Thank you.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.
The discussion focuses on many appropriate aspects of national security, including a number that have been raised in the government's Green Paper.
Three aspects are of specific concern to us.
The first, the most basic of the three, is the effective examination of Canada's national security and intelligence agencies. Like the Arar and Air India inquiries, the CBA agrees with the need to create specialized review bodies and to provide them with the resources and the mandate they need to examine all activities in the realm of national security.
As the CBA has set out in various submissions over the years, including our recent submission on the green paper and on Bill C-22, rigorous, independent oversight plays a crucial role in maintaining confidence in the national security apparatus.
I will emphasize three aspects of review that are of particular importance. First, each national security agency must have rigorous, independent review of its core activities. Some agencies like CSIS and the RCMP have these review mechanisms in place. Although there are criticisms of the functioning of these mechanisms in certain circumstances, at least the means for review exist. Other agencies, in particular the Canada Border Services Agency, have no review mechanism whatsoever outside of the agency and the minister in charge. This must be remedied and addressed.
Second, there must be effective review of the national security apparatus as a whole. This is all the more crucial as we see greater levels of information sharing and co-operation between the agencies. The reviewing agencies, if there are any at all, are siloed and not able to follow their investigations all the way through to where the information or the investigation is heading.
Of this aspect, there are two parts. One has to do with the proposal for a national security committee of parliamentarians. We expressed our support for this and made some suggestions for changes in the way this has been set out. We discussed these with you before in respect of Bill C-22. That's one aspect of it.
The second aspect would be the creation of what's being colloquially referred to a “super SIRC”, or an organization more independent of Parliament. Such an organization would be able to develop not only the required resources but also the institutional memory and the ability to engage in investigations beyond the scope and ability of parliamentarians, who have a lot of other responsibilities. Both of these mechanisms are important, particularly as investigations become more integrated within the national security apparatus.
The next issue raised in the green paper that I would like to address is information sharing. We raised a number of concerns during the hearings and review of Bill C-51 with respect to the information-sharing regime. This was significantly expanded by the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.
As we pointed out at the time of the passage of Bill C-51, this expansion raised a number of concerns. First, there were concerns around the scope—in particular, the definition given of “national security” within the act. It is different from the definition in the CSIS Act and from the way things are framed in Bill C-22.
We are concerned about having different definitions of national security for different purposes. This needs to be remedied. It would be beneficial to have one definition for oversight, information sharing, and activities of national security agencies. The oversight and review ought to be of the same expanse as the activities and information sharing themselves. Currently that is not the case.
The second issue is information sharing with foreign entities and the ability to review these activities. This issue is becoming of particular concern in light of recent developments on the global stage with respect to the partners with whom we share information. It was at the core of the concerns raised in the Arar commission and with regard to what happened to Mr. Arar. This is an ongoing issue in terms of what kind of information sharing happens, who the information is shared with, and it's a growing concern with respect to expanding information sharing within Canadian agencies.
This has a domino effect in the sense that if you have further, and broader unrestricted and unreviewed information sharing within Canadian agencies, and those agencies are then co-operating in an unreviewable or unreviewed way with foreign agencies, the problems that faced Mr. Arar are likely to arise again in the future. This needs to be addressed in the information-sharing regime that we have.
Finally, the green paper raises once again the issue of lawful access, which was discussed in great detail under the previous government. At that time, it was framed by the previous government in the context of child pornography. I believe it was Minister Toews at the time who made comments in Parliament to the effect that you're either with us or with the child pornographers in regard to how the debate ought to happen with respect to lawful access. That's been reframed in the green paper in terms of terrorism. These are not helpful ways to engage in what are complex public policy discussions in balancing liberties against the interests of national security, or other interests of the community.
These are important issues that need to be addressed coherently and consistently across the board, and ought to be addressed in a way that's consistent, whether it's within the national security framework or outside of it.
We are happy to engage further in those discussions. I see that my time is up. I'm happy to address any questions. Thank you very much.