Public Safety Committee on June 5th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

We will start our second round with Mr. Lloyd for five minutes and end it with Mr. MacGregor.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses.

It's good to be back at committee. My wife and I welcomed our third child three weeks ago, so I've been taking a bit of time.

[Some hon. members]

Hear, hear!

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Thanks to my colleagues for supporting me during that time.

I'm going to talk about an issue that I don't think gets talked about enough. It's not really controversial.

In proposed section 31, we have the five-year mandatory parliamentary review. In this legislation, different from the NSICOP Act, there's also a report that needs to be given to Parliament within one year of that review. We're currently almost two years overdue for the report on the NSICOP Act. I'm concerned that, if this legislation goes forward as is, a future Parliament.... It might not be until two Parliaments from now, given that there's a four-year mandate if there's a majority government. It might not be until two Parliaments from now when this critical legislation gets reviewed.

Dr. Leuprecht, I wonder if you have any suggestions or recommendations about shortening that five-year review period, or about whether we should put additional language in there to ensure this review takes precedence at committee, rather than just being shuttled off whenever another piece of legislation or an important issue comes up—just like the NSICOP Act review has been delayed.

Thank you.

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

We live in a democracy and it's ultimately up to the government of the day and our elected representatives to decide what the priorities are and how they're going to tackle them. I think the Prime Minister has also made that very clear with intelligence and national security. There are, of course, other examples, such as the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorism Financing Act, where the review is long overdue.

The first thing my students always want to do is change legislation. I always tell them that changing legislation is probably the single hardest thing you could possibly think of doing. Think of a tax incentive, policy or regulation—whatever. Don't try to change legislation, because you might spend a decade on it. You have to look for a politically opportune moment to bring in legislation such as this, Bill C-51 or others. Nonetheless, it keeps the attention on the matter. Otherwise, it just drops off the radar and nobody will pay attention to it until we run into some sort of crisis.

If we think that the first and foremost obligation of the state is the safety and security of the citizens and its political, economic and societal institutions, we need to have a mechanism to at least try to keep our eye on the ball. That's what I think these reviews do.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Do you feel that the mechanism that currently exists...? This bill has mechanisms similar to what we've seen—you know, a five-year review—but the language is slightly different. The language in this bill says “must”, but the language in previous legislation says the committee “is to”. I'm not sure that gives any more clarity on whether or not committees will be mandated. It will be up to, as you said, whether or not the government at the time places a high priority on it. Clearly, this is a high priority, and it's been something that's been neglected for far too long in this country.

Would you recommend expediting those reviews to less than five years? Also, would you recommend language that makes it stronger and puts the emphasis on this needing to take priority at the same level as legislation, which usually takes priority at committees?

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

When the current government came to power, I think it had 85 reviews on the go at the same time. My concern is that we are too specific with the reviews, and it is generating too many reviews. We would probably be better off with either a national security intelligence review or, within the remit of this committee, a five-year review on countering foreign interference and the mechanisms at our disposal—what we did five years ago, what's working, what's not working and what could work better—rather than trying to limit our swim lane so precisely to one agency and one particular act.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Thank you.

There was some discussion with the last panel discussing whether this needs to be an independent officer of Parliament.

Did you have any feedback on the pros and cons? What would be your recommendation on that matter?

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

I've written on this publicly. I'm not a big fan of the proliferation of independent officers of Parliament, in part because I think reporting to the executive actually gets us more timely, more efficient and, in many cases, more effective action. I have a lot of faith in whatever executive is in power to take action.

An independent officer of Parliament will help with transparency. I do not believe that an independent officer of Parliament will help get things done or will help to get it done faster, better or more efficiently.

I think the bureaucrats are very well intentioned...or an independent outside judge or some combination thereof, as Australia has done in the past with people who understand the system. I'm not sure you'll get something better out of an independent officer of Parliament, but I'm married so I know I'm wrong all the time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Lloyd

We go now to Mrs. Zahid.

Go ahead, please, for five minutes.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to all the witnesses. My first question is for Madame Rheault.

This legislation takes a country-agnostic approach instead of creating a list of the so-called problematic countries it would apply to. A list-based approach would be hard to update with changing and emerging threats. It would be open to political influence and considerations, and potentially stigmatize innocent members of the diaspora communities.

Can you outline the risks of a list-based approach? Why is it important to not unfairly stigmatize diaspora communities, which are often at the greatest risk from foreign interference and threats?

[Emmanuelle Rheault]

Based on my knowledge of Bill C‑70, the list you mentioned would not have any consequences on the Criminal Code or the Canada Evidence Act, logically, since the Criminal Code applies to offences committed in Canada, with certain exceptions. In addition, it focuses primarily on individuals, not entities. You can't prosecute a country under the Criminal Code.

As for the rest, I apologize, but it's somewhat outside my area of expertise.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Mr. Leuprecht, would you like to comment on that?

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

You heard the witnesses before us. The concern that I hear from my friends, colleagues and in public isn't so much about stigmatization. It is about foreign repression in their lives by hostile state actors.

I have written publicly about my concern that all this talk about stigmatization risks playing into the narrative that our hostile state actors are using to impede our ability to pass precisely the legislation that not only will keep our diaspora communities safe from foreign repression, but will protect the freedom of expression in this country.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you.

My next question is again for Madame Rheault.

This legislation adds the word “intimidation” to section 20 of the Security of Information Act:

Every person commits an offence who, at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with, a foreign entity or a terrorist group, induces or attempts to induce, by intimidation, threat or violence, any person to do anything or to cause anything to be done.

I agree with the spirit here, but do you feel that there needs to be clarity on just what constitutes intimidation in this context?

[Emmanuelle Rheault]

Certainly, threats and violence are defined concepts in criminal law, whereas intimidation is not. If Parliament does not define it, it opens the door to the courts, which will then have the opportunity to define it themselves and have the definition go all the way up to the Supreme Court.

So yes, it would be better to clearly and accurately define what Parliament considers to be intimidation.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you.

My next question is for Mr. Neiman.

Can you please explain how the threat sharing with U.K. companies has worked out? Are there any lessons to be learned from that?

[Trevor Neiman]

I'm not intimately familiar with how the U.K. operationalizes the threat intelligence; however, at the highest level, I do understand that amongst the Five Eyes nations, Canada is an outlier in terms of the lack of authorities our domestic security agency has to share threat intelligence with the business community.

We just spent a week in the United Kingdom last month, and we met with the U.K.'s domestic security agency, MI5. They have a special body that is designed purely for the purpose of collaboration with the private sector. They told us quite specifically that they have the authorities that CSIS is now seeking through clause 34. They tell us that those authorities are working effectively and have allowed them to build very robust partnerships, and this has been starting to build increased resiliency across the economy.

We've also had an opportunity to recently travel to Washington, D.C., to meet with the office of the private sector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They have similar authorities.

The model we looked at in the United States that has worked quite effectively is something called the Domestic Security Alliance Council, which is a joint partnership between 700 strategically important U.S. companies, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. Through two-way exchanges of information between the United States government and U.S. corporations, they're able to advance the United States' mission of protecting that country's national and economic security while at the same time helping U.S. corporations better protect their employees, their customers and the communities in which they operate.

By participating in this organization, both the public and private sectors gain access to senior leaders within those two sectors. The private sector gains tailored access to threat intelligence specific to their sector, and then the public and private sectors also gain access to a very large and robust network of senior security executives, who can work together jointly to solve security issues and to share best practices.

We believe that Canada is really well positioned, CSIS in particular, the Department of Public Safety and the business community, to establish a body similar to DSAC to operationalize the authorities contained within clause 34.

If we're looking for examples to operationalize what's contemplated in the legislation, the FBI and the DHS's Domestic Security Alliance Council would be a model we should look for.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

There's a competitive issue here in terms of prosperity. Why would you invest in Canada if you know you can get better threat intelligence in the United States, the United Kingdom or Australia?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

Mr. Villemure, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Rheault, I was startled by a comment my colleague made. I'm asking you to weigh in on the dilemma. As a great linguist once said, translating is betraying.

Section 31(1) of the proposed bill deals with the review of the act. It says that “a comprehensive review of this Act and its operation must be undertaken by the committee”. The French version reads “est entrepris”. Honestly, the phrases “must be undertaken” and “est entrepris” are not of equal strength, semantically speaking.

[Emmanuelle Rheault]

That's right.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Does this happen on a regular basis?

[Emmanuelle Rheault]

In criminal law, it's not uncommon for the English and French versions not to be identical, or even for there to be a difference between them. According to the principles and protections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the most favourable version for the accused prevails, but only in criminal law.