Public Safety Committee on Nov. 30th, 2017

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is for our chief of CSE. Under proposed sections 30 and 31, can you explain the necessity of including the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the decision-making when authorizing cyber-operations? Why is it necessary to include the Minister of Foreign Affairs in this decision-making process?

[Greta Bossenmaier]

Thank you for the question.

Ms. Gallant, I believe that you're referring to the cyber-operations that are in the proposed bill and there are two different types of cyber-operations. The first are called defensive cyber-operations. For those, the Minister of Foreign Affairs would need to be informed of this initiative. She wouldn't actually be approving it, but she would be informed of it.

For an active cyber-operation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as you said, would actually also have to be approving it, which would be a two-key approval, if I can say that.

I think the important thing to underline here is that these operations, whether they be defensive or active cyber-operations, are focused on foreign targets or focused outside of Canada. Of course, the Minister of Foreign Affairs would have an interest in and responsibility for Canada's international and foreign affairs, as these activities would be implicating foreign targets or threats to Canada, which would be part of the rationale for that.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Okay. The approval is required for the second part.

For Mr. Rigby, what is the justification for Bill C-59 changing the definition of “terrorist propaganda” in the Criminal Code? It raises the evidentiary standard beyond what is the factual reality of current practices in radicalization, recruitment, and facilitation, and actually duplicates what is already the crime of counselling a criminal offence in section 22 of the Criminal Code.

In light of this, will the government consider removing the proposed amendment in Bill C-59 relating to terrorist propaganda?

[Vincent Rigby]

I'll defer to my colleague from Justice on this issue, although the minister addressed a bit of your question with respect to the definition and use of the word “counselling” in greater precision. Perhaps my colleague can provide a more fulsome answer.

[Douglas Breithaupt]

Indeed there is a link to the counselling offence that's proposed in Bill C-59. The “terrorist propaganda” definition is proposed to be amended to mean “any writing, sign, visible representation or audio recording that counsels the commission of a terrorism offence”. It's very closely linked to the new counselling offence.

There were concerns with the current wording of the terrorist propaganda definition, which is “advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general”, suggesting that this wasn't so easy to apply. That has been deleted, fulfilling a commitment the government made to narrow overly broad definitions, including “terrorist propaganda”.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

That means that if somebody receives a message or sees something on social media and simply shares it with another person for, quite possibly, the purpose of information, the sender will not be prosecuted for simply sending or receiving this kind of information.

[Douglas Breithaupt]

It's important to realize that the counselling offence, as proposed in Bill C-59, is an offence that would be subject to prosecution. The “terrorist propaganda” definition applies to a system within the Criminal Code.

Former Bill C-51 created two new warrants in the Criminal Code, one allowing for the seizure and forfeiture of terrorist propaganda in a tangible form, according to the definition, and the other allowing a peace officer to come before a judge to seek a warrant for the deletion of terrorist propaganda from a website that's available to the public through a Canadian Internet service provider. The terrorist propaganda definition applies to these warrants, as well as under the Customs Act, because it allows terrorist propaganda or prohibited goods under the Customs Act.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Rigby, the importance of cybersecurity with respect to our infrastructure is your purview, and it's very important to protect against cyber-attacks. We know that the electrical grid is one source of exposure.

It's my understanding that all the provinces—and the United States for that matter—have a framework in place to protect their grids, with the exception of Ontario. Is there some federal provision or something that Parliament could do, even with Bill C-59, requiring all the provinces and territories to ensure that protection is in place, because we're all connected?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Regrettably, Mr. Rigby, there's no time to answer that question.

Ms. Dabrusin.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Thank you.

In the first round I mentioned that one of the issues that was very important to people in my riding was the issue of charter protections, so I have a couple of questions for the Department of Justice.

I was reviewing your charter statement on Bill C-59, and the first question I have is, when was the last date this was modified? It's just to make sure I have the last update on this.

[Douglas Breithaupt]

The charter statement was tabled on the date the bill was introduced, which was June 20, and there are no updates to the statement.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

There have been no updates as far as charter analysis is concerned.

Something that came up quite a bit was threat reduction measures, and I was wondering if you could outline what you found in your charter statement in respect to the threat reduction measures.

[David Vigneault]

I will provide some comments, if the committee is comfortable with that.

First and foremost, it's important to say that all CSIS activities must comply with the charter. The minister explained the way the previous bill—Bill C-51, which became law—was constructed. There may have been an issue with the way it was constructed.

Bill C-59 essentially confirms that the law cannot create an opportunity to deviate from the charter. What it does in terms of threat reduction is to ensure that if ever we were to contemplate a threat reduction measure that would limit the freedom of someone protected by the charter, we would have to go to the Federal Court to apply for such an authorization. The Federal Court would then determine if the limit on that freedom is reasonable and proportionate, which the charter itself allows for. That is how the proposed Bill C-59 addresses the charter issue for the threat reduction mandate.

Also, the law will specify the types of activities that are contemplated, so that will be transparent in the law. I would then be able to interpret that, as the director of CSIS, to determine.... If it limits people's freedom, I have to go to the Federal Court for a test. If it's something that does not limit people's freedom, it's an activity I can do. The committee supervises our activities. The new agency would be informed and able to review the activity to make sure we have complied with the act.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

I'm not sure who is the right person to answer this question. I think it's the Department of Public Safety, Mr. Rigby.

Has there been a gender analysis on this legislation?

[Vincent Rigby]

Yes, there was.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Is that available?

[Vincent Rigby]

I can take that back and respond. I believe it's a cabinet confidence, but I wasn't present at the creation. We can certainly go back and look into that.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

All right.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

If it's not subject to cabinet confidence, I'd appreciate it if you would forward it to the committee, please.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Thank you.

On the Youth Criminal Justice Act, part 8, this would probably go to the Department of Justice. We're now creating a system whereby information about young offenders will be available to people issuing passports. Is that consistent with the objectives of the Youth Criminal Justice Act?

[Douglas Breithaupt]

You may see under the provision, I believe it's section 119 of the act, that there are a number of paragraphs dealing with authorities to share information under the act. There is an additional paragraph to be added that allows for the sharing of access to youth records for the purposes of administering the Canadian passport order, subject to the privacy protections of the act, so it is consistent with the approach taken under the act with respect to sharing information.

It indicates with whom it should be shared and the reasons. It can be made available to the Minister of Public Safety, for example, in deciding whether to grant or revoke a passport. For example, the fact that a youth has been subject to a terrorism peace bond could be made available for consideration in making those decisions.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. MacKenzie.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the panel for being here.

I'm pleased that we're updating the existing Bill C-51, and I think there are some updates in here. I'm sure we all agree that in three or five years from now we'll be looking for more updates.

One of the things that has always been of interest to me and I think to Canadians is that, if we can disrupt and prevent things, it's always better to do that than it is to deal with the fallout afterwards. I wonder if Bill C-59 has changed the scope of the non-warrant disruption activities that could be designed to reduce threats and if so, how and why?

Does Bill C-59 require a CSIS officer to obtain a warrant to go to speak to a suspected person's parents about their child's radicalization or terrorist intent? I recognize that, when you go to a judge to get a warrant, there's a lot of work, a lot of time involved, and sometimes time is of essence. Would this then enter into that whole process?

[David Vigneault]

Specifically in terms of the non-warranted threat reduction measures, the new bill does not impose any new measures. The service has used threat reduction measures about 30 or so times.

In your specific example, if we were aware of an individual who wanted to travel abroad for the purpose of joining a terrorist organization, we would not need a warrant to intervene with a parent or with people in close proximity to this individual to inform them of what we know in order for them maybe to have an influence on that. Bill C-59 does not make any changes to that provision.

As I've said, we've used this measure about 30 or so times.