In essence, it was explained to me that the IC will not have a role to play because, unlike when information is collected in active and defensive cyber operations, no collection will occur. They suggest that there are no charter or privacy rights that would be affected by these techniques that will be used outside of Canada. This is with regard to the CSE.
Unfortunately, I don't necessarily agree with that view, and neither does the Department of Justice, which is the legal adviser to the government. I'm quoting from the justice department's legal opinion, page 9 of a document entitled “Charter Statement - Bill C-59”. It's short, but it explains my position. I quote:
The provisions authorizing active cyber operations would not by definition engage any Charter rights or freedoms. However, specific activities authorized under this scheme could potentially engage rights or freedoms. The considerations that support the consistency of this aspect of the mandate with the Charter are very similar to those supporting the consistency of the defensive cyber operations mandate. One difference is the distinct purpose of active cyber operations, which would be to further the government’s compelling objectives in relation to Canada’s international affairs, defence or security.
Although no information is collected, people's private communications will be disrupted, influenced, and interfered with, and this could very well, in my view, affect Canadians in the same way as inadvertently collecting information on Canadians abroad. In my view, there should be no difference between collecting communications of Canadians abroad and disrupting and interfering with communications of Canadians abroad, so—