Evidence of meeting #72 for Public Safety and National Security in the 41st Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was association.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Conservative
Conservative
Roxanne James Conservative Scarborough Centre, ON
Thank you.
Thank you, Ms. Ablonczy.
Mr. Quiggin, you talked to some extent in your opening remarks about the brutalization of women and girls. We recently had legislation with regard to zero tolerance for barbaric cultural practices. It's something I took directly to my constituents with regard to early and forced marriages.
I'm just tying it together, because I want to stress for the record that I think the vast majority of Canadians agree that this type of situation for women and girls is a serious concern, that it is an issue. I think when people are presented with those facts they agree with the direction our government is taking.
We heard a talk about the revocation and taking away of passports and so forth to stop individuals from travelling overseas. A while ago we may have assumed it was only the young men or radicalized males who were being pulled into this recruitment effort by radicals. That's not the case; we're seeing more and more young women also being drawn in and also attempting or succeeding at travelling overseas. Could you tell me what the outcome for these young women would be if they succeed and get over there?
As an Individual
The short answer is that for most of the women in ISIS, the evidence to date appears to show that they wind up in brutalized, distressing relationships where most of the time they want to get back out of the country when they realize how bad it is.
For a minority, however, including the two young women who I believe are from Manchester in the U.K., they actually rise to senior positions as recruiters where they are capable of recruiting other women from other countries around the world.
So the short answer is that most women who go there wind up brutalized and in horrible conditions and look to get out, but a small proportion of them go on to be leadership figures in the community where they can exercise that influence around the world.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Daryl Kramp
Thank you very much. Time is up.
We will now go to Mr. Easter.
You have the floor, sir.
Liberal
Wayne Easter Liberal Malpeque, PE
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witnesses.
To both of you, can you speak of the experience in other countries with the removal of passports. How successful has it been? Have the appeal processes worked? And based on that experience is there...?
I think one of the concerns here is whether or not there maybe needs to be a special advocate regarding security agencies and police forces when those are looking for judicial authority to remove someone's passport. I'm concerned that there isn't the balance of fairness under the law. Would it make sense to have a special advocate, or would it not?
From that perspective, could either or both of you speak to whether you have any knowledge of the experiences in other countries and whether it's worked well, if there need to be changes, and whether we should be learning from their experiences.
As an Individual
Mr. Chairman, honourable members, I worked for a year and a half in Singapore. One of my colleagues there, Haniff Hassan, is regarded as one of the world's experts on deradicalization.
In the case of Singapore I think that passport revocation to them is a cut and dried issue, and they do it very quickly and very clearly. But I think it's worth pointing out that in Singapore it's done in the context of a much larger program. It's seen as one tool in the tool kit.
Singapore has a very effective deradicalization program, but as Dr. Leuprecht pointed out, it's successful because it's very narrow, very focused, and is very knowledgeable on life as it exists in Singapore. It's not just about moving the person away from the radicalized thinking, but also at looking at their families, their future, and how to integrate them back into the larger society.
So my short answer would be that passport revocation is good and a necessary tool, but I think it should exist as part of a larger larger effort, or tool kit as Dr. Leuprecht describes it.
Liberal
Wayne Easter Liberal Malpeque, PE
Dr. Leuprecht, do you have anything to add?
Then moving to your larger tool kit, I think, Dr. Leuprecht, in your remarks—and maybe you didn't intend it this way—but I wondered whether you had confidence in deradicalization programs.
I ask because I think Mr. Quiggin is right. I think this is one measure that's needed among many. Young people of 18 are wanting to leave—some of them are wanting to leave for just pure adventure I expect—and they are having their passports revoked. But I hope that there are ways and means for them to get their passport back, as things change over time and your life experiences change.
Should deradicalization programs or other programs be necessary to accommodate that? You spoke about that a little earlier.
Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Faculty of Arts, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
The model that is being attempted in both Toronto and Calgary is an adaptation of the hub model that was originally developed in Glasgow on the criminalization side to keep youth out of the criminal justice system. Dale McFee brought it to Prince Albert. There is a variant of it in 14 communities throughout Ontario.
That model was intended to keep people out of the criminal justice system. It's not a deradicalization tool. The essence of it is recognition that there are multiple agencies that we need around the table: social agencies, education, public health, mental health, guidance counsellors, employment counsellors, and whatnot. We need an effective strategy, but one that is tailored to each specific case.
I'm a bit concerned about the broad remit that somehow we can have a one-size-fits-all deradicalization program, as opposed to the interventions that we know work in keeping people out of the criminal justice system, namely targeted intervention among multiple agencies that is designed for each specific case with sensitivity to that specific case.
What I want to stress is that from the most recent data we have, for instance, from the Saskatchewan hub, 52% of cases are brought by police, but police only end up being the lead agency in 12% of these cases. There's a recognition that by and large law enforcement and security intelligence need to be supporting agencies in getting people to desist from activity that might cause them to fall into the criminal justice system, but they're not, in most cases, ideal as the lead agency.
Instead of macro level deradicalization programs, I would favour a more nuanced type capability. We do have two pilot projects at least in Canada.
Liberal
Wayne Easter Liberal Malpeque, PE
A number of us on the committee are familiar with the hub model, and I think we recommended that it be expanded in our economics of policing report. I appreciate your comments.
I have a last question, Mr. Chair, and then you can move on.
I asked earlier whether there is a need for a special advocate at the front end to obtain authority to take someone's passport. Do either of you have a view on that? Yes or no?
As an Individual
I'm not quite sure how you're using the term “special advocate”, sir. Do you mean special advocate in the national security certificate sense, where we have a lawyer who's a special advocate, or do you mean a particular post?
Liberal
Wayne Easter Liberal Malpeque, PE
It would be an individual with experience in the area, who would try to bring balance. When security officials are before a judge saying that they have evidence to believe such and such, and it is classified information to a certain extent, there's no one to advocate on the other side. Should there be?
As an Individual
I don't believe we require a special position or a particular appointment of a special advocate who would do nothing but that. Having been closely involved in and having testifed at criminal cases, and having been closely involved in national security certificate cases in the Federal Court, I have had close personal contact with the special advocate system where lawyers and judges are granted special status and given special security clearance to work on this. I believe giving defence lawyers special advocate status is a hugely powerful tool. It's useful. I believe that judges, when they're given that status, are an immense contribution to the process.
If there is a situation where a passport has been revoked—
Conservative
LaVar Payne Conservative Medicine Hat, AB
Thank you, Chair.
Mr. Quiggin had previously offered to send us documents to the chair to distribute to the committee regarding CAIR-CAN. I would request that happen. Thank you.
Conservative
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Daryl Kramp
Thank you very much.
I'm sorry, but our time has expired for our first hour. At this particular point we thank our witnesses for coming here today.
We will now suspend for a minute while we change witnesses.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Daryl Kramp
Colleagues, we will begin our second hour of witness statements and questioning. It will be devoted to division 10, dealing with Hill security.
We have special guests with us here. From the House of Commons Security Services Employees Association we have Mr. Roch Lapensée, president. Welcome, sir.
From the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, we have Mr. Michael Ferguson, the Auditor General of Canada, and the principal assistant, Gordon Stock. Welcome to the committee, gentlemen.
We'll have up to 10 minutes of opening statements, should you wish. Following that we will have a round of Q and A. We certainly thank you for attending today to enlighten the committee with either your thoughts, expertise, or certainly your patience in dealing with some of the questions from our committee members.
Mr. Lapensée, you have the floor, sir.
Roch Lapensée President, House of Commons Security Services Employees Association
Thank you.
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, please allow me to thank you, on behalf of the House of Commons Protective Services Employees Association, for this opportunity to speak before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.
The House of Commons Protective Services Employee Association has been certified since 1987 to represent some 225 members of the Protective Service of the House of Commons. The members of the association comprise approximately 190 constables, 15 corporals and 15 sergeants, who all report to the director of the service.
The present brief pertains solely to division 10 of Bill C-59, which amends the Parliament of Canada Act by adding sections 79.51 to 79.59, as well as certain transitional provisions.
Considering the profound changes proposed by this bill regarding security in the parliamentary precinct, the association considers that it is important to appear before this committee to submit its observations in relation to the contemplated changes.
Before delving into the heart of Bill C-59, the association wishes to emphasize its great pride in the professionalism and exemplarity of its members, especially regarding their behaviour during the events of October 22, 2014.
Nobody knows the precinct and members of Parliament better than the employees of the House's Protective Service, which plays a key role in the functioning of our democratic system. Our work requires a significant skill set to combine the necessary security requirements with the public nature of the parliamentary precinct, and this work deserves to be recognized and underscored before this honourable committee.
Turning to the substance of Bill C-59, it should be noted at the outset that the bill provides a definition of the term “parliamentary precinct” in section 79.51. This is a novelty to our knowledge, and one that should be commended. For several years, the work of members of the House's Protective Service has expanded far beyond the walls of what was once called “the Hill”.
The association is satisfied that this new definition recognizes that parliamentary privilege follows the parliamentary function, thus recognizing a functional rather than geographical vision of the concept of parliamentary privilege.
Putting into practice the authority vested in the Sergeant-at-Arms and the Speaker of the House with respect to protection matters, the employees of the House's Protective Service exert all their functions within the confines of parliamentary privilege, being its custodian and therefore an essential part of the legislative function of the House of Commons of Canada.
It is this legislative function that is at the heart of our work, which is why the protection of parliamentary privilege was significantly underscored in the press release issued by the association on February 4, 2015, when the elements now contained in Bill C-59 were announced for the first time by government. The concerns that were voiced in this press release are entirely transposable to Bill C-59, and can be grouped into two broad categories: operational concerns, and labour relations concerns.
The association does not dispute the findings made by the Auditor General of Canada in June 2012 recommending greater coordination between the various entities engaged in the protection of the parliamentary precinct. It is clear that greater coordination in terms of protection and security would have been desirable on October 22, 2014, and still is. This is a conclusion that was also reached by the Ottawa police in a recent press conference.
Also in June 2012, the Auditor General recommended that the House of Commons should contemplate the feasibility of a unified security force for the entire parliamentary precinct. Again, the association is not opposed to this recommendation and welcomes the creation of the Parliamentary Protective Service proposed by section 79.52 of the bill. There are, however, two caveats that the association wishes to underscore.
Firstly, better operational coordination between the various entities does not necessarily require an operational merger of the two protective services, namely, of the House of Commons and Senate. The association considers it unlikely that constables, corporals and sergeants of the House will be used interchangeably in the Senate and vice versa. Our work requires a deep and detailed knowledge of places and people to adequately fulfill our duties, and this knowledge comes with experience that is gained by devoting one's lasting attention to either the House of Commons or the Senate.
The association also considers that it would be impractical and undesirable from a security standpoint to reorganize the protective staff of both houses in order to require that every employee can interchangeably perform the duties in the House of Commons or in the Senate without having long-term assignments in one of the houses.
It would be much more desirable to maintain the current working structures to continue to increase team effectiveness and responsiveness. Thus, the association believes that an operational merger of the two protective services, in the House of Commons and Senate, would not increase the coordination, but on the contrary would reduce its effectiveness by diluting the specificity of its action.
Secondly, the association noted that the bill requires that PPS's new director be an active member of the RCMP, who will serve under the dual authority of the Speakers of the House of Commons and of the Senate. We also note that, although section 79.53 entrusts the PPS with “matters with respect to physical security throughout the parliamentary precinct and Parliament Hill”, section 79.55 of the bill confers exactly the same functions upon the RCMP, referring to an “arrangement” and providing that the RCMP shall “itself” provide physical security services in accordance with this arrangement.
Operational inferences stemming from this situation assume two alternative hypotheses: either the director of the PPS will concretely report to the Speaker of the House of Commons, to the Speaker of the Senate and to someone within the RCMP, or that person will actually be exclusively under the authority of the RCMP. In the first hypothesis, the association is unclear as to how a PPS director receiving directives from three different heads would be likely to improve security in the parliamentary precinct, or coordination between different protective services involved in such protection.
The mandatory institutional links between the new PPS director and the RCMP also appears problematic, especially in the very likely event that this person is confronted with conflicting or incompatible instructions. The triple-allegiance of that person — in other words, to the House of Commons, Senate and RCMP — would inevitably create a conflict, since the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and oaths made under this legislation would compel the new PPS director to disobey the House or Senate Speakers, and obey only the Commissioner of the RCMP. How could one conclude that parliamentary privilege, ensuring the independence of the legislative function, would be preserved in such a situation? Not to mention the operational nightmare that such a situation could present in an emergency situation similar or worse than the events of October 22, 2014.
The association views the second hypothesis, that is an exclusive operational control by the RCMP, as being equally or even more problematic. The association refers to its press release of February 4, 2015, setting out its position on the possible control by the RCMP of protection within the parliamentary precinct. Our concerns about upholding parliamentary privilege remain intact, and the association does not believe that it is in the interest of our democracy to give control of security within the legislative power to the executive power, this said with the utmost respect for the quality of work of the RCMP in its primary position, which is not the protection of the parliamentary precinct.
Returning to the “arrangement” under section 79.55 of Bill C-59, the association wonders about the practical significance of this provision. Are there plans to replace, double or add to existing positions in the House's Protective Service? If so, in what areas? No response could be provided as to the practical intentions of government regarding this provision.
Still with respect to this “arrangement”, nothing in the bill seems to prevent that the Speakers of the House of Commons and of the Senate may not have a decision-making role in the choice of the future director of PPS. It is entirely possible that this “arrangement” provides that the decision-making level in the selection process lies somewhere in the RCMP, somewhere in the Privy Council Office, or within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, which would appear to the association to be yet another dent into parliamentary privilege and into our democratic system.
In sum, it is the very idea of RCMP control on protection operations within the parliamentary precinct that the association questions. This is not a matter of turf or jurisdiction, but a strong plea for the need to combine operational effectiveness and the respect for the sacred principles on which our Constitution has been founded.
Concluding on this aspect, the association would like to recall that no report, no study and no informed public commentator has questioned the work of the House's Protective Service, including in relation to the events of October 22, 2014.
It is, in this context, entirely legitimate to question the merits of the probable takeover of the PPS's control by the RCMP, or at least the very real possibility thereof envisaged by Bill C-59. Why change a recipe that works and works well? Are such changes not rather conducive to weakening our security safeguards? The association believes that the answer is in the question.
The association is satisfied by the presence of certain transitional provisions in Bill C-59 which, at first sight, seem to guarantee employment for the 225 employees of the House's Protective Services. This is especially so with respect to section 100 of the bill, which seems to protect the position of those currently employed by the House and of the Senate.
However, the association is concerned that the bill does not uphold the commitment made by the Speaker of the House in his motion of February 25, 2015, guaranteeing the employment of all employees of the House's Protective Services.
Indeed, Bill C-59 does not reflect this clear commitment and does not preclude a reorganization of work that could result in cuts or abolition of positions or modifications in terms of the workforce. Contrary to providing such job security, Bill C-59 introduces a significant amount of doubt and insecurity by requiring, as noted above, that both the PPS and the RCMP will be responsible for providing physical security throughout the Parliamentary Precinct, but without specifying who will do what, and by giving an unfair advantage to the RCMP in this regard by requiring that the director of PPS be an active member of the RCMP. This is a significant concern for the association, which would wish that the commitment made on February 25, 2015, jointly by the Speaker of the House and by the late Speaker of the Senate, Mr. Nolin, be clearly spelled out in Bill C-59.
To the extent permitted by the necessary discretion inherent to security operations, the association is available to answer questions that this honourable committee may have regarding division 10 of Bill C-59.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Daryl Kramp
Thank you very much, Mr. Lapensée.
Now we will go to opening statements.
Mr. Ferguson, sir.
Michael Ferguson Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada
Thank you.
Mr. Chair, thank you for this opportunity to discuss part 3, division 10, of Bill C-59 pertaining to the Parliamentary Protective Service.
I am accompanied today by Gordon Stock, principal in the office.
In June 2012, we issued our audit to the administration of the House of Commons of Canada and the administration of the Senate of Canada. In these audits, we looked at the services each administration provided in areas such as financial management, human resources, information technology systems, and, of particular interest today, security.
Mr. Chair, I will summarize for the committee our relevant audit findings related to security; however, it is important to note that most of our audit work was completed in February 2012, so we cannot comment on actions taken since then.
First, we examined whether each administration had in place appropriate policies and controls designed to ensure a safe and secure environment for parliamentarians, staff and visitors. We also examined whether each administration had identified key risks and had implemented suitable mitigation strategies.
Overall we found that the House of Commons Security Services responded to security risks by implementing standard operating procedures and providing appropriate training to the responsible personnel, and that the administration of the Senate had mitigating controls for key security risks, such as having a memoranda of agreement with the House of Commons and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide armed assistance if needed.
However, to ensure clearly assigned responsibilities and accountabilities within each administration, we recommended that each administration develop an overall security policy along with appropriate objectives and performance measures. The House of Commons administration anticipated having its policy in place by 2015.
Second, we examined the procedures in place for communications and coordination among the three security partners—the House of Commons Security Services, the Senate Protective Service and the RCMP—given that responsibility for the security of the parliamentary precinct is under their shared jurisdiction.
Before our audit, the three security partners had worked together and developed a master security plan. After the plan was introduced, coordination and communications improved. However, at the time of our audits, gaps still existed, highlighting ongoing jurisdictional issues. For instance, at that time, no security force had accepted primary responsibility for the roofs of the buildings in the precinct.
In 2010 each administration had examined options for a unified security force for the parliamentary precinct. Each agreed on proposed changes to resolve the jurisdictional issues. The proposed changes involved integrating the three partner security services for the entire parliamentary precinct. To that effect, we recommended that the House of Commons administration and the Senate administration work toward a unified security force for the Parliamentary precinct. In our view, a single point of command and control accountable to both the House and the Senate would allow a more effective and efficient response. The portion of the bill before you today is a way of addressing the substance of our recommendation, and I hope that our audit findings will be of assistance to the committee in its current review.
Mr. Chair, this concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer any questions the committee members may have.
