Evidence of meeting #8 for Public Safety and National Security in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was police.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Conservative
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Thank you. It's always difficult. There are so many interesting areas, and we don't generally speak openly from a committee perspective on what we are or are not doing. We simply come to ground on what we're doing, and then we announce it and then we speak only once we have produced something.
You can imagine that many of us were asked to comment last week about the opposition day motion. That's all fine and good, but generally we don't respond at all. However, I think one interesting area that the committee might consider is the whole question of the Investment Canada Act, the tests that may or may not be applied now for foreign acquisitions of Canadian companies and the sufficiency or insufficiency of those tests or the metrics that are used. That could be helpful in a Canadian context in an increasingly globalized world.
We have decided internally, Mr. Van Popta, to reduce the number of reports and reviews. You can see why, perhaps, given the document in front of you. We'll be staggering the releases of those as well.
Conservative
Tako Van Popta Conservative Langley—Aldergrove, BC
Good. Thank you.
Mr. McGuinty, I think I'm not the only Canadian citizen who is surprised, reading this report, at the extent to which Communist China seems to be infiltrating our media. I'm referring particularly to paragraph 159 in your report, where the term used is “borrowing a boat to go out into the ocean”, the implication there being that the People's Republic of China uses western media to get their message out. It is a shock to hear the extent to which that is happening.
Going back to the opposition day motion about having a more robust relationship and reviewing that, with regard to our relationship with China, did the Prime Minister seek advice from you as committee chair on the opposition day motion? It seemed to be very much aligned with what your report suggested.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
No, he did not. Thanks for the question. We've never spoken about the opposition day motion. I didn't participate in that debate.
I'm hoping that the opposition day motion, though, will drive an awful lot of interest in the details laid out in this report, as you rightly point out. In this case, it's with regard to threats to media, what's going on with threats to our universities, threats to our ethnocultural communities, and threats to folks who are seeking public office. We thought it was really important to expose as much as we could, to be as transparent as possible, so Canadians understood the amplitude of the risk.
Conservative
Tako Van Popta Conservative Langley—Aldergrove, BC
Thank you. I just want to congratulate—
Sorry, am I out of time?
Conservative
Tako Van Popta Conservative Langley—Aldergrove, BC
Okay, I just want to congratulate members of the Liberal Party who actually voted with us on that motion.
Mr. McGuinty, I noticed you weren't one of them, which in retrospect maybe surprises me, given the thoroughness of your report highlighting the threats coming from China.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I knew I shouldn't have given you that extra time.
Madame Khera, you have five minutes.
Liberal
Kamal Khera Liberal Brampton West, ON
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to both our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. McGuinty, for being here and for the incredible work that you and your committee do. I think it's extremely important.
Perhaps, though, I can get you started on something very basic. I find that among Canadians there are many different versions or understandings of what foreign interference is, but more importantly, across government agencies and departments there are a variety of different definitions of what foreign interference is.
Could you explain briefly exactly what foreign interference is? Can you touch on why you think departments and agencies struggle to agree on the definition of foreign interference?
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
That's an excellent question. We try to tackle that, Ms. Khera, in the report, in chapter 2. I think it starts at paragraph 106 or 107. We talk about the definition: “activities ranging from overt and often friendly forms of normal diplomatic conduct on the one hand to covert and hostile actions on the other”.
The CSIS Act goes some distance in describing what foreign interference is, and you rightly point out that one of the things we came up against fairly early on was the fact that there wasn't a sort of uniform nomenclature across the entire security and intelligence community, or an understanding.
For example, if foreign interference were being exercised on the ground in a municipality somewhere, maybe in a municipal election campaign, for example, or maybe in some other form or fashion, you wouldn't get necessarily an understanding from front-line police officers. If an outstanding female OPP officer came across something that might constitute foreign interference, she might not know what to do with it or wouldn't understand it as foreign interference.
That's one of the things that we've addressed: to lay out what it looks like. Again, in paragraph 108, we talk about the effects of “Foreign interference activities” and what's at risk here. It undermines a series of Canadian values.
Liberal
Kamal Khera Liberal Brampton West, ON
Thank you for bringing that up in terms of my line of questioning. I know, as you mentioned, that one of the challenges of investigating suspected foreign interference is that these activities can take place alongside legitimate activities such as public diplomacy or academic collaboration, or they may target specific ethnic diasporas to influence Canada's position domestically or internationally.
Mr. McGuinty, I represent Brampton West, one of the most diverse ridings in the country. Can you talk a bit about what vulnerabilities this poses to ethnic diaspora communities like mine? I know that sometimes many lines can be blurred to showcase if something is legitimate or illegitimate. Can you talk about the challenges that CSIS is having in investigating suspected foreign interference and how it can be addressed?
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Maybe I can take a crack at it and ask Ms. Marcoux to add something as well.
It's really important for committee members to hear what our committee says on this, which is that we're not singling out ethnocultural communities—as some have asked us about in the past—because we want to negatively affect the perceptions of certain ethnocultural communities in Canada. On the contrary, we want it to be really clear that it is different ethnic and cultural communities that are actually the targets of foreign states. The committee emphasizes that these communities should be free from foreign threats and inducements. They're targets.
That's why, for example, we also highlight a measure that was passed through China, which basically extends extraterritorially to Chinese-Canadian nationals who are here a so-called responsibility back to China. That is also laid out in detail in the report.
Maybe Ms. Marcoux could answer a little of that as well, if that's okay.
Liberal
Executive Director, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Sure.
Getting back to your question about CSIS, for an investigation to be initiated for foreign interference, it has to be very clearly presented or seen as detrimental to the interests of Canadians and Canada, and of a clandestine or deceptive nature.
Any activity that constitutes lawful advocacy, protest or dissent is specifically excluded from investigation, but it's also why it has been so difficult for government and for certain agencies to present a threat from foreign interference. It's because it is so complex and and can be misconstrued as legitimate discussion or protest.
Executive Director, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
I hope that answers your question.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Madam Khera, the tech team is asking if you could move the boom on your microphone up slightly. I'll leave it to you.
Madame Michaud, you have two and a half minutes, please.
Bloc
Kristina Michaud Bloc Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC
Mr. McGuinty, I'd like to talk about CBSA and the findings in your report. You recommend that the public safety minister provide CBSA with written direction on the conduct of sensitive national security and intelligence activities. The direction should include clear accountability expectations and annual reporting obligations.
According to your report, that direction should have been provided by the minister months, even years, ago. CBSA has been asking the minister for clear direction since 2013, but to no avail.
In recent weeks, La Presse has learned that CBSA had reportedly approved direction, but that the minister had yet to issue directives.
Why do you think ministerial directives have not yet been issued formally? The government seems to be pinning the blame on COVID-19, given that directives were supposed to be approved back in February. Nevertheless, it seems to be part of a broader plan, so I'd like to hear your thoughts.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
If I understand what you're asking, you would like to know whether the minister is exercising his authority to issue directives.
Bloc
Kristina Michaud Bloc Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC
Actually, the minister must issue clear direction to CBSA on accountability, among other things. CBSA has apparently been waiting on those directives and rules for a few years now. The former Conservative government did not do it either.
Can you elaborate on your recommendation to the minister?
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Ms. Marcoux, would you mind answering that, please?
Executive Director, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Yes, absolutely.
We did not get a response from the minister. In the course of our review, we did indeed note that ministerial directives were lacking, but we did not receive a response as to why they were not issued.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
Mr. McGuinty, thank you for your report. It's very sobering.
I have dozens of questions, but little time. I will note that the government has had this report for 15 months now, so the kinds of responses we were just talking about should already have been done. I'm assuming the government will have no trouble within 30 days to come up with a robust plan according to the motion of last week.
My question specifically deals with one of your recommendations, which is about assessing the adequacy of existing legislation that deals with foreign interference. I'm assuming you found various shortcomings in the legislation as it exists.
Could you take a few minutes to outline some of the inadequacies, or some of the shortcomings, or something that should be done to improve the ability of Canada to protect against foreign interference?
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Mr. Harris, would you point me toward the right recommendation, the number?