I wish I could be, Mr. Chair, more specific. We've been as specific as we possibly can be in the report in the Canadian context.
I would, however, repeat that the evidence indicates that this is happening in the context of every political party in this country at all levels of government. It's about the deployment of individuals on Canadian soil directed by a foreign state actor.
I would point committee members and Canadians to paragraphs 70 and 74 as an example of the extent to which a foreign actor will go. We lay out what has ostensibly happened in the likely launching of a cyber-attack against the Australian Parliament and its three largest political parties, likely by China, prior to the Australian general election in early 2019.
We then go on to describe what happened in June 2020 when China likely conducted another large-scale cyber-attack against Australia and Australian companies, hospitals, schools and government officials.
In the case of the United States, in paragraph 74, since our report was published the U.S. justice department and Homeland Security confirmed that their voting machines weren't necessarily tampered with, but Russia clearly tried to influence the election by using sophisticated online disinformation campaigns.
We've captured that in the report to point out the nature, the extent and the level to which some state actors will go to disrupt the democracy that we have, which is why we made four or five major recommendations to the Prime Minister around the five-person panel that is there to help blow the whistle, if and when major irregularities should occur during a Canadian election. We think it should be expanded. We think the membership should be varied, and we think the way in which Canadians are informed should be handled very carefully.