Public Safety Committee on Oct. 18th, 2016

[Regena Crowchild, Councillor, Tsuut'ina Nation]

Thank you.

Dadanast’ada. Sizi naituigokoo at’a.

Good afternoon. My name is Regena Crowchild. I'm a member of council with Tsuut'ina Nation, and with me is Terry Braun, who is our legal counsel. On behalf of Tsuut'ina Nation, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you regarding the study of Canada's national security framework.

Tsuut'ina supports action being taken by the federal government to deal with terrorist activity. However, this action cannot be taken in a way that infringes on the inherent and treaty rights of first nations.

On September 22, 1887, Chief Bull Head, on behalf of the Tsuut'ina Nation, entered into Treaty No. 7 with the imperial crown. We were sovereign peoples. We had a right to self-determination, we had our territories, we had our laws, we had our language, and we had our culture, tradition, and spirituality. Treaty No. 7 was a peace and friendship treaty. Our peoples agreed to share our territories with the newcomers to the depth of the plow and to live side by side without interference. The Tsuut'ina Nation would continue as a sovereign nation.

Almost from the day of making the treaty, we have been fighting to protect our treaty and inherent rights as a sovereign nation. At times, this fight has taken place by way of demonstrations and protests on the freedom of speech. Notwithstanding section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, in which existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples are recognized and affirmed, first nations continue to have to fight to protect our inherent and treaty rights. While we hear this Government of Canada saying that they wish to develop a nation-to-nation relationship and that they wish to develop a relationship that affirms and protects inherent and treaty rights, we continue to wait.

First nations continue to have to take matters to court. Look at the Northern Gateway Pipelines project. In June of this year, the Federal Court of Appeal overturned Canada's approval of the Northern Gateway project. In the decision, the Federal Court of Appeal agreed with the first nations that Canada had failed to fulfill its constitutional duty to consult.

Unfortunately, court action is not always possible. Many communities, our communities, continue to live in poverty, so that when a decision needs to be made as to whether to feed, clothe, or shelter the community or to take a matter to court, the decision is usually very easy.

For most communities, the only way to get the attention of the federal government is by way of demonstrations. While the Anti-terrorism Act is legislation that was introduced by the Harper government, or the Conservative government, the Liberal government has not taken meaningful steps to address the concerns that have been raised by first nations. Almost immediately upon the introduction of Bill C-51, first nations raised concerns about a lack of consultation on this legislation that clearly impacts first nations.

As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Haida, when precisely does the duty to consult arise? The foundation of the duty in the crown's honour and the goal of reconciliation suggest that the duty arises when the crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the aboriginal rights or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.

Our first concern is the lack of consultation as is required by the federal government. Our second concern is the legislation itself.

Quite honestly, the act feels like a return to the past, to past legislation that held Indians liable to imprisonment if three or more Indians, acting in concert, made a request to an Indian agent or a servant of the government that was deemed to be a breach of the peace.

The act, as we read it, applies to any activity that undermines the sovereignty, security, or territorial integrity of Canada, or the lives or the security of the people of Canada, and includes a broad list of activities that can be used to suggest that just about anything could be deemed to be in contravention of this act.

One of the few ways that first nations can protect our rights is by coming together. We need to look no further than Idle No More. Idle No More was a call to all people to join in a peaceful revolution, to honour indigenous sovereignty, and to protect the land and the water. Are these people terrorists? Are first nations who come together to stop damage to our ecosystems by preventing clear-cutting by forestry companies terrorists? Are first nations who come together to protect the land and the water from exploitation by profit-driven oil and gas companies terrorists?

While we have heard that this isn't the intention of the legislation, there is a long history of Canadian governments creating laws to restrict the rights of first nations. Just look at the Indian Act to understand why first nations are suspicious as to the intention of any legislation enacted by the federal government. Or more recently, look at the First Nations Financial Transparency Act. Notwithstanding both the Government of Canada and here in Treaty No. 7 territory, the Government of Alberta has suggested that they would be reviewing legislation that may infringe on the inherent and treaty rights of first nations. First nations continue to wait.

Minister Bennett stood before the United Nations assembly and confirmed that the Government of Canada was a full supporter of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Yet we are here today, and in my humble opinion, nothing material has been done.

I do not intend to go line by line through the declaration, but I will direct this committee to a few articles from the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Article 3:

Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4:

Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.

To be clear, first nations have a right to self-determination, to freely determine their political status, to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development; the right to autonomy or self-government. As the Anti-terrorism Act is currently written, it does not recognize these rights of first nations. As the act is currently written, it does not recognize the inherent and treaty rights of first nations.

I wish to close by again referring to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Article 19 states:

States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.

Not just with this act but with all legislation and policies, the Government of Canada has an obligation to consult and co-operate in good faith with first nations, and must obtain their free, prior, and informed consent.

Siiyigas. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Meegwetch. Thank you.

Mr. Zekulin, you have 10 minutes.

[Michael Zekulin, Adjunct Assistant Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

I would like to start by thanking the committee for the opportunity to come here and present today.

While Canada faces a great number of potential threats to its national security, I will be spending my opening remarks trying to impress upon you the very real challenges that exist, and in my opinion will be intensifying in the near future, related to the issue of home-grown terrorism and radicalization.

Obviously this is a very complicated and multidimensional issue that requires a tremendous amount of time—greater than we have here—to discuss in detail. Before I begin, I would, however, also like to make the following general but important point. While the focus of my statement here refers to the threat posed by Islamist-inspired groups and individuals, as someone who studies terrorism I can assure you that the threat posed by individuals or groups willing to use violence in pursuit of any number of political or ideological goals remains very real.

That being said, I do believe that currently our greatest concern remains groups such as ISIS and a resurgent al Qaeda, and that this threat, and the threat it poses to Canada and our allies, will actually be increasing in the near term.

I would also like to implore you to think about the threat not as a manifestation of any one group but instead the ideas that they espouse. Make no mistake about it: ISIS, as we understand them today, will be defeated. But the ideas that drive them and other like-minded groups will continue. It is likely that in the next few years we will see a different version of ISIS, much like we witnessed with al Qaeda following the Afghanistan war, and the emergence of new groups that share the ideology of ISIS. This is why we must make their ideas the focal point in our strategy. This is how we successfully degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS and groups that may emerge in the future. You must accept the reality that the ideas espoused by groups such as ISIS will continue to resonate with a very small segment of our population. We must confront these ideas and neutralize them. We must do our best to challenge their being introduced, slow their dissemination, and prevent their entrenchment into our society.

In my opinion, the Canadian government has not done enough in its efforts to address these concerns. The problem is that not only has our failure to address them left us vulnerable today, but more importantly it will be a contributing factor to the severity of the problem in the future. An absence of physical threats or attacks in the present should not be taken as an indicator for the future. Ideas spread by these groups and individuals may be here and may be incubating. They may be the basis for attacks in the future.

You need to understand the complexity that underlies this issue and the larger interplay between the ideas espoused by these groups and the dangers they pose. We are obviously concerned about those individuals who adopt these ideas and then choose to pursue violence. To be clear, we know that cognitive radicalization, the adoption of radical ideas, does not necessarily lead to behavioural radicalization, the pursuit of violence on those ideas. In fact, we know that the number of individuals who escalate from ideas to violence is actually very small.

These individuals, however, are only one part of a larger concern. Beneath the very small number of individuals who adopt these ideas and are willing to commit violence, there potentially exists a larger number of individuals who, while not yet willing to pursue violence and who may never arrive at that point, nonetheless support or assist others who might. Further beneath that group exists a possible third group of individuals we might label as sympathetic to the ideas, and while not violent or even supportive of these groups or individuals, they instead remain quiet.

I should also be clear in stating that supporters and sympathizers do not need to be active or willing participants. For example, a group of individuals operating in a neighbourhood may be able to intimidate others to offer support or stay quiet. The result, nonetheless, is the same. It allows a safe space for these individuals to operate.

Again, please allow me to be very clear on this point. I'm in no way suggesting that this is an accurate representation of what we currently face here in Canada. I do not believe there is any significant number of individuals who fit into these categories here in Canada, but offer the following qualification: “at this point”.

I'm simply suggesting that our failure to take this threat seriously today creates conditions in which the scenario I have identified could become a reality. Your current point of reference, should you require one, would be places such as Brussels, and France more generally. The success of a very small number of individuals wanting to target civilian populations with violence becomes increasingly possible due to this larger logistical, supportive, or sympathetic segment of the population.

The task before this government is a challenging one. To try to help you understand the complexity of this phenomenon and how we might proceed to addressing it, I would suggest that you think about it as three separate components that are all intertwined with one another. Each one needs to be addressed individually, but in addressing each one of the parts, the sum together helps us mitigate the threat posed by this phenomenon. I will also caution you at this point that there is very little tangible agreement on how we accomplish these goals. There remain tremendous disagreement and debate about each one of these components and the best way to address them. However, this can no longer be used as an excuse to do nothing.

The first aspect of this threat is the one that is most pressing right now: safeguarding Canada and Canadians against those who are intent on harming us, and willing, today. Government reports indicate that this number is currently around 160 individuals. These are individuals who law enforcement and intelligence agencies have identified as significant concerns here and now. This is where governments must make legislative choices about the threat. What do we do with these individuals? How can we keep tabs on them and ensure that they cannot launch attacks?

This is also the danger zone. We cannot be spending all of our time and effort in this space because doing so means we are on the defensive and playing catch-up. Over time we want to shift the focus to the other two components of this phenomenon, which I will quickly outline for you now.

In addition to the clear and present threat, the two additional aspects that need to be addressed are, unfortunately, where government has left a lot to be desired.

The first of these is the preventative component, otherwise known as counter-radicalization. This is where we need to focus on challenging or providing alternative narratives to those presented by these groups. Essentially, it is about starting discussions, encouraging open debate and conversations, and providing a counterweight to the messages these groups are using to attract individuals. Absent this effort, we are not participating in this debate for hearts and minds. This creates a vacuum in which these groups are the only voices individuals may be exposed to. This allows for the possibility that their ideas take hold and, over time, solidify.

The link between prevention and the current threat is straightforward. If we prevent individuals from adopting these ideas or provide counter-perspectives before the ideas become hardened, fewer individuals may graduate to potential violence. Again, these efforts will not prevent every individual from adopting these ideas but through them we seek to minimize the number who may progress towards the next stage. We want and, more importantly, need the number of 160 to decrease to a more manageable number. An increase in this number will quickly stretch resources beyond our ability to keep tabs on all of them, allowing for the possibility that some will slip through the cracks. Again, Brussels is under water.

Canada lacks a preventative strategy. We continue to hear that the office of counter-radicalization will emerge, but this idea has been circulating for several months, maybe even years, without any meaningful implementation.

The third and final aspect pertains to the idea of deradicalization, what we do with individuals who have travelled to join groups or who have become radicalized. This term is also problematic, because it implies that you can change someone's ideas. The term most readily employed in the terrorism literature now is “disengagement”. Discussion of it focuses on ways to prevent individuals from potentially acting on their ideas or actively spreading them.

ISIS is likely nearing defeat, and individuals, including Canadians, may begin returning home. In addition, there's a real possibility that some of these fighters may have children with them. How will Canada welcome them, and what will we do with them? A framework for this reality needs to be prepared. Will Canada pursue a criminal justice approach or a social work approach? Will it be different for different individuals? Who decides, and how? Failing to start investigating this third component will, once again, leave us vulnerable in the future as we react with knee-jerk policies in a potential time of crisis.

In closing, we need to do a better job on preventative measures to ensure, moving forward, that fewer people might become threats to our national security. In addition, we need to start preparing for the eventual return of individuals who have travelled abroad. While it is true that not every one of the individuals who return will pose a threat of attacking Canada or Canadians, the ideas they bring with them may be disseminated, and they, in and of themselves, are part of the concern.

The government needs to be more proactive in addressing longer-term challenges and must immediately implement some meaningful counter-radicalization efforts.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you very much.

Professor Nesbitt.

[Prof. Michael Nesbitt, Professor of Law, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

Hi. I want to thank you very much, first of all, for having me here. I think this is a wonderful initiative. I don't envy you your task, but I do appreciate that you're undertaking it.

Thank you. It's truly an honour to be here with you today.

I'll do my best to keep this under 10 minutes. The first thing for me, the hardest thing, was coming up with a topic to discuss here today. I come to this both as an academic in law but also having spent almost 10 years in government, both in Foreign Affairs and the Department of Justice. A number of the issues in the green paper are fairly close to me, having seen both intelligence and evidence and having dealt with listing procedures and terrorist financing.

Let me discuss what I think are the two critical issues that will have to be dealt with in this round of hopefully what amounts to changes to the legislation and approach in Canada. This will be from a lawyer's point of view, because that's what I am.

The first is Bill C-51’s unprecedented grant of authority for CSIS to move beyond its traditional role as an information-gathering and analysis agency to one that's authorized to conduct disruptive activities, including specific authority for charter-infringing and unlawful activities.

The second, to take a contrary position to what I understand you heard earlier, is the desperate need for better review and oversight—I'll be a stickler about the difference between those two—of Canada’s national security bureaucracy. I say this based on my experience as a lawyer and policy adviser within Ottawa’s civil service as much or more so than I do as an academic. Too often the effectiveness of our bureaucracy is limited by the fact that decisions are made within the bureaucracy and information is passed up to ministers and reviewed, if at all, in departmental silos. Cross-cutting issues can evade cross-cutting review and oversight, and frankly they can evade cross-cutting solutions.

Let me be clear that review and oversight are not solely about protecting against possible abuses or correcting mistakes, though this is obviously very important. Sometimes human rights and security can be mutually reinforcing rather than a tug-of-war. Review and oversight are desperately needed to improve the coordination and effectiveness of our institutions in responding to national security threats.

In this regard, parliamentary review of national security matters of the type that's now been proposed is a crucial first step and gets us in line with our Five Eyes allies, but it alone isn't sufficient. Internal review of national security operations that stretches government-wide is needed. Greater formalized central coordination—I'm talking about oversight here—or the possibility thereof, for example in the hands of the NSA, is also needed.

With that in mind, I want to spend the remainder of my talk on the first element that I mentioned, Bill C-51’s amendment to the CSIS Act to grant the department disruptive powers. In particular, I'm going to focus on three troublesome aspects of this new disruptive power: first, the authority to breach the charter; second, the authority to conduct unlawful activities; and third, what I see as, in practice, the limited opportunity for an independent party, particularly the courts, to review the legality of CSIS’s behaviour.

To be very clear from the outset, I don't necessarily take issue here with the objective of the new disruptive powers nor with the specific determination that CSIS must have such powers. To my mind, we the public simply don't have enough information to make a determination on that ground. As a result, my concerns will relate more to the scope of the grant of power as it was legislated.

I'll move to the first aspect, the authority to breach the charter. This is perhaps the most clear-cut of the issues, to my mind. CSIS’s new authority to breach any charter provision so long as it obtains a warrant is fairly clearly unconstitutional. No other body in Canada can obtain prior authorization to breach the charter, let alone any section of the charter. Such authority is completely unique and is found nowhere else in Canadian legislation for very good reason; as I said, it's probably unconstitutional.

This authority has been compared to a couple of provisions that I understand have come up, one being the section 8 warrant procedures and the other section 9, arbitrary detention. I'm going to argue that these are very different animals.

Let us be clear that when police have a warrant judicially authorized, it's done to confirm the reasonableness of the proposed search and seizure; quite the opposite of authorizing a charter breach, in the normal circumstances with police, the normal warrant process confirms that police are indeed acting legally and in compliance with the charter. It was brought up earlier what reasonableness might mean. Well, it is actually really clear in law and fairly easy to determine. That is, you have reasonable grounds to make the case out of sufficient evidence, you go to a judge, and the judge confirms that for you.

To put it another way, the process is meant to ensure the prevention of charter breaches in the first place, not to authorize future breaches. The same is true of section 9 of the charter, on arbitrary detention. You get an arrest warrant. The warrant process is there to ensure that the detention will not be arbitrary; it is not to authorize a future arbitrary detention.

Moreover, this normal process only applies to section 8—and as I said, section 9—because the section 8 right is qualified by the term “unreasonable”, and again, section 9, by the term “arbitrarily”. Yet CSIS is nevertheless empowered to request authorization for a breach of any section of the charter.

The other argument I've heard is that section 1 of the charter provides for “reasonable limits” to charter rights—which it does—so the CSIS warrant process is really no different from this. However, section 1 requires that the government legislate, first, specifically and clearly when introducing legislation that might breach the charter. It's then incumbent on the government to articulate the specific objective, its scope, and its limitations. An open-ended invitation to judges to undertake this legislative process ex parte, so with only government lawyers present, and in camera, so in private, to determine when and how state actions might infringe the charter is, once again, a very different animal. My suggestion would thus be to remove from the CSIS Act the authority to breach the charter.

I'll move to my second concern, the unlawful activities. Under its new disruptive powers, CSIS is authorized to conduct unlawful activities. Such a power in this case is not without precedent: the Criminal Code does authorize police in certain situations to conduct unlawful activities, mostly undercover operations. Yet again there are striking differences in practice, even if the wording sounds similar as between the two provisions.

First, police power is constrained by about four pages of legislation in the Criminal Code, including specific limitations on the type of unlawful activity such as the loss of or serious damage to property, and the requirement to file a specific report on the unlawful activity as well as detailed annual reports on unlawful activities. The CSIS Act does not offer anything close to the same protection, does not require any reporting, and does not limit the scope of what unlawful activity might be in the same way that the Criminal Code does.

Although I'm not convinced one way or the other that there needs to be authority for CSIS to engage in unlawful activity, if CSIS makes to you a specific and compelling case that such authority to conduct unlawful actions should remain in the CSIS Act, then many of the protections and limitations that apply to the police under the Criminal Code should be introduced to the CSIS Act as well.

That brings me to the third difference between the exercise of police powers and the exercise of CSIS's disruptive powers. When police act, they act with the goal of making an arrest. The result is that the situation goes to court, and police warrants and the exercise of police power is challenged by the defence and reviewed by the courts. If there's a mistake, it can be appealed. In other words, if there are defects with the police actions or the warrants, or the issuance or authorization of the warrants, then the courts are available to review and correct the behaviour. This is why we have judicial review.

CSIS is in a very different situation. Even if their actions do become known, by their own admission and given their mandate, CSIS activities are highly unlikely to form part of a criminal prosecution and thus unlikely to be challenged in the same way as police activities. The idea is for one to be public, the other to be secret. As excellent a job as SIRC does, it is not an adequate substitute for layers of judicial oversight and adversarial challenge, particularly in these circumstances.

Again, there's a solution available, or at least a partial one. That is, a so-called special advocate—and this would be taken from the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act—responsible for providing a challenge function to CSIS requests, should be specifically built into the CSIS Act. The idea would be to compensate for the fact that CSIS warrants are a different animal from police warrants in that they're unlikely to be challenged by a defence lawyer at a criminal trial, they're unlikely to be reviewed by a court, and the subsequent implementation of a warrant by CSIS is unlikely ever to be reviewed by a court or made public. That is to say, as soon as the warrant process has been done, there is no oversight of the CSIS activity to ensure their subsequent activity complies with the original warrant.

With these inherent differences in mind, the special advocate would need authority not just to challenge the warrant, but to follow up on CSIS action to ensure the subsequent compliance with the terms of the judicial warrant, and, where abuse or a mistake is suspected, request subsequent judicial review. Again, to be really clear here, my primary concern is an innocent mistake or misunderstanding, either by the warrant-authorizing judge or in the execution of the warrant. Where matters are serious, where rights are affected, and the pressure of national security is great, innocent mistakes will be made. That's okay: but we need an opportunity to review them.

Thank you very much.

I'll listen to your questions in English or French, but I'll answer in English.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you.

Ms. Damoff, you have the floor.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

Thanks to all of you for being here today.

Ms. Crowchild, I'd like to start with you. We haven't had anyone from the indigenous community testify before us yet, so we all really appreciate your being here and providing that perspective.

When Pam Palmater provided testimony in 2015, she talked about the need for any legislation to do with this issue to acknowledge the treaties and first nations sovereignty. I'm wondering what your thoughts are on that and also how we incorporate first nations in decision-making, if we are incorporating first nations sovereignty in anti-terrorism legislation, because it's not there right now. Do you understand what I am asking?

[Regena Crowchild]

I think I do. We're both talking sovereignty. Pam's talking sovereignty and so are we. We are sovereign nations. We were sovereign nations as we entered into treaty. In our treaties, Canada, the imperial crown, promised that they would protect our lands and protect us. They had a relationship with us as indigenous peoples, the first peoples of this land.

So when Canada legislates their acts, they need to take into consideration their fiduciary responsibilities for the first nations of this land, of Turtle Island. In order to do that, Canada must consult with the indigenous peoples and give them fair chance to comment and to discuss the issues that they are going to legislate, so that there is proper understanding and there's co-operation with both parties.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

She had suggested that certain departments be excluded under information sharing, specifically Indian Affairs—we've changed the names now, but I'll use the names she used—Health Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, environmental agencies, NRCanada, and CRA. Obviously, in her opinion, those departments wouldn't be part of...or there wouldn't be a need to share information.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

[Regena Crowchild]

The state of Canada needs to address the issues with the chiefs of the treaty nations. I'm only speaking for the treaty nations—that includes treaties one to 11—that have entered into treaty with the imperial crown. That's how Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, part of B.C., and Ontario are now part of Canada. Canada needs to address these issues with the treaty chiefs and not just through the departments, because our chiefs represent the peoples who are the rights holders, and that process has always been left out.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

What role do you see for those chiefs in this consultation process? You're here today, which is wonderful. As we're developing this framework, what role do you see for the chiefs in being part of that?

[Regena Crowchild]

The chiefs need an opportunity to review the intents of the legislation, so they have an opportunity to bring forward any concerns or issues that Canada needs to address. Then there can be proper understanding between the two parties. Our peoples will ensure that our treaty and inherent rights are not being infringed upon.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

I had a conversation a few years ago with a former regional chief. He expressed concerns about first nations youth being radicalized because they were living without hope and becoming marginalized.

Do you have any comments on that as well?

[Regena Crowchild]

From the way Canada has treated indigenous peoples, it is obvious that we are oppressed. It is obvious that our people are beginning to have a lack of hope because Canada is not living up to the responsibilities under our treaties and not recognizing our treaty and inherent human rights, per se. We've been saddled with legislation that totally interfered in our lives when it was not supposed to, and that was not intended at the treaty-making. We needed to look at....

We've been fighting. As I said earlier, ever since the treaty-making, our peoples have been fighting to try to protect the treaty and inherent rights. We've been saying it to deaf ears—telling people, telling the various governments and the various parties that form the Government of Canada, yet we are still in the same situation. Yes, our peoples begin to lose hope.

As you know, the way Canada has treated indigenous peoples through the residential school era, the sixties scoop, and infested blankets, they wanted to get rid of us. They wanted to get rid of our peoples. We weren't even allowed to assemble. We weren't even allowed to leave the reserves without a permit, in previous years. We are beginning to wonder, are we going back to that stage? Is Canada bringing us back to that, even after they have made political promises? They have gone to the UN; they are signatory to the international covenant on human rights, yet they come back and treat us as if we are not human and we don't have treaty and aboriginal rights.

Yes, there is lack of hope amongst our peoples. It's up to Canada to sit down with the treaty indigenous chiefs and address these issues for a resolution. Our treaties were peace treaties, and we need to move forward and live in harmony with each other, side by side, without interference, and recognize each other's rights.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Nesbitt, we heard testimony last night that the government already had the powers it needed, so what was given in Bill C-51 wasn't necessary. Do you have any comment on that?

[Prof. Michael Nesbitt]

Do you know what powers, specifically?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

It was that in order to combat terrorism, we already had what we needed, and what was added through Bill C-51 was powers that weren't needed. That is generally what a number of people have come forward to say.

[Prof. Michael Nesbitt]

As you know, it's a huge bill. Making that omnibus statement in response to that bill.... I could pick up on a couple of examples.

For example, the advocating terrorism provision, which was put into the Criminal Code, is either unconstitutional or unnecessary, in my mind. That is to say, we already had hate speech provisions and facilitating groups provisions. We already had counselling offences, which could include counselling terrorist offences, etc.

To the extent that it adds something to the code, it would be terribly broad, which to my mind would make it unconstitutional. There certainly are provisions that were added where, I think, the powers were already there. It's more about starting to use them in ways they haven't been used. This gets you back to your intelligence versus evidence problem—we have very few criminals prosecuted, particularly in terrorist financing, but also in all other areas of terrorism. Part of the problem, apparently, is how to get the evidence to actually do the prosecutions, rather than enact new powers to prosecute.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you, Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. Miller, go ahead.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll be splitting my time with my colleague Ms. Watts.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

Ms. Crowchild, a number of things you brought up really don't have anything to do with what our study is on, the national security framework, but I have to respond to them, and I have a question for you, because you brought them up.

You talk about treaties broken and the residential schools. I totally agree with you, and every Canadian, I believe, would support the fact that there is no doubt that your people have been wronged in the past. The previous government apologized for the residential schools issue. You can't change what happened. It was a terrible black mark on Canadian history, no doubt about it. But we have to go forward, as you say, to live in harmony. The previous government settled more treaties in the time frame than any other government in history, and I presume the present government is working on that same timeline. I support that the treaties that were broken have to be negotiated and settled. I'm fully there.

A former colleague of mine, a native MP from northern Saskatchewan, worked hard to make huge changes to the Indian Act. I consider him a good friend. I know he was frustrated at times. Negotiations between the government and your people never made much headway. But I do agree that in order to replace it, you must have something to replace it with. We haven't been able to come up collectively with something there, so I think that should continue on.

The social and cultural aspect I totally support. I'm very proud of my Irish-Scottish roots, as you are of your native ancestry. But we're both Canadians first and what have you.

On self-government, I think most of us support and believe in the fact that you should have self-government, providing that you can fund it yourself, with the exception of seed money and the regular grants that other municipalities in Canada get.

I was also a councillor, I was a mayor. You're on council. I don't know whether you've been chief or not; that doesn't matter. The point here is that with the first nations accountability act, every other municipality or city or province that deals with the federal government has to be accountable for any monies they get from there. Can you explain to me or tell me why first nations communities that get money from the federal government shouldn't have to be accountable for it in the same way?

[Regena Crowchild]

First of all, the reason I brought up these other issues like the Indian Act and so on is because the lady asked if there was a lack of hope amongst our people.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

No, no, that was in your presentation.

[Regena Crowchild]

Yes. But anyway, there is lack of hope.

Yes, I'm a member of council for Tsuut'ina Nation. I brought up the transparency act because we are targeted as indigenous peoples. We have no problem with being transparent to our peoples. We hold general meetings with the public, with our peoples, every three or four months and sometimes more. We deliver our budgets. We explain. We give progress reports to our peoples with respect to the monies being spent from our budget. We provide an audited statement to our peoples. That includes the funding we get from outside and our own source funding. We do that.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

My question, though, Ms. Crowchild—

[Regena Crowchild]

I know. I'm getting there.

With the government, when they provide us with grants, we have no problem. We submit those annually. We submit our audits annually. Whatever the federal government wants to do with those, it is up to them if they want to post them. Now they are asking under Bill C-27 that we submit consolidated statements that include our own source funding. We do not want to be in a position where the whole of Canada...once they are on the web, that for 10 years we have to account to the public on our own funding.