consider that every penitentiary is a small community in itself. Hundreds of people come in and out of the institution every day. Packages and delivery trucks are coming in. There are challenges with regard to the throw-over situation. The tools we have are great.

As an example, at Stony Mountain Institution last night, our officers detected a vehicle entering the grounds. When that vehicle was confronted by our motor patrol, it fled, nearly running over some of our officers. It was obvious to us that this person was up to no good. Without setting up a roadblock at the bottom of the hill restricting all traffic—that's the type of challenge we're facing on a daily basis.

It comes down to motivation. They're extremely motivated to get their drugs into the institution. There are multiple ways to do it. So our job is to try to stay one step ahead of them, using the technology and training we have.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

I'm going to jump in here. I know someone else may have a question, but I would like those questions that I posed a little earlier answered.

Commissioner Head or Mr. McLauchlan can answer. Are the 250 that you're hiring existing correctional officers with extra training? Are we working towards a model in which there are one or two or three in each institution? How does it work?

[Don Head]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Those are new staff that we're hiring through our staffing processes. They may come from existing staff or they may come from individuals outside.

In terms of the security intelligence area, we're hiring additional security intelligence officers and additional security intelligence analysts. This is one area in which we were weak in the past. We have a lot of information. Previously there was only one security intelligence officer—someone like Mr. McLauchlan—per institution. With 400 or 500 inmates in an institution, you can imagine the volume of information that flows. That's a lot of information for one person to collect, to analyze, to share findings with, and then to disseminate back out.

So we are increasing the number of security intelligence officers in institutions. We're moving to two, and in some cases, at some of our larger institutions, we'll have three security intelligence officers.

Our security intelligence analysts at the regional and national headquarters will be helping the officers analyze that information so it can be readily returned to front-line staff who have a need to know, so they can do the work they need to do and keep an eye on those inmates who need to be watched.

We are expanding the training for security intelligence officers. There is some standard training, that, again, Mr. Chair, with your permission, I'll let Mr. McLauchlan describe. We're also reaching out to groups such as the RCMP, as well as other agencies that have much more experience in analyzing intelligence information, to help equip the new staff we're hiring.

At the end of the day, when we're finished the hiring, particularly in the security intelligence area, we'll have two to three security intelligence officers per institution; we'll have security intelligence analysts at the regional and the national level; and we'll have greater connection with other law enforcement partners, such as Mr. McLauchlan talked about—not only the police forces in jurisdictions where our institutions are located, but also others such as CSIS and groups like that, with which we have some common interests in relation to individuals who are involved in very serious situations.

Through you, Mr. Chair, I'd invite Mr. McLauchlan to talk about some of the increases and the training he's seeing and experiencing.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. McLauchlan.

[Christer McLauchlan]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

From a personal perspective, as security intelligence officers we had a training program in place that was really an amalgamation of other agencies' training philosophies. One of the things I'm very excited about in the security intelligence department is that we have a brand-new training program for all of our security intelligence officers that was actually developed and is being facilitated by experienced security intelligence officers in the Correctional Service of Canada. This training is much more practical for what we're actually doing, for what our actual jobs within the institution are, than some of the theoretical training we were getting in the past.

In addition, it's been recognized that the training we receive and that's available within the Correctional Service of Canada may not be sufficient in and of itself. One of the measures taken was to give the security intelligence officers a training allotment. It is basically a budget we can utilize to seek training from other agencies. As a result of that, I've been able to access training with CSIS, with the RCMP, and with other outside agencies, which has helped to expand my personal repertoire and expertise. I'm very excited about that as well. The training is there.

With regard to staffing, on a personal note, and to bring some of this into perspective, I'd like to speak specifically about Stony Mountain Institution. When I started as a security intelligence officer a couple of years ago, we had two SIOs—security intelligence officers. That was our full complement for 575-plus inmates with a high gang and drugs percentage. We currently have three security intelligence officers in the office, and we occasionally use a fourth. In addition to that, we've received an administrative assistant, which has greatly reduced our workload when it comes to things like filing and data.

In addition, we have security intelligence analysts at our regional headquarters. They are helping us take some of the volume of information we're developing, the forms we're producing, and the intelligence we're producing, and look at it from a top-down perspective. They are also able to correlate it with what's happening at other sites, which really wasn't happening in the past. I was dealing with Stony Mountain Institution as an island. What they're able to do is connect things happening here with things happening at other institutions. It's definitely made things easier for me as a security intelligence officer at Stony Mountain Institution.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

We have also heard from Darcy Thompson in Drumheller. He has given us testimony as to how they have incorporated it into their local penitentiary in Drumheller.

We'll go to Ms. Hoeppner, very quickly, and then to Mr. Aspin.

[Candice Bergen, Conservative, Portage—Lisgar, MB]

Thank you very much.

I had a very quick question I wanted to ask Mr. McLauchlan to follow up on his description of when a vehicle was on Stony Mountain's property and it turned around and left. I assume that you couldn't pursue them and they were able to get away. There was probably a strong suspicion that they were involved in something potentially illegal.

I'm wondering if there's anything you can tell us we could be doing and changing to help you. What would you need so that you would be able to actually pursue this vehicle, or I guess send a message? What we want to do is send a message that you can't try to smuggle drugs or commit crimes in penitentiaries or outside penitentiaries. Is there anything we could do to help you do that job better?

[Christer McLauchlan]

Thank you.

One of the things the members may not be aware of is that correctional officers are not peace officers when they're off the penitentiary reserve and do not have immediate custody of an inmate. What that means is that, literally, the officer who was pursuing the vehicle did the right thing, which was to stop at our penitentiary reserve. Once they were gone, he could not pursue them. He would not be a law enforcement officer once he left the penitentiary reserve. That's one aspect.

Second, I've studied the Bill C-10 proposals. One of the provisions in that bill that's very positive, from my standpoint, is the fact that it would actually make it a separate offence to traffic drugs within a penitentiary. Again, some of the members may not be aware of the fact that it is not illegal to bring drugs into Stony Mountain Institution. It's illegal to have possession of drugs. The fact is that when we're taking these cases to court, typically the court is looking at amounts that are typically smaller than what they're dealing with on the streets. If I have an individual trying to smuggle 10 grams of cocaine into the institution, it is looked at as a street charge of simple possession, because 10 grams is not a substantial amount as far as the court is concerned. One of our challenges is to try to provide expert witness testimony to try to explain how 10 grams coming into the institution is more significant.

[Candice Bergen, Conservative, Portage—Lisgar, MB]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Ms. Hoeppner.

Mr. Aspin.

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

Thank you, Chair. I'm pleased that you mentioned this institutional drug subcultural model because it's prompted a few questions in my mind.

I would like to direct this question to Mr. Head. I am looking at this chart. I was always under the mis-impression before I joined Parliament and joined this committee that a lot of privileges were taken away when one encountered such institutions.

I see the same things such as joint bank accounts and telephones and whatnot. I'm still having a hard time with how these connections are made and why they're allowed to be made. I'm having a difficult time, Mr. Head, in appreciating how money is flowed from an inmate to, say, a joint bank account. I'm particularly having a difficult time with telephones.

Just this week I had one particular individual call one of my staff, who talked to him for half an hour in terms of advocating for some type of task force or some type of committee. Can you help me with that? Why are these privileges allowed to continue, and how are they allowed to continue?

[Don Head]

I'll speak specifically to the issue of telephones. Telephones are in all our institutions. Inmates can access them to keep in contact with their family, with their lawyer, with the Office of the Correctional Investigator. Inmates get a card with approved phone numbers on it. And we have the ability to monitor and record those phone calls. Under certain conditions we can listen into them and do whatever necessary follow-up if we have a certain suspicion.

Usually what happens is that it's not as direct as phoning up and saying, “Mr. Norlock, I want you to bring drugs in.” Mr. Norlock would never do that, of course. But it's not as direct as that. What would happen is—and Mr. McLauchlan has probably as many, if not more, stories than I do. A phone call will be made to somebody. Some code or discussion will lead them, then, to have another phone call outside, and they make the contacts, put the pressure on people, and things start to go there.

This chart that you have in front of you, as Mr. McLauchlan pointed out, is a more complex one than most cases, but there are others that are even more complex in terms of how that reaching out occurs. It will go through several people, as opposed to just the direct contact, say, between me and Mr. Norlock.

It's something that we try to stay on. As I say, our biggest problem is not so much the use of the phones that inmates have access to through their control card. It's when they smuggle in the cellphones and then we're not able to record or pick those up. Then there's more direct contact and more specific direction given as to who to contact, what's needed, what's to be brought in.

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

I was just wondering, though, in terms of today's technology.... You're spending a lot of money in terms of intervention-type equipment. You used the term “cell jamming technologies” here. Is there not a way to eliminate that kind of activity?

[Don Head]

There is. As I mentioned before to the question of the other committee member, it's looking at how we are able to first work within the existing legislation and regulations that govern things such as cell jamming. Where we've identified the shortfalls, now we're looking at whether we need to bring proposals forward to the minister for some other opportunities.

We know there's equipment out there. We know its limitations, we know its capabilities, and it's finding the right balance. For example, if I were to put in a full-blown device, similar to what I saw being used by the military when I was in Afghanistan, not only would I blanket the institution, but I would blanket the surrounding community that abuts against it. I think I'd have many neighbours or many constituents of the minister screaming at me because they can't use their cellphones.

It's just trying to find the right equipment and using either existing legislation or looking at whether we need to bring proposals forward to the minister.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

I see that our time is up; however, I have one little question on this chart. You've referenced both medium security institutions and minimum security institutions. Is that just the fact that you just kind of put them out there...? Is there as big a problem in maximum security institutions with drugs?

[Don Head]

No, the maximums, because the flow of people in there is more restricted than in medium, and definitely more restricted than in minimum.... Each of those institutions has different challenges. For maximums, we pretty well know the sources and we're able to contain that a little better. Mediums are a little more problematic. Minimums are a different situation altogether, yes.