Evidence of meeting #42 for Public Safety and National Security in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was parliamentarians.
A recording is available from Parliament.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
Nicola Di Iorio Liberal Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC
Very well.
Now, Mr. McPhail and Mr. Plouffe, I would draw your attention to clause 9.
5:15 p.m.
Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
Yes.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
Nicola Di Iorio Liberal Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC
Clause 9, which is entitled “Cooperation”, states the following:
The Committee and each review body are to take all reasonable steps to cooperate with each other to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work by the Committee and that review body in relation to the fulfillment of their respective mandates.
Do you agree?
Mr. Plouffe, you yourself stated that it is a committee of parliamentarians many of whose members—the vast majority, but not all—are elected. These people go to the polls every four years to renew their mandate.
5:15 p.m.
Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
Yes.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
Nicola Di Iorio Liberal Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC
Do you agree that, in the event of a difference of opinion, this committee takes precedence over committees such as the one you chair?
5:15 p.m.
Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
Are you referring to committees of experts?
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
Nicola Di Iorio Liberal Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC
I am referring to committees of experts such as the one you chair, and the one Mr. McPhail also chairs. The question is also for Mr. McPhail, of course.
5:15 p.m.
Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
I don't see it that way. I do not think it is a question of taking precedence. I see what you are getting at, but each committee or body has its own mandate. I don't think it is a question of precedence. I do not see it that way at all.
The expert review mandate that we have, as regards the Communications Security Establishment, is one thing. This involves in-depth reviews several times per year and so forth. I imagine that the committee, by virtue of its mandate, will probably restrict itself to more general matters as opposed to the specific or detailed matters that we examine.
I think they are complementary mandates. It is not a question of precedence; both are important.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
5:15 p.m.
Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
Yes.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
Nicola Di Iorio Liberal Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC
Should the committee have the power to summons?
5:15 p.m.
Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
That might be useful. I do not see a problem in calling witnesses to appear if you wish.
For example, if you are conducting a review of a specific department and want access to documents and witnesses, but are being refused, it could be problematic if you do not have a power of coercion.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
Nicola Di Iorio Liberal Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC
So there would have to be a power subpoena duces tecum, that is, the power of subpoena to produce documents.
5:20 p.m.
Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
Yes, that is something to consider. That is the power to subpoena persons to appear with documents, known as duces tecum, as you said.
5:20 p.m.
Liberal
5:20 p.m.
Chairperson, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
It's an excellent question, but I think it goes to the basic role of parliamentarians and review bodies. It's hardly up to me to say what the roles are, but I think you would agree with me that the key roles of parliamentarians are to consider, and if appropriate, pass legislation and to hold the executive to account. The role of review bodies is to carry out the instructions of Parliament in their respective fields.
I would anticipate that if that same philosophy were to carry over into this proposed committee of parliamentarians, it would probably not be the wish of the committee or any such committee to duplicate the work by conducting detailed reviews on specific matters, but rather to consider, for example, the issue that has just been raised today, that is, the question of what access should police have to supposedly confidential material on cellphones, to encrypted messages.
5:20 p.m.
Chairperson, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
There's a very valid public debate on that, but that's not the role of a review body, quite clearly. I just use that as an example.
5:20 p.m.
Liberal
November 15th, 2016 / 5:20 p.m.
Conservative
Tony Clement Conservative Parry Sound—Muskoka, ON
I want to get back to what was described by previous deponents as the “triple lock” that is found in the legislation in clause 8, in clause 14, and in one other clause. I want to get a sense from the witnesses of how reasonable that is.
The triple lock means that you have these clauses that make it clear that the mandate of the committee can be circumscribed if there's a national security issue, something “injurious to national security”, as it says in clause 8. Then we have the whole kitchen sink list in clause 14 of things that cannot be before the committee, and the refusal of information. I guess clause 16 is the other one, which incorporates by reference the Security of Information Act. This has been described to this committee already as a triple lock on the ability of the committee to do its job.
I'm speaking as a member of the previous government, and we didn't want to have this committee in the first place, but it seems to me that if you're going to go to the trouble of having the committee, it should be a committee that is actually able and capable of doing something. This was described in negative terms by the deponents, Professor Kent Roach amongst others, as a triple lock.
Monsieur Plouffe, obviously you're the commissioner of an agency, and Mr. McPhail, you've dealt with these kinds of reviews in the past. There's a balance to be struck, and I get that, but how do we strike the right balance? Obviously, no one around this table wants to do something injurious to national security, Lord forbid. At the same time, if I may say so, all parliamentarians are honourable people, and they're busy people, so to have us go through the genuflection of having a committee without having a real committee seems to me to be a waste of time.
I would like to have your thoughts on this matter, gentlemen.
5:20 p.m.
Chairperson, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Mr. Clement, your point is well taken, and I suspect that probably all of your colleagues on both sides of the table would agree with you.
I can only comment specifically with respect to information that's in paragraph 14(e):
information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution;
The language used in our enabling legislation is somewhat broader.
I will get back to the point that I was making a moment ago, which is that I don't believe that it would be your intention that the committee conduct its own investigations of particular actions of the RCMP in terms of its national security activities.
Let me give you an example, if I may. National security activities of the RCMP are actually far broader than I think the public realizes, because many national security provisions have been enshrined in the Criminal Code. As a result of that, there's a law enforcement mandate for the RCMP. The RCMP also works very closely, in many of these areas, with other federal government agencies, and with provincial and even municipal police services.
Our body has the—
5:25 p.m.
Chairperson, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Am I getting a little off track?
