Public Safety Committee on June 3rd, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

We go now to Ms. Dzerowicz for five minutes, please.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank both of you for your excellent contributions so far.

I'm not usually someone who sits on this committee, and I feel very privileged to be here.

One of the hats I wear is that of chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. I'm often with other NATO parliamentarians around the world. We often talk about foreign interference, cybersecurity and disinformation. One of the things we talk about is whether or not our national security and intelligence units have the ability to be transparent about attacks that might be happening and that they stop. For example, around disinformation, often it's a way of communicating to the broader public that something has taken place and has been stopped.

I want to get your take first, Mr. Kempa, and then Mr. Burton's, if he has something to add, as to whether there is the framework in place that allows CSIS to be able to provide that transparency to Canadians.

[Michael Kempa]

CSIS, currently and with this legislation, would have the transparency to report on, essentially, successes in addressing disinformation campaigns. The only thing I would say is that, obviously, they wouldn't release details that would let other entities know what they're capable of or how they succeeded, because then those entities would simply change their tactics and so forth.

However, as part of CSIS's developing culture to inform the public and report, there's no reason they couldn't do so in general terms.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Do you have anything to add, Dr. Burton?

[Dr. Charles Burton]

Yes. I've mentioned this before in Parliament: Compared with Australia, the United States and Great Britain, our security agencies, up until relatively recently, have been much less forthcoming about matters. Mr. Vigneault said to the old commission, “The purpose of CSIS is to have secrets.” Well, I hear what he's saying, but I think a sort of cult of secrecy may be going too far. If other nations are able to be more forthcoming and provide more information about foreign interference and influence operations in their statements of claim in legal cases and so on, Canada could start to do the same.

I defer to Mr. Kempa on this, but there seems to be a cultural issue within our security agencies. They are much more reluctant than other nations to inform Canadians and Parliament about what they're doing.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Well, I think there's been excellent testimony today about the need for a culture shift, not only because of Bill C-70 but also, I think, because of the world we live in and the threats we face.

Mr. Kempa, in a number of recent articles, you discussed the serious problem that foreign interference represents, particularly in local nominations. Of course, there's a minority government under way right now. Lots of nominations are under way and will continue to be under way.

To what extent do you think Bill C-70 will protect the legitimacy of upcoming nominations in the next election?

[Michael Kempa]

It helps directly, in the sense that CSIS would be able to share information, obviously, with political parties across the board sooner, and also work in partnership, for example, with Elections Canada. Obviously, Elections Canada does not regulate most of the details of nomination procedures, but it certainly does in the area of, for example, the financing of nominations. That would be a significant step forward, certainly.

The other issue around the leaky nature of unregulated nominations and foreign interference has to do with the Elections Act and the fact that parties follow private rules for nominations, apart from finance. This bill would be a step in the right direction in that sense.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Thank you.

My final question is for Dr. Burton.

I've had constituents in my own riding come to my office and say, “Julie, I'm convinced that I am being monitored by the Chinese government.” The only place I can refer them to is our local police. I think there's some division somewhere that is supporting them.

I guess my question to you is this: It might be in protocols and regulations, but is there enough of a framework here, particularly around the commissioner, for when someone in public feels they are being monitored? Would they be able to find an avenue where someone could help them?

[Dr. Charles Burton]

Yes, I think that also came up among parliamentarians in the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, IPAC.

I received some informal information from CSIS in that regard. I didn't know about it. For whatever reason, it doesn't seem to be their common practice. However, they approached me about this, and I'm grateful they did. I don't know. I don't think I'm really equal to challenging skilled young hackers out of Shanghai who are trying to get my emails and telephone conversations, but I'm making my best effort to encrypt and be more careful.

I don't see why CSIS can't tell you if they suspect that. They did not tell me who it was, or why it was. They only told me when it started. I took that information on board and tried my best to find out about how to be more careful in my cyber-communications.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Ms. Dzerowicz.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today. It's been most helpful. It will be a great help to us in moving forward with this legislation.

We'll suspend for a few minutes and bring in the next panel.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting back to order.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses for the second hour.

We have, from the Canada Tibet Committee, Sherap Therchin, executive director; from the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, Mehmet Tohti, executive director; and from the World Sikh Organization of Canada, Balpreet Singh, legal counsel, who is joining us by video conference.

I will now invite Mr. Therchin to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Sherap Therchin, Executive Director, Canada Tibet Committee]

Thank you, Chair and committee members.

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today on the important matter of countering foreign interference. I would like to thank everyone involved for taking this matter seriously and for the detailed process to develop countering measures.

I would like to focus my presentation on part 1 of Bill C-70 with reference to the review of the bill by Sarah Teich and Hannah Taylor. While the review finds many of the amendments encouraging, it points to a limitation, which is that Bill C-70 does not propose the addition of a definition of “transnational repression” to any pieces of legislation that the bill proposes to amend or enact.

Defining transnational repression is essential to recognize and address the specific tactics used by foreign states to silence dissent among diaspora communities. This repression can take various forms, including harassment, surveillance, threats, coercion and physical violence. Authoritarian states, such as the People's Republic of China, routinely use these tactics to control dissent and opposition beyond their borders.

The PRC's transnational repression is a well-documented phenomenon affecting several groups, including the Tibetan diaspora. The Chinese Communist Party employs various methods to exert control and suppress Tibetan activism and identity worldwide.

I'd like to describe some of the key tactics here.

One is surveillance and intimidation. The CCP gathers personal information on exiled Tibetans through cyber-attacks and spyware and by questioning relatives in Tibet. This information is used to intimidate and coerce Tibetans abroad, often through direct threats or by harming their families back home.

Two is coercion by proxy. The Chinese authorities frequently threaten or harm relatives of exiled Tibetans in Tibet to exert control over the diaspora. This method ensures that exiled activists are silenced or forced to conform to the CCP's demands out of fear for their loved ones.

Three is infiltration and disinformation. The CCP infiltrates the Tibetan diaspora communities and organizations, using spies and co-opted individuals to sow distrust, spread disinformation and undermine solidarity networks. These activities severely disrupt the community's ability to organize and advocate for Tibetan rights.

Four is economic and social coercion. Tibetan exiles often face economic and social pressure from the CCP, including blackmail and efforts to sabotage their livelihoods. Such tactics aim to destabilize the diaspora and reduce its capacity to support the Tibetan cause.

There is a need for a clear definition in Bill C-70. Incorporating a clear definition of transnational repression in Bill C-70 would enhance Canada's ability to combat such foreign interference effectively. It would provide a legal basis for identifying and prosecuting transnational repression activities, thereby protecting diaspora communities from foreign state harassment and coercion.

With this, I'd like to offer some recommendations for Bill C-70.

Recommendation one is to define “transnational repression”: Include a comprehensive definition of transnational repression that encompasses all forms of extraterritorial control and coercion used by foreign states against diaspora communities.

Recommendation two is to enhance surveillance and prosecution mechanisms: Strengthen provisions within the CSIS Act and the Criminal Code to allow for robust monitoring and prosecution of transnational repression activities, ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable.

Recommendation three is to support victims and communities: Establish mechanisms, including specialized funds, to support and protect diaspora communities, providing resources and assistance to those affected by transnational repression.

Finally, recommendation four is international co-operation: Foster international collaboration to address transnational repression, working with allies to develop coordinated responses and share best practices.

In conclusion, defining transnational repression in Bill C-70 is a crucial step towards effectively countering the PRC's tactics against the Tibetan diaspora and other affected communities. By recognizing and addressing these activities, Canada can better protect the rights and freedoms of all its residents, ensuring a safe and supportive environment for those fleeing authoritarian oppression.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

We'll go now to Mr. Tohti for an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Mehmet Tohti, Executive Director, Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project]

Thank you, Chair and distinguished members.

I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify today about the critical and pressing issue that we have been advocating on for nearly decades: countering foreign interference. As a fervent advocate for the Uyghur people and against the Chinese Communist Party's ongoing genocide, I can say that foreign interference by the Chinese state has had a marked impact on my personal life here in Canada.

Chinese repressive and innovative efforts to silence dissidents have attempted to shackle my activism and intimidate me into retreating from speaking out about the devastation of my family, friends and community. I have received numerous times threatening phone calls from the state police directly and messages about the most wild things being said about my loved ones. I'm a Canadian, and my rights to exercise free speech and freedom of assembly are attempted to be curtailed by the Chinese government all the time.

Bill C-70 is a heartening response by the Canadian government to my community's experience of transnational repression. Bill C-70 is a significant step forward in addressing foreign interference and protecting Canadian citizens from transnational repression. We talk about transnational repression because, on a personal level, we do not experience interference. We experience repression by the hijacking of our family members just for our speaking up in Canada. For that reason, both Tibetans and Uyghurs use the term “transnational repression”.

As a human rights defender, I do believe that the broader application and the coverage of certain acts of transnational repression against human rights activists afforded by the proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will allow for greater protection of the full and uninhibited exercise of our democratic rights in Canada. The proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will foster a joint strength among us Canadians to effectively counter threats to the security of Canada and safeguard the diaspora communities in Canada and abroad.

The expansion of information disclosure to anyone, not just a public official, if deemed to be essential in the public interest, will allow for enhanced bureaucratic transparency. Enhancing CSIS's ability to carry out its important functions serves to strengthen Canadians' trust in the agency and its capacity to detect, prevent and respond to threats from foreign agents, including those from China.

Necessarily, Bill C-70's emphasis on international co-operation underpins a crucial and powerful tactic in countering the global reach of authoritarian regimes such as China.

I applaud the proposed creation of a foreign influence transparency registry, which will enhance the effectiveness of protecting vulnerable diaspora communities, and the proposed appointment of a commissioner of foreign influence transparency; however, I am a little bit concerned about the absence in Bill C-70 of proposing the addition of specific foreign interference offences to the Criminal Code, nor does it propose that refugee espionage, online harassment or digital violence be criminalized. Further, given the limited amendments to the Criminal Code, there are deficient means for the victims of foreign interference to seek redress for the impacts of transnational oppression.

It is crucial that the government go beyond interference that activists carry out in relation to certain political and government processes in all aspects of Bill C-70. The Chinese government's reach extends far beyond attempts at directly interfering with Canadian institutions. My experience of transnational oppression is unrelated to political or governmental process, yet it is an assault on my democratic rights, warranting protection as much as upholding the integrity of our democratic process.

Crucially, addressing foreign interference must take a victim-centric approach. Chinese transnational oppression and interference in Canada pose a significant threat to the Uyghur communities and the Canadian values of freedom and democracy. With the introduction of Bill C-70, Canada is making a strong statement against those oppressive tactics. It is imperative that we remain vigilant, stand in solidarity with those affected and take concrete steps to counter these challenges.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir.

I now invite Mr. Singh to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Balpreet Singh, Legal Counsel, World Sikh Organization of Canada]

Good afternoon. My name is Balpreet Singh. I serve as legal counsel for the World Sikh Organization of Canada, which is also known as the WSO.

The first week of June is a particularly sombre time for Sikhs, as we remember the 1984 Sikh genocide and the Indian government's brutal attack on the Darbar Sahib complex and approximately 70 other gurdwaras across Punjab. I mention the horrific acts of June 1984 to remind committee members of the price that Sikh community members have paid due to state-sponsored violence, foreign interference and surveillance, simply for practising our faith.

For the past 40 years, India has consistently sought to intimidate Sikhs in Canada and stifle Sikh advocacy for Khalistan, which is a sovereign state governed according to Sikh principles and values. This interference has included disinformation campaigns, visa denials, intimidation of family members and, as we know now, even assassinations. Discussing or promoting Khalistan is protected under freedom of expression and political discourse. Attempts to draw attention to ongoing Indian interference targeting Sikhs have fallen largely on deaf ears, as India constantly maligns Sikh activism as extremism and worse.

The Sikh community is currently at a pivotal moment in its history. In June 2023, Bhai Hardeep Singh Nijjar was assassinated while leaving the Guru Nanak gurdwara in Surrey, where he served as president. The community, including our own organization, the WSO, recognized that this was an assassination at the hands of the Indian state. This was later substantiated as information emerged of Indian plans to kill Sikh activists here in Canada and across the world.

This weekend, I met with two Sikhs who have been given duties to warn. They have been provided with no details on the source of the threat they face or any resources to protect themselves. In short, they feel that they are on their own and pretty much abandoned.

Foreign interference has had deadly consequences for Sikhs in Canada. We believe more needs to be done to counter foreign interference. In that respect, Bill C-70 is a step in the right direction.

I would like to highlight the ability of CSIS to now disclose security information to any person or entity, should CSIS deem it relevant. This will be a positive step. However, we are also concerned about whether foreign consular officials in Canada might also be considered an entity. Also, India regularly supplies false and misleading intelligence about Sikh activists in Canada. There would need to be some sort of controls to ensure that this isn't further disseminated.

We know that the framework for co-operation on countering terrorism and violent extremism between Canada and India is still active. We have grave concerns over intelligence sharing between Canada and India. Vigilance needs to be ensured, so that new powers created by this legislation are used to counter foreign interference and not turned around against communities here. India has falsely claimed that Khalistan activism in Canada is directed by foreign state actors. Could accusations like that trigger the provisions in this bill?

The sabotage provision being added to the Criminal Code makes it an offence to interfere “with access to an essential infrastructure...with the intent to”—and this is in (b)—“endanger the safety or security of the naval, army or air forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada”. Sikhs have often protested in front of Indian consulates and the embassy here in Ottawa. The Indian embassy staff includes a military, naval and air attaché. Last year, the Indian media falsely reported that the Indian embassy in Ottawa was targeted with “two grenades” by a Sikh protester—a story covered today in the Journal de Montréal. India's NIA, the National Investigation Agency, also filed charges against a Montreal-based Sikh based on these accusations. Could this new Criminal Code provision be used to stifle Sikh protests?

With the short amount of time I have left, I'd like to highlight the reference to international relations between countries in Bill C-70.

We're concerned that this language and provision could go against the overall purpose of the legislation. Judges are given discretion to not release records following a trial if they believe that doing so “would be injurious to international relations or national defence or national security”. Additionally, subsection 82.31(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act gives the minister the ability to intervene if they believe that matters could damage international relations.

The reason foreign interference against Sikhs has gone unchecked for the past 40 years is the desire of successive Canadian governments to increase trade relations with India. This has been at the expense of the Sikh community. A report by Sam Cooper in The Bureau revealed that “CSIS planned a major intervention in 2017” to dismantle “Indian intelligence networks in Vancouver that were monitoring and targeting the Sikh community”. According to this report, this operation was obstructed by the government, citing potential repercussions for Canada-India relations.

Canada needs new tools to counter foreign interference, no doubt. However, our organization and the Sikh community fear that the international relations clause may be used as an excuse to ignore ongoing interference by India against Sikhs in Canada and might even create tools that would persecute Canadian Sikh activists.

That's my time.

I look forward to the questions you might have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir, for your remarks.

We'll start the questions with Mr. Genuis, please.

You have six minutes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

It's a real pleasure for me to have these three witnesses before the committee. All three individuals represent groups that I've had a chance to work with for almost the entirety of my time as a member of Parliament.

I want to thank all three of you for the way you diligently inform us as legislators and also for your work on many important issues.

As all of you know, Conservatives have been highlighting the urgent need to pass this legislation. The Liberal government has done everything possible over the last nine years to delay action on foreign interference. We are concerned, given the delays we've seen, that they may want to avoid this legislation being in force in time for the next election, which is why we have been pushing them for timelines to get this done.

This is a question for all three of you. I would ask you to answer it quickly, if possible. I want feedback from each of your on the information-sharing provisions in this legislation.

If CSIS is aware of a threat against an individual, there are obviously many advantages to CSIS being able to make the decision to inform that individual of the threats directly. There's maybe the concern about potentially political decision-making if there's a political check requirement and that leading to an avoidance of information being disseminated.

What do you think about the information-sharing provisions? Are they adequate? Should they be strengthened?

I would ask for a quick response from all three of you, please.

[Mehmet Tohti]

It is important. It has been a one-way street. At least now we will have a chance to hear from CSIS. A number of times we faced direct threats and there was no warning. We could face a direct attack by people just following us in a car. In that circumstance, if there was a warning beforehand, and if there was a car chasing us in our daily life, at least we could take some personal precautions or additional measures to protect ourselves.

[Sherap Therchin]

I would add that depending upon the level of seriousness of information that is available from CSIS about the citizen, if the information is serious enough and if it could possibly help prevent any danger to the citizen, then I think the information should be made available or shared with the concerned citizen.

[Balpreet Singh]

I'll just add that this could potentially be a double-edged sword. We definitely, as a community, need to know more when there are threats against members of our community. Right now, like I said, these individuals who have duties to warn are completely in the dark. They have no idea who's threatening them and what the level of that threat is.

On the other side, we also know that there's an open channel with this framework of co-operation between India and Canada passing information back and forth. Is this information, potentially false information, often coming from India, going to be disseminated further as a result of this? Second, do foreign diplomats or other entities here in Canada count as entities with whom CSIS can share this information?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you.

I have a second question. How will bad actors try to get around this legislation, and what could we possibly do to block those workarounds? One area that occurred to me is that they might try to interfere through subtle pressure, discrimination or implied threats rather than direct threats.

What do you see as being the likely response from bad actors, and how can we cut off those kinds of potential responses?

I would ask for a quick response from everyone again.

[Sherap Therchin]

I would like to go back to my focus on the need to define transnational repression. If the legislation does not include a clear definition of transnational repression, I think it gives an opportunity for authoritarian states like China to go around the legislation and coerce diaspora communities, including Tibetans, to do what they want them to do.

In the specific example of Tibetans, in recent years there have been cases of Tibetans applying for a visa to visit Tibet, which is usually considered very difficult. If you have participated in, let's say, the annual Tibetan National Uprising Day, which is on March 10, or if you are a regular participant at the celebration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's birthday, you most likely won't get a visa. If you do manage to get a visa and if you do manage to visit inside Tibet, when you come back to Canada, you'll be asked to gather information, or you'll be asked not to attend anymore those events that you used to attend.

It's about having that clear definition. This is just one example.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Okay.

We have probably about 20 seconds for both of you on this.