Let me turn to the limitations. We had the minister testify just a couple of days ago. He spoke about this committee's power to follow the evidence wherever it would lead, although he acknowledged in an exchange with me that there were limitations. We spent some time talking about those limitations, and they boil down to three categories: paragraph 8(b), which includes the restriction on any activity unless it would be injurious to national security; clause 14, which has the enumerated categories of automatic refusal; and subclause 16(1), which talks again about restricting access to information on the basis that it might be injurious to national security or it would fall under the definition of special operations.
You've described this as a triple lock. In fairness, though, in two of the three categories that we've discussed, there is an exercise of ministerial discretion involved. Do you see a scenario in which over time, the exercise of that ministerial discretion could evolve as public confidence in the committee is strengthened, as well as its relationship to the House of Commons, to Parliament, through its reporting?