I'm puzzled why some of those changes weren't followed. I think perhaps it was the result of an excess of caution on the part of the government. They were wanting to start up this parliamentary exercise, particularly on control of membership and how membership would be appointed and the election of a chair, which were all new measures brought in in 2013.
What was also brought in in 2013 was a practice I think the committee somewhere down the road could usefully follow, which is creating a memorandum of understanding between the committee and the Prime Minister that would be tabled in Parliament. It would contain some of the more specific activities of the committee and what it would cover.
There are two things in particular about the changes to the British practice post-2013 that I think we could usefully follow. One is the specific listing of agencies that would be a primary concern to the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which was expanded in 2013. The other goes back to this question of the circumstances in which the Prime Minister could direct the committee not to release aspects of a report. The revised legislation in 2013 indicated that if that were going to be the circumstance and the Prime Minister felt strongly enough about it, then the Prime Minister would have to consult with the committee chair and explain the reasons. At the same time, the committee—and here I may slightly disagree with my colleague, Ron Atkey—would have the power to at least indicate where in the report released to Parliament the redactions occurred, and it would do so by a series of ellipses. That would be symbolic, but probably would be important as an exercise of committee power.