There is a very interesting discussion to be had in terms of how that gets implemented in practice. Is it a mechanism by which a judge is going to decide, on a proportionality analysis, that this disruption activity is actually of sufficient benefit to society as a whole that it justifies overriding an otherwise constitutionally protected right or another kind of lawful right, an interest in property or otherwise?
I think it's also worth taking a step backwards and asking if there is a place for such disruption activity, and if there is, whether it properly belongs in CSIS. One of my concerns is that so much happens in the shadows that it's difficult to determine what path it's following. Some of the activities the RCMP was undertaking prior to the McDonald commission really do seem like disruption, which is why it was taken out of the RCMP and moved into CSIS in the first place.
If we are giving CSIS the ability to burn down barns—just to pull an example out of a hat—that does seem to undermine the significant way our national security apparatus was set up. I wouldn't want to have that happen in just one bill, like Bill C-51. If we are going to rejigger our entire national security apparatus and change the nature of CSIS, I think that needs to be the topic of a much broader discussion.