First of all, I think it's important to appreciate that the acronym for mutually assured destruction is MAD, but part of the complexity in that is that the threats are not necessarily from state actors. That's a challenge in itself.
The thing that concerns me the most, frankly, is advanced persistent threats. They're already planted and they're sitting there waiting for the folks in Pyongyang or Beijing to decide that now is the time we're going to do this.
We've changed our systems. I mean, we don't turn on the SCADA operating systems at nuclear power plants anymore by somebody flipping a switch, and it's created a vulnerability. I'm not a techie but I think the capacity to proactively intercept and stop, take down the systems and remove the capability to cause the harm, is an essential component.
Having said that, however, I think it is critically important, given the authority and the power that's there and its ramifications, that this should not simply be one branch of government reporting to another, then signing off and saying that's it. I think this is something, given its importance, that requires some form of independent review and authorization. Although we would want all of these circumstances to be considered exigent, some kind of a review should be done after the fact. I think, just as a general principle, that unless there's a reason not to have that independent oversight, the nature of the authority is such that it requires that balancing effect.