Thank you very much.
Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, my name is Peter Neumann. I'm director at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and I'm also a professor at King's College London.
I apologize for the fact that I cannot be with you in Ottawa today. I so appreciate the opportunity to talk to you from afar about terrorism and the distress that it poses.
My centre has been interested in the conflict in Syria and in ISIS and foreign fighters for over two years. We are immensely grateful to Canada, and in particular to Public Safety Canada, because two years ago, we received a Kanishka grant to do this work at a time when a lot of other governments weren't particularly interested in this topic.
As a result of our research, we know many of the people who have radicalized and joined the Islamic State. We found over 700 of them on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Tumblr, social media platforms where they are posting news and updates, comments, and pictures. We've spoken to nearly 100 of them, some over the course of several months. We've met face to face with many facilitators, transporters, sheiks, and the fighters themselves on the ground in the border towns from where they've gone into Syria.
In other words, we have a very rounded and very comprehensive picture of this population and the threat they pose.
One thing we've never been is alarmist. If you cry wolf all the time, people will not take you seriously when you should be. Keep that in mind when I'm saying to you now that I believe we are at a particularly dangerous juncture.
Only four years ago, we thought this conflict with jihadism was coming to an end. The Arab Spring was bringing peace and democracy. Osama bin Laden was dead. Almost the entire senior leadership of al Qaeda was dead. Almost exactly 10 years after 9/11, a lot of people were ready to turn the page.
Today, we know that wasn't true. It was a false dawn. The threat today is worse than it's ever been. It comes not from one but from three directions, and I would like to briefly talk about each of those three in turn.
The first, of course, is the foreign fighters. Only a few weeks ago, my centre published a new estimate showing that the total number of people who have gone to Syria and Iraq as jihadists in the past three and a half years now stands at more than 20,000. They are from 90 countries, the majority Middle Eastern, but a good quarter from western Europe, and some from Australia, the United States, and of course also Canada.
We know these people. We know their stories. We know there isn't just one story. There are many stories. Some of them are pious. Others are not. Many have troubled histories. Others would have had good prospects had they stayed in their western home countries. Some were driven by the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people. Others were seeking thrill and adventure. Also, of course, many were genuinely committed to the totalitarian ideology that is represented by the group that calls itself the Islamic State.
Because their personalities, backgrounds, motivations, and indeed experiences in Syria and Iraq are so different, the people who survive and may at some point come back to Canada as well as to my country will pose very different types of challenges. Some of them will be disillusioned and can be reintegrated back into society. Others will be mentally disturbed and will need psychological support. But make no mistake: there will also be a number who are outright dangerous, people who come back with military training and are experienced, with global connections, and who are often brutalized, emotionally desensitized, and driven by and fully committed to their mission. They will plot against Canada and they will plot against my country, and they will also seek to inspire others. They will be the future leaders of their movement.
A lot of attention has focused on the foreign fighters, but the imminent threat comes not from them but from ISIS supporters. That's the second prong. If you look at all the attacks that have happened since September last year—Ottawa, Sydney, the attack on the kosher supermarket in Paris, and Copenhagen—you see that they were all jihadists and they were all enthusiastic supporters of ISIS, but none of them had actually travelled to Syria or Iraq. It's something that we've observed everywhere.
The foreign fighters are, in nearly all cases, part of tightly knit groups that often knew each other from before the conflict and radicalized collectively. While some have made their way to Syria, others have stayed back at home in the west.
Until September last year, those who were staying home had two options, either to go to Syria themselves or to stay at home and support the fighters with money and supplies. Since September last year, they've had a third option, which is to launch lone wolf attacks in the west, because in September last year ISIS spokesperson Abu Mohammad al Adnani made an important announcement in which he said:
If you can kill a disbelieving American or European...kill him in any manner or way, however it may be. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him.
That's exactly, of course, what we have seen, including the attack in Ottawa. I'm concerned that especially in the short term, there will be more attacks, not necessarily by foreign fighters but by stay-home supporters.
The third and final element of the threat is the emerging competition between ISIS and al Qaeda. Al Qaeda still exists, though of course it's lost a lot of its momentum, but some of the al Qaeda affiliated groups are still among the strongest, most professional, and most proactive terrorist groups in the world. They now have an extra incentive to attack, which is to show the world that they still exist. There's an open competition now between al Qaeda and ISIS for recruits, influence, and territory. One of the most compelling ways in which al Qaeda can show that they are still there and still matter is to carry out spectacular attacks in western countries. Groups like al Qaeda in Yemen and AQAP do have the capacity, the people, and the expertise. They are determined to make a stand.
Over the past year or so, I have spoken to many law enforcement and intelligence agencies across Europe. Every single one of them has told me that they are at full capacity, and some of them are beyond full capacity, that the number of cases they are dealing with is unprecedented, and that they feel the choices they have to make in terms of who is dangerous and who is not dangerous, who to monitor and who not to monitor, and who to spend precious resources on are getting tougher and tougher.
In the long term this situation can only be dealt with by responsibly increasing the size of the security agencies, but you cannot hire 5,000 people overnight. I think it's absolutely justified, given the nature of the threat, to increase the capacity in the short term by giving agencies specified additional powers with adequate oversight so they can make better choices, reach their conclusions faster, and carry out arrests, where necessary, without delay.
I'm not Canadian. I have no intention to interfere with your domestic political process, and I'm not an expert on Canadian counterterrorism law, either. These are not issues that would be appropriate for me to speak on. What I can speak on is the nature of the threat, and based on that, let me say that I do have sympathy for the request by your government and by the professionals in your security agencies for specific additional powers.
Thank you very much.