Evidence of meeting #33 for Public Safety and National Security in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was parliamentarians.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Honourable Ron Atkey  Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, As an Individual
Tom Henheffer  Executive Director, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression
Alice Klein  President, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression
Ron Levi  George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Carmen Cheung  Professor, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Hugh Segal  Chair, NATO Association of Canada, Massey College

2 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)) Liberal Rob Oliphant

I call this meeting to order.

This is the 33rd meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, convened to do a study on the national security framework of Canada.

I want to welcome both our invited guests, who are here to give us testimony and to help us with our study, as well as members of the public who have joined us today.

I want to remind you that there are two meetings today. The meeting from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. is an example of a meeting we would be doing in Ottawa; however, we are on the road this week. Then from 5:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. we are having an open-microphone meeting, allowing any member of the public who would like to make a statement to the committee on the issues defined within the study we are doing on national security framework, to come and make their opinions known. You're all welcome to come back, if you haven't had enough of us by then.

I would remind everyone that this is an extension of Parliament. We are here today as parliamentarians. Even though we are on the road, this is a bit of Parliament coming to you.

We work in both official languages of Canada, English and French, so you can put in your earpieces to listen to the interpretation.

We welcome you as members of the public to this meeting.

As I said, we are engaged in a study on the national security framework. We had meetings in Vancouver on Monday, and in Calgary yesterday. The committee is very bright and awake, but we were up at 3:30 this morning in order to be on an airplane quite early to get here, in Toronto, so you'll probably see us drinking water and coffee a lot as we continue.

We welcome our guests.

I'll start with Ron Atkey, adjunct professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, and also teaching at Ryerson University, as our first witness, for 10 minutes.

2 p.m.

The Honourable Ron Atkey Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, As an Individual

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for scheduling us in the first panel, so we'll be finished well in advance of the start of the baseball game. We'll see it, and we'll come back and report the score to you.

Thank you for this kind invitation to appear before you on the important subject of Canada's national security framework. Let me say how pleased I am that this consultation process is finally proceeding. I guess it was a year ago that an election was held. One might have thought, given the strong positions taken by opposition parties in the last Parliament on Bill C-51 and companion legislation, that the consultation process would start earlier, but I also understand the exigencies of the machinery of government.

I regret to say there was not a careful, measured debate on Bill C-51 in 2015, as the then-government rushed through Bill C-51, perhaps echoing public demand for swift and firm security action in response to the 2014 attacks in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu.

Let's be grateful that this much-needed conversation can now begin. Of course, we are all assisted by the recent release of two important documents. First, on August 25, 2016, the Minister of Public Safety released his “Public Report On The Terrorist Threat To Canada”, noting that the principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremist groups at home or abroad who could be inspired to carry out an attack within Canada.

The second was an important background document released last month, on September 8, a national security green paper entitled “Our Security, Our Rights”, which is an objective discussion on most of the hot-button issues such as accountability, disruption, information-sharing, the no-fly list, interdiction measures, and investigative techniques.

This 66-page document, plus endnotes, is by no means bedtime reading, and it has been difficult for me to get my students to plow their way through it, but I am going to, before the end of the term, I assure you. It walks the delicate line between being an advocacy piece for enhanced security measures and the need to protect fundamental charter rights and freedoms. For those Canadians who want a shorter document, there is relief, because the actual green paper is only 21 pages.

I offer my sincere congratulations to Minister Goodale for finally getting this process under way. How long it will take remains to be seen. There are some provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act that are clearly unconstitutional and need immediate legislative fix, such as the power given to federal judges granting a disruption warrant that can ignore the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or the lack of due process on the administrative side in the administration of the no-fly list. These should not have to be litigated in the courts. They can be easily dealt with by Parliament in this session.

I note that the green paper proposes a mandatory review of the Anti-terrorism Act after three years, but I can't help but observe that this will provide the government with an excuse to do nothing following the current consultation, until the end of 2018 or perhaps after the next election.

The period 2018-19 will be the lead-up to the next general election—hardly a time, in my experience, for constructive, non-partisan debate and enactment of meaningful legislation, if 2015 is any guide to the process.

The first of two items I want to deal with is accountability. Now, to be very fair, last June this government introduced Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act, which was long overdue. This will provide, for the first time, a select group of Canadian parliamentarians with access to the national security tent. I hope the bill is passed this year, although not without some constructive amendments that may come forward. I may be suggesting some of these to you when I appear as a witness before you next week in Ottawa.

The point I want to make is that Bill C-22 is only a small part of the jigsaw puzzle of national security. Its anticipated achievement as a new structure in our system should not be used as an excuse for delaying necessary reforms to our national security framework generally.

Let me share with you my experience over the past 40 years. During that time, I was an opposition MP; a minister of immigration during troubled times in 1979-80; the first chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, from 1985 to 1989; amicus to the Arar commission; and a special advocate under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. I have taught national security law for eight years as my retirement project. So I know a little about the subject, and I have some views.

Regarding accountability, I've changed my views. When I first became the CSIS watchdog in 1985, along with four distinguished colleagues following consultations with the opposition parties, I accepted the conventional wisdom that reviewing the complex security operations at CSIS was too difficult and time-consuming for busy MPs, who could not be trusted to maintain security confidentiality in the political atmosphere of the House.

Over time that situation has changed. Whether it was Parliament's responding properly to the horrible events of 9/11 with controversial provisions regarding what was then the Anti-terrorism Act, or the heavy-handed response of Parliament with the passage of Bill C-51 to the 2014 attacks in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, which became law in June 2015 after much partisan debate, one thing has become clear: a way has to be found to bring elected MPs inside the national security tent.

The debate in Parliament and before committee on Bill C-51, which I closely followed, suffered from an absence of an understanding of the objectives and techniques of preserving national security for Canadians while protecting rights and freedoms under the charter. If Canadians are going to be asked to support the toughening of our national security framework, sometimes at the expense of individual rights and freedoms, they need assurances that changes going forward will be carefully scrutinized in camera by a select group of elected representatives. This committee of parliamentarians will be the first point of reference for an overview when something goes terribly wrong, which it's bound to under the circumstances.

That is not to say that the committee of parliamentarians should be a substitute for the independent review bodies like SIRC, or the CSEC commissioner, or the CRCC reviewing RCMP activities. In fact, the committee's work will be complementary to the expert review bodies. It is my view that the jurisdiction of these expert review bodies should be extended to cover other federal agencies such as CBSA or Transport Canada—that's my list—and that steps should be taken to allow these review bodies to share classified information with each other or to conduct joint reviews of national security and intelligence activities.

A lot of the work on the possible changes to the framework for national security accountability in Canada was undertaken by Justice O'Connor and his staff a decade ago as part of the mandate of the Arar commission. Unfortunately, many of his recommendations appear to have been ignored to date. I hope the release of the green paper currently guiding you in your discussions and debate on Canada's national security framework will rekindle some interest in the O'Connor recommendations, many of which remain valid today.

I'm going to conclude by commenting on something that's not in the green paper, and that is the national security adviser to the Prime Minister. Currently this office is within the Privy Council. It does not appear to have a high profile or any operational responsibilities. Given the communication problems that exist between the 17 agencies or departments involved in national security and intelligence activities, the complexity of sharing arrangements contemplated by the Security of Information Sharing Act under Bill C-51, and the practical efficiency of joint operations on a broader base than it is currently, why not give the responsibility to someone with clout at the centre, the national security adviser to the Prime Minister? Of course, the mandate would have to change under this proposal, and so would the manner of appointment. Similar to the Auditor General or the Privacy Commissioner, this person should be appointed by Parliament on the recommendation of the Governor in Council. Presumably the committee of parliamentarians established by Bill C-22 would play a major role in the nomination and approval process, and the national security adviser would be required to table an annual report in Parliament subject to the usual redactions regarding security matters.

Some commentators may regard this proposal as plumping for a national security czar for Canada, but the concept has worked in the U.S. to ensure, since 9/11, more inter-agency co-operation, and the avoidance of institutional stovepipes in the unwillingness to share important security information in an organized and secure framework.

That concludes my remarks. I want to thank you for letting me share these ideas with you, and I look forward to your questions.

2:10 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant

Thank you very much, Mr. Atkey.

We're going now to our second witness, Tom Henheffer from Canadian Journalists for Free Expression. He will be giving the presentation, and I believe that Ms. Klein will be available to answer questions, as well. Thank you.

2:10 p.m.

Tom Henheffer Executive Director, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression

I would like to thank the chair, the clerk, and the honourable committee members for the privilege of this opportunity to speak to them today.

I'm here on behalf of Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, a non-profit, non-governmental organization that works to promote and protect freedom of the press and freedom of expression around the world. In July 2015, CJFE and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association brought a constitutional challenge to the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, on the grounds that specific provisions therein violate sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a manner that cannot be saved under section 1 of the charter.

There's a lot of work to be done with Canada's national security apparatus, but given the short timeframe, I will limit my remarks to the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, and its impact on freedom of expression, as protected under subsection 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I will also touch on issues of privacy, as the right to privacy is necessary for the full enjoyment of the right to free expression.

I'll leave it to my colleagues from other organizations to speak to other, equally pressing issues and concerns on the protection of rights and democratic values in the national security framework of Canada.

I'll start with free expression. The oft-touted argument that we must strike a balance between security and rights, implying that the two are at odds, is equally flawed. Protecting democracy requires a deep respect for human rights, as enshrined in our charter and in international human rights documents, full stop. Ignoring Canada's international obligations and disrespecting basic human rights will only create instability and insecurity.

We are very thankful that your government has embarked on this consultation, but we share the concern with many other civil society organizations that the green paper on national security reform is biased in favour of security and police agencies, putting their interests ahead of human rights.

One particularly egregious example is that it contains no mention of the need to impose judicial control over Canada's foreign intelligence agency, CSE, and to regulate the agency's expansive metadata surveillance activities, despite revelations that CSE operates under a ministerial directive that allows it to collect and analyze metadata that is produced by Canadians using mobile phones or when accessing the Internet. CSE is permitted to read Canadians' emails and text messages, and listen to Canadians' phone calls whenever Canadians communicate with a person outside Canada. There is no court or committee that monitors CSE's interception of these private communications of metadata information, and there is no judicial oversight of its sweeping powers. CSE's operations are shrouded in secrecy. At the very least, we must bring judicial oversight to the work of Canadian intelligence agencies, as this is a basic tenet of democracy that our country now lacks.

In terms of the specific legislation, the new Criminal Code offence of “promoting terrorism” is extremely troubling and must be addressed. It is vastly overbroad and captures speech made for innocent purposes, including private conversations. In prohibiting the perceived promotion of “terrorism offences in general”, the law unduly and unnecessarily limits Canadians' freedom of expression and ability to engage in proper democratic debate. It is also unconstitutionally vague and imprecise, and a clear violation of section 7 of the charter.

Leading constitutional scholars have written that this speech crime could easily be interpreted to prosecute anyone quoting a terrorist or sharing content produced by an extremist group online. This is particularly troubling for journalists in Canada, and indeed threatens the very institution of journalism because the law does not weigh a person's intent when they share this content. In other words, a journalist could conceivably be charged with a terrorism offence just for doing his or her job, by doing something such as quoting a so-called terrorist as a source in a story. A private citizen could also be charged for sharing content from an extremist group, even if that sharing was solely for the purpose of condemning that same group.

The vaguely worded speech crime will also undermine the government's commitment to develop new community level programs to counter violent extremism. In order to succeed, any such program will need to engage in robust and frank dialogue with radicalized and extremist individuals. By definition, many of these individuals will hold opinions that are sympathetic to proscriptive terrorist groups. They have to trust they won't be placed under surveillance or arrested because they engaged in good faith with community programs.

Furthermore, criminalizing the expression of a political opinion, however repugnant, is anathema to a free society. There is an important distinction to be made between expressing an opinion, even in support of people carrying out violence, and directly inciting an act of violence. Content should only be considered a threat to national security if it can be demonstrated that it is intended to incite imminent violence, it is likely to incite such violence, and there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood of occurrence of such evidence.

This provision also has a chilling effect on freedom of expression, even if no prosecution is ever brought. Persons will prefer to remain silent rather than risk the perils of prosecution.

The law is unnecessary. Criminal laws in place before the adoption of the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, were an effective means of dealing with these issues, and they did so in a way that was far less threatening to human rights.

As such, we urge the government to repeal this unnecessary, overbroad, and dangerous law.

When we look at privacy and information sharing, without strong privacy safeguards it becomes far more difficult, if not impossible, for people to exercise their human right to free expression. There are real, tangible harms that are demonstrated to occur when a society and its citizens are subjected to the far-reaching, suspicionless surveillance that the government is currently directing at Canadians.

This is not an abstract or theoretical concern, it is an established fact backed by a large body of scientific research that when people believe they're being watched, their behaviour changes in significant ways. Surveillance in Canada has become increasingly pervasive, and recent revelations have shown that Canadians and others have been surveilled under numerous programs, with little oversight or transparency.

The alternative to mass surveillance is not the complete elimination of surveillance, and we're not advocating for that. It is, instead, targeted surveillance, and only of those for whom there is substantial evidence to believe that they are engaged in real wrongdoing. Such targeted surveillance is far more likely to stop terrorist plots. It also allows for judicial oversight, which again is crucial in any democracy. We urge your government to concentrate on targeted, constitutional surveillance, and to end the ineffective mass surveillance practices that are encroaching on the rights of all Canadians.

Overbroad information sharing is a further threat to privacy. As has been pointed out by privacy commissioners and advocates across the country, the Anti-terrorism Act 2015 allows a large number of government departments and agencies to share an individual's private information and it does so without necessary oversight to ensure that this power is not abused. Worse, this legislation does nothing to address the 2010 Air India bombing commission's recommendation to make sharing information mandatory in terrorism cases. We strongly urge your government to repeal the ATA's information sharing provisions and to replace them with constitutional laws that meet the commission's recommendations.

Our time is limited today, but I want to briefly touch on a few other aspects of the ATA.

Firstly, the bill's new warrant process destroys the entire purpose of the courts in Canada. In a normal democracy, a judge has oversight over the warrant process in order to ensure an investigation can be conducted without unjustifiably violating charter rights. The ATA allows judges to pre-authorize charter violations in secret and without notifying the subject of those violations. This is a bizarre reversal of the purpose of the courts, and it is clearly unconstitutional. Furthermore, it puts legitimate investigations in jeopardy, as it could easily lead to judges throwing out illegally obtained evidence. For the sake of rights and our national security, it must be repealed.

Secondly, the bill allows the government to hold secret deportation hearings, and it drastically limits information shared with advocates on the subject of those hearings. This is an unconstitutional violation of jurisprudence and must be repealed.

Thirdly, the Secure Air Travel Act further extends Canada's opaque no-fly list process, without providing a meaningful means to appeal for anyone who has been added to the no-fly list. There is no evidence that no-fly lists have ever prevented a terrorist attack, but there is clear evidence that they have a huge societal cost. Many innocent people have been robbed of their ability to travel because they've been added to this list through a secret process, with no effective means to appeal.

Maher Arar, to illustrate just one example, is still on a no-fly list. He is still unable to travel because of this faulty process, despite the fact that he has been completely exonerated and he has been compensated because of the situation that he was in previously, thanks to Canadians' sharing of information with other governments. This legislation must be repealed.

Although these issues may not appear to impact free expression directly, the broadness of the legislation, the lack of oversight, and the potential for abuse means these new laws could easily be used to target political enemies of the government, journalists uncovering difficult truths, or citizens exercising their constitutional right to speak freely and to protest. Genuine security can only be maintained through the promotion and protection of human rights. Human rights should be a core consideration in any national security strategy. To ensure the effectiveness of this approach, a national security proposal should be carefully examined, tested for constitutionality, and regularly reviewed to assess its impact on human rights standards and obligations. Our current national security regime, which rests largely on the ATA 2015, was not built on these principles. As such, the Anti-terrorism Act must be repealed.

Thank you for your time.

2:20 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant

Thank you very much.

We now begin our first round of questioning from members, and we begin with a seven-minute round.

The first questioner is Mr. Mendicino.

2:20 p.m.

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the three of you for your testimony today.

My first two questions are for Professor Atkey. I want to take you to the part of your remarks where you addressed threat reduction measures that could potentially violate an individual's rights under the charter. My broad question is whether what was Bill C-51, but is now existing statutory language under the CSIS Act, specifically subsection 12.1, by its existing language implicitly requires a judge to engage in a section 1 charter analysis. I'll be a little bit more tailored, and then I'll let you answer.

Before CSIS requests a warrant, there has to be reasonable grounds. The measures have to be spelled out and articulated. But more to the point, there needs to be some proportionality and some reasonableness addressed in the warrant itself. Do any of these principles, in your mind, require a judicial officer to engage in what is essentially a section 1 analysis?

2:20 p.m.

Ron Atkey

Mr. Mendicino, the legislation is in conflict with itself. The provisions of subsection 12.1 mirror in many respects section 12 in the granting of a warrant under normal surveillance circumstances, and there are some 22 or 23 conditions the judge has to be satisfied with, many of them including the items you just mentioned. But in the same legislation, in effect in the definition of section 12 of the CSIS Act, to direct that the judge may ignore charter rights and obligations, in my opinion, is unconstitutional. There is the balancing task that the judge performs, both in terms of granting the warrant and in the eventual appeal courts, if there is an appellate situation involved, in the balancing of section 1 rights and whether it's absolutely necessary in a free and democratic society.

The balance we had—which is superimposed and was built on in terms of the charter-proofing subsection 12.1 and section 12—works, as long as you don't have the specific direction, which appears to me as how I read the legislation in section 12, that the judge may ignore our charter rights.

2:20 p.m.

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

To be fair, the statute doesn't say that. What it says is that a warrant couldn't authorize the violation of an individual's charter rights, unless the prerequisite conditions were met under the enabling provisions. And it is within the context of those latter revisions, where it talks about articulating the measures.... The one that I think attracts the most amount of attention is “reasonableness and proportionality” which does, I think, lend itself to a certain extent to section 1 of the charter, namely, where you're going to limit somebody's rights, are those limits reasonable, are they prescribed by law, are they justifiable in a free and democratic society?

2:25 p.m.

Ron Atkey

But reversing that situation, if you're sitting as an appellate court judge looking at a situation in camera, a judge may say, “Well, I don't have to act in a proportional context in this particular case; it's so egregious that I don't care what the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is going to say, so I'm going to grant the warrant.” First of all, I think that may be subject to appeal, and I think it just reinforces the unconstitutional nature of that particular definition.

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

Let me take you to the secondary, as I'd like to probe a little bit, and that is how you see cooperation between the committee of parliamentarians working with existing civilian oversight, like SIRC. There is a section under Bill C-22 which calls for cooperation between the committee of parliamentarians and other oversight and review bodies.

Drawing on your experience, what are the statutory gateways that could essentially road map the kind of co-operation you envision?

2:25 p.m.

Ron Atkey

I have a view of the committee of parliamentarians as a body for overview of security matters dealing with all departments of government. I don't ever see the committee of parliamentarians having the detailed staff and the time and the ability to go into the in-depth types of monitoring analysis that SIRC goes through, or that the CSEC commissioner goes through.

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

So how do you see it working?

2:25 p.m.

Ron Atkey

I think the two will work together. I think they will work responsibly. I don't think they'll compete. I think they're complementary to each other, and I think the committee of parliamentarians will come to rely on SIRC.

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

May I pause for a moment, because what I want to do is take it to the language itself. What clause 9 of Bill C-22 proposes is that the committee of parliamentarians take “...reasonable steps to cooperate with each other to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work by the Committee and that review body in relation to the fulfilment of their respective mandates.”

It seems to me that, as drafted, what we don't want is redundancy, but we do want co-operation and collaboration.

To be as tailored as you can be in your answer, how do you see that co-operation being mapped out?

2:25 p.m.

Ron Atkey

I think the committee of parliamentarians will welcome having a body like SIRC reviewing CSIS and maybe CBSA, if that's in their future jurisdiction, to be able to hand off the detailed work that has to be done in order to properly analyze the situation and provide a report back to the committee of parliamentarians. I see the committee of parliamentarians in that context as more of a coordinator in the first line of fire when the questions come up in the House or in the media, but I think it will be a logical response in many cases to say, “We've looked at the matter, and we've asked SIRC to get to the bottom of the issue.”

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

Do you have any other practical tips or advice that you can offer the committee as it embarks on this new chapter of accountability and national security?

2:25 p.m.

Ron Atkey

Don't get bogged down in the detail. The detail is for the expert bodies.

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

The devil's not there?

2:25 p.m.

Ron Atkey

Don't miss the forest for the trees, or whatever situation you want to describe. I think having an overview body of parliamentarians is extremely important, but not to get bogged down in individual cases, not to get involved in adjudications of individual complaints, but to deal with a broad sweep and use the review bodies, of which I hope there will be more after you do your work, to delegate, and maybe ask a judge, as was done in O'Connor and Iacobucci. It may be to SIRC, or it may be to the CSEC commissioner. The circumstances are all different. I think the committee of parliamentarians with its staff will be able to coordinate and quarterback all that situation and say, “Next case, let's get on with it.”

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

Okay. I think that's my time. I'll have to save my third question for the next round.

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant

Thank you.

I'm going to turn to Ms. Watts, but just before I do, I wanted to check a word you used. You were referring to “overview”, and I was wondering whether that was an intentionally chosen word because we have been talking in this committee about accountability and the difference between oversight and review. Review happens after the fact, and oversight happens contemporaneously. You've been using the word “overview”, and I don't think we've heard it before.

2:25 p.m.

Ron Atkey

That's very perceptive, Mr. Oliphant, and it's deliberate.

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant

Deliberate, okay.

2:25 p.m.

Ron Atkey

I think you should not get involved in oversight in terms of approving and being part of the direct operations of the security agencies.

2:25 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant

But review may be too little. I'm just wondering whether overview is more than review and less than oversight?