Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It's nice to see you, Ruby. I feel like we should be talking about electoral reform. We're veterans, here.
This amendment very clearly attempts to turn on its head what both subclause 31(1) and subclause 31(2) accomplish. At the moment, the effect of subclause 31(1) and particularly subclause 31(2) is to make the decisions of a minister refusing to provide information pursuant to subsection 16(1) not only final insofar as government decision-making goes, but also exempt from normal review through our federal courts.
It's a very straightforward amendment. I am proposing to replace eight lines with four—economy of purpose. We would no longer have subclauses (1) and (2), and the amendment would say:
The appropriate Minister's decision to refuse to provide information under subsection 16(1) is final, except for judicial review under the Federal Courts Act.
I think the purpose is clear. You've certainly heard expert witnesses to the effect that this is the sort of area where too much.... The Federal Court can certainly handle confidential information. The decision-making by a minister of the crown can go to Federal Court, and that process can also be as secure for purposes of public security and the national interests as any other body one could imagine. It would certainly improve the decision-making under this act and the access to information that is critical to a parliamentary committee of both MPs and senators whose job is national security and intelligence. They certainly will not be able to do their job if ministers do not provide information. That should be an exception, and it should be difficult for ministers to make that decision. They should know that their exercise of discretion is open to Federal Court review on tests that have been developed through the ages.
It certainly doesn't open this process to abuse or to leaking secure information from our intelligence services, but it is a check on the inappropriate exercise of discretion by ministers.
