Evidence of meeting #162 for Public Safety and National Security in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was report.
A video is available from Parliament.
Executive Director, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
It's the intelligence priorities.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
I'm sorry. The intelligence priorities will be part of the foundational examination in the commission of inquiry on the Christchurch shooting. We're reaching out as best we can, but the feedback so far is very positive.
Conservative
Jim Eglinski Conservative Yellowhead, AB
I have a quick last question.
We gave you a mandate when the group was started, and there was lots of controversy over it initially. Have we given you enough tools? I believe there was supposed to be a five-year review. Do you find, even in your first year, that we may need to look at that more quickly? Are you going to need better tools to assist your organization?
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
We might, but right now we're only two years or so into the five-year mandate, and I think it's going to be interrupted a bit with an election campaign in the fall—
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
I think the committee would say that five years is an appropriate moment, but we're certainly carrying forward some of these areas, and as we practise and get more experience, I think we'll have more to say and perhaps more suggestions for improvement.
Liberal
Liberal
David Graham Liberal Laurentides—Labelle, QC
Thank you.
On page 66 of the report, paragraph 170 describes defence intelligence. There is a description of the different types of intelligence. Signals intelligence is, of course, the one that gets the most interest. It's the one that all the Edward Snowden stories were about at the core. By the very nature of SIGINT, it captures everything; it's really hard not to.
In your view, and this comes down to the core reason the committee was created for political reasons, does Canada's intelligence apparatus, and our Five Eyes partners especially, take adequate safeguards to prevent unjustified or illegal collection of data by, about or between Canadians?
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
That's an excellent and really difficult question. I'm going to deflect it to a certain extent by letting you know that again this year, 2019, one of the major reviews we're undertaking is a special review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. We're going to be examining the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information on Canadian citizens by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. We're going to try to make sure there's clarity on the legal and policy constraints around this collection of information on Canadian citizens when conducting defence intelligence activities. So it's something we're immediately seized with.
Liberal
David Graham Liberal Laurentides—Labelle, QC
Does DND have domestic intelligence or is it mostly international?
Executive Director, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
They're able to collect intelligence if they have a legally mandated authority to deploy forces on a mission, whether it's in Canada in support of the RCMP or CSE for example, or on a mission abroad. They can collect in support of a mission wherever it is.
Liberal
David Graham Liberal Laurentides—Labelle, QC
Do we know if the existence of NSICOP has changed the behaviour of any of the intelligence community?
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
I think it has. I mentioned earlier that one of the immediate effects of examining intelligence activities at the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces is that for the first time ever, the department set up a unit within to respond to outside review, to pull together information, to collate and to respond to the requests that we made. We've made many requests to the department and have received thousands of pages. When we think it's not satisfactory, we go back and ask for more. If something is missing, we ask why things might be missing.
We think the probity that NSICOP can bring to organizations that are involved in national security intelligence is really positive for Canadians.
Liberal
David Graham Liberal Laurentides—Labelle, QC
At the very end of your report, paragraph 265, I read a hint of frustration that the intelligence community is less than forthcoming and sometimes has to be coaxed along to provide information you're asking for. Is this changing, and will the recommendations you propose also help solve that?
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Did you say paragraph 265?
Liberal
David Graham Liberal Laurentides—Labelle, QC
Paragraph 265 on page 110. It's towards the end of the report. There was a bit of frustration by the committee that you'd ask a question and you'd get a very narrow response instead of getting the answers you're looking for.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
I think Ms. Marcoux is best placed to answer that question, because she is dealing with her colleagues inside these departments and agencies on a regular basis.
Executive Director, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
As I think I mentioned earlier, it's a question of the departments, particularly those that are not subject to regular review, getting used to providing information, the relevant information, to the committee.
In some cases, it's perhaps about the secretariat needing to be more precise in terms of time frames or the type of information we want. It's a back and forth process that's going on. In some cases, it's just a question of the need to read the document carefully. If there's a reference, for example, to a document in a footnote, it is incumbent on them to give us that document as well. So it can be the small things as well as the big ones.
Liberal
David Graham Liberal Laurentides—Labelle, QC
I understand.
Paragraph 107, on page 41—you don't need to go to each page; I'm just telling you where they are—discusses a case of CSIS drafting a ministerial direction minus two priorities, and it creating a bunch of confusion about whether or not intelligence can be collected.
Are they allowed to collect things outside of the priority list? Why would it create confusion? They can still do data collection, even if it's not among 10 items that are redrafted on the—
Executive Director, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
It's easier for me to—
Liberal
David Graham Liberal Laurentides—Labelle, QC
Sure. It's paragraph 107, on pages41 and 42. This is excellent weekend reading, by the way.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
I don't think we're in a position to give you much more insight, given the classified information that backs up that paragraph.
Executive Director, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Yes. I think it's because CSIS operates within very precise references and direction, so the more precision they get, the better it is for the officers in a region to collect. I think that's what we were trying to refer to.
