First of all, we cannot forget that the legislative basis for the Department of National Defence always remains the prerogative of the Crown.
What we know about the Crown prerogative is that it's several centuries old. It's a very old vestigial power vested in the Crown that allows countries to, for example, deploy troops, prosecute wars and conduct foreign policy.
The powers vested today in CSIS and CSE, for example, also sprang forth from the original concept of the Crown prerogative, but as a result of evolving, both of those organizations now have four corners of a statute within which to operate. They have their own law. They have their own enabling legislation, and by its own admission, in the government's defence paper, the Department of National Defence indicates that it's the only full spectrum organization in the country. In other words, it does what CSIS, CSE and the RCMP do combined.
It also plans on expanding the number of intelligence personnel by 300 over the next several years. It is a major actor in the intelligence sphere.
We took a long hard look at the statutory footing on which it's operating and began to ask some difficult probative questions. The report tries to walk a fine line between the merits of the government considering a statutory footing, new legislation, and some of the inherent risks that the department has brought to our attention. We've been very careful in the report to put it in very plain black and white for people to understand. In so doing, we wanted to simply raise the profile of this issue and ignite a debate, not only amongst parliamentarians but in Canadian society.