Public Safety Committee on May 30th, 2024

[Mark Scrivens]

Thank you for the question.

I'm speaking on behalf of the Department of Justice, but I can address the question.

Certainly, we have benefited from having seen the experiences of the Australian legislation, and the bill reflects efforts to learn from the experiences of Australia. In particular, some of the definitions in the Australian legislation have been criticized as being vague and not providing sufficient detail to guide law enforcement and prosecutors. We took note of that in the design of the current legislation.

[Chandra Arya, Liberal, Nepean, ON]

Again, I'm quoting from the article. It says:

...it has become a cautionary tale for the country's large diaspora communities.... In theory, the new laws were an effort to defend democracy against foreign influence. In practice, they have raised tough questions about when such intentions might drift into xenophobia....

How do we give assurance to the diaspora communities in Canada that this will not happen here in Canada?

We'll start with CSIS again.

[René Ouellette]

I can start by saying that the consultations that preceded the introduction of the legislation were extensive and included discussions with a wide range of diaspora communities' leadership, including, for example, the cross-cultural roundtable on security.

We've heard these concerns. They've been expressed loud and clear during the consultation phase of the bill. That input that was provided by these communities and by our partners and stakeholders has been incorporated into the drafting of the legislation in a way that we expect will prevent the kinds of issues that you're raising this morning.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Arya.

That wraps up the third round. We'll start a fourth round following the same pattern, except this time I think we'll run out of time by the time we finish with Mr. MacGregor, so we'll end it there.

Also, before we rise, I want to encourage all parties to get witness lists to the clerk—hopefully by noon tomorrow—in some priority fashion so that we have a sporting chance of setting up meetings for next week. The clerk will do his best to organize things in terms of who is available and when they can get here, given the priorities that we provide to him.

Having said that, I will now go to Mr. Caputo for five minutes.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Bittle pointed out that I was incorrect during my last round, so I should correct the record: The NDP leader's pension will vest prior to that date. It was 25% of his caucus that I should have been referring to.

Now, in any event, when we're talking about sabotage and the sabotage-related offences, we are speaking about infrastructure and critical infrastructure. I'm going to see if I can find the exact wording of the provision that talks about essential infrastructure and the definition of that essential infrastructure. My question is whether.... For instance, under proposed subsection 52.1(2) of the Criminal Code, we're talking about “transportation infrastructure”, “information and communication technology infrastructure”, etc. There are eight enumerated grounds, and then the regulations can add other infrastructure.

Would the offence of sabotage apply only to infrastructure that has actually been completed—in other words, an existing rail line or an existing telecommunications line? What about when a private company or the government is in the process of planning or constructing that infrastructure? Would the offence of sabotage apply to that as well?

[Heather Watts]

What I would draw your attention to is the definition of “essential infrastructure” in the bill: “a facility or system, whether public or private, that provides or distributes services that are essential”. I think it would be a question of the specific facts and the operational state of that infrastructure.

In theory, something that is still under construction is not actually at that point providing or distributing, which is what we've defined as essential infrastructure here. Obviously, interference with that type of thing may be covered under other offences in the code but may not necessarily fall within the offence of sabotage related to essential infrastructure as in the bill.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Okay, that's interesting. To me, that's a bit of a gap, because foreign interference could certainly seek to undermine that which is being built in Canada for infrastructure. That might be an area that should be considered for amendment.

One of the questions I have is in relation to the offence of sabotage as well. The offence has a five-year maximum. This, to me, feels like a fairly serious offence. Is there a reason that there isn't a higher maximum for the sentence?

[Heather Watts]

I'll just correct you. It's a maximum 10-year sentence for sabotage when committed by way of indictment.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Oh, okay. I'm sorry. I thought it went from two years to five years, but I must have misread that. I apologize. Okay, thank you.

I believe Mr. Genuis is really chomping at the bit here to get in a last couple of questions, so I'll cede my time to him.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Always. Thank you, Mr. Caputo.

One gap in terms of the response here has been around people facing coordinated discrimination based on political activity and people in diaspora communities who are involved in pro-democracy activity, for example, who then face various forms of discrimination that may be officially or unofficially coordinated from abroad. One instance I heard of recently was someone involved in pro-democracy activism related to Hong Kong who faced negative consequences from their landlord as a result of it.

Now, I have a private member's bill, Bill C-257, that would add political belief and activity as prohibited grounds of discrimination, which I think is one solution. That wouldn't apply in provincial jurisdiction, but it would apply in federal jurisdiction. You can imagine similar models being adopted provincially.

However, I think this is one problem that Bill C-70 does not solve. I'd be curious for your feedback—especially the Department of Justice officials' feedback—on this and what steps could be taken to protect people from discrimination that may be coordinated from abroad and may respond to political activities they're involved in here in Canada.

[Heather Watts]

I'll make a few remarks, and if my colleague has more to supplement them, he can do that.

I will admit that I am not familiar with your private member's bill, but I'm going to guess, based on how you've described it, that what you're talking about is adding political belief to the Canadian Human Rights Act. Is that correct?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Exactly.

[Heather Watts]

Okay. The Canadian Human Rights Act is a bit different, in the sense that it applies to relationships between private individuals and discrimination that may take place there. The stuff we have in the bill would not cover those scenarios unless there is a link to a foreign entity, if that makes sense.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

If there is a link to a foreign entity, will it be covered? If the person who was doing the discriminating was involved with or connected to a foreign entity in some way, but it was in a private relationship, would the bill impact that, and how?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

That is your time.

The witness may answer.

[Heather Watts]

Perhaps I'll just clarify the terms. Discrimination, normally, is how you provide goods and services in the sense of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

My colleague can supplement this, but I think what could potentially apply here is if, for example, you are doing something as the landlord, the direction and benefit from and association with the foreign entity could potentially be covered by the new general foreign interference offence.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

[Mark Scrivens]

Just briefly, if the form of the discrimination rises to intimidation, threats, violence or coercive behaviour that doesn't give the victim a choice in the matter, then certainly, the new and newly amended offences in section 20 and proposed sections 20.1 and 20.2 could apply to those circumstances.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

We'll go now to Mr. Gaheer for five minutes, please.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

Great. Thank you, Chair.

I understand the sensitivities around asking this question, but could the officials please speak to the intelligence-gathering mechanism to establish that there is an arrangement between a foreign principal and an individual or entity here in Canada? What's involved in that intelligence gathering?

[Richard Bilodeau]

Thank you for that question.

I can start. I won't speak to the collection capabilities of intelligence partners, but I will speak from the perspective of a client or a consumer of intelligence.

We have intelligence shared with us, and that can be informative. Again, it depends on the nature of the intelligence in terms of its corroboration and value, how it can be relied upon or caveats associated with its use. There is a structure around intelligence and how it's shared with law enforcement. I am not an expert in that field. I would defer to my colleagues from the service or from the Department of Justice on that to clarify it or take it away.

The commissioner has investigative powers to collect information, but could also receive intelligence that has been collected by partners, so there is a distinction there. Obviously, when you get intelligence, there are limits to how it can be used, which are imposed by the process.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

Okay.

Is there a mechanism to ensure that there is information sharing between different government agencies?

What if different agencies have different pieces of the pie? What mechanism is there to ensure that they combine that information to see the entire picture? Maybe that reaches the point where they can launch an investigation.

[Sarah Estabrooks]

The service, for example, is unlimited in the disclosure of information and intelligence to the Government of Canada. That's its principal client, and of course it can disclose intelligence widely.

Are there processes in place for ensuring that the sharing is wide? Yes. Are they perfect? No. This is a point that came up in the recent public inquiry report, and I think we have a significant commitment to address some of the issues in this respect.

When it comes to sharing with a particular body, it's slightly different for more routine intelligence gathering and sharing. I assume—and I'm guessing—we'll have to have some mechanisms, an MOU, a process or a structure for doing this, but not until the bill becomes law. That's not the current focus.

However, the broader integration of the security and intelligence partnership and key clients is very strong at all levels, and the sharing of intelligence is a huge priority, but there are some process improvements that can be made.

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

What I can say is that essentially the service has the legal authority to share. The legislation for FITAA sets out that the commissioner can receive the information, consume it and use it. There will need to be arrangements and MOUs established between the two organizations to receive the information and make sure that the classified systems are in place to receive and store the information.

That's one of the reasons the commissioner would be housed in a department. It's to make sure that we optimize the use of the information-sharing arrangements and the infrastructure that is there for the intelligence to be shared with the commissioner.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

That's great. Thank you.