Public Safety Committee on June 6th, 2024

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Thank you for highlighting what I think all of us would properly be concerned about—the impact on diaspora communities in Canada. You're absolutely right. They are often victims and targets of foreign interference.

We've seen publicly reported cases that should worry all of us. That is one of the reasons it would be terrific if Parliament was able to strengthen, in the appropriate way with the right safeguards, the ability of our agencies to protect these communities, to protect Canadians.

You and I had a chance, Mr. Gaheer, to talk about this specific element about what information could properly be shared with different foreign governments or consular agents. I know there are agreements that govern, and properly so, these kinds of sharing arrangements. I think we can agree that the kind of information—and I'm speaking for my RCMP and CSIS colleagues, and I hope they won't disagree—we might share with, for example, Five Eyes partners is different from what we might share with a particular country that's interfering in an illegal and inappropriate way in Canadian affairs.

If you'll allow it, Mr. Chair, the director of CSIS, Monsieur Vigneault, will be able to give, I hope, the precise answer to Mr. Gaheer's very proper question.

[David Vigneault, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Minister.

The member points to something extremely important in the debate on foreign interference. There was a lot of focus on electoral interference, but minority communities have been targeted and continue to be targeted by foreign states. That's why it's so important that we have the proper tools.

In terms of information sharing, I can assure the member that there are very specific and reviewable guidelines under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act that govern the way we share information. It is reviewed annually by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency. We take this extremely seriously to make sure that we do not share information that would potentially harm Canadians.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

That's great. Thank you. What I'm hearing is that there are proper checks and balances before information is disclosed.

The other point that was raised is that there's a framework for co-operation on countering terrorism and violent extremism between Canada and India. That is still active. I think it was 2018 that the agreement was signed. When that agreement was signed, members of different diaspora communities—the Sikh community, for example—had certain hesitations about it, and fears were heightened when news came out of Hardeep Singh Nijjar's killing in B.C. When the Prime Minister stood up in Parliament, we all witnessed it.

The community and the WSO are asking whether that agreement is still active and what information is being shared under it. Is information being shared, or could information be shared, that puts individuals in danger, whether they're here in Canada or with their families overseas in India?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

It's a very good question.

It's important to reassure the community that the appropriate protocols are in place. Their interests and security are obviously paramount in any decisions that our security agencies might undertake.

Perhaps that's for the director of CSIS or the deputy commissioner of the RCMP. There would be, I assume, in the case of a criminal investigation—for example, Mr. Nijjar's—versus a terrorism investigation....

Mr. Chair, with your indulgence, I think the director of CSIS and the deputy commissioner of the RCMP could provide exactly the information our colleague wants.

[Deputy Commissioner Mark Flynn, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

I'm happy to take that question.

I know that my colleagues at CSIS and other departments have similar processes. Within the RCMP, we have a process that ensures there is a proper risk assessment. Independent individuals who are not part of those investigations are brought in to analyze the information, the requests for information and our responses to them to ensure that any information we are going to share with any foreign entity is properly assessed and does not cause jeopardy to any individual. That's any individual, whether Canadian or otherwise.

I recognize the concern that was raised. It's something that we, as law enforcement and security and intelligence officials, have to deal with every day. It is a global community. Many problems are global in nature. The reality is that we have to communicate with people and with countries that do not have the same values and ethics that Canadians and Canada as a whole do. However, I can assure you that we take all of those engagements very seriously. We exercise extreme caution in all of those engagements.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Gaheer.

Mr. Villemure, you now have the floor for six minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you all for being here this morning, and so many of you, too; it's impressive. I'm going to ask Mr. Virani some questions, but I'm going to start with Mr. LeBlanc, if I may.

Mr. LeBlanc, I've been following the foreign interference file very closely for a very long time, and I fully understand your answer when you say you can't answer Mr. Caputo or give a list of names.

By its nature, classified information marked “top secret” cannot be disclosed; we already understand that. We don't require it to be made public, because we know it can't be made public. However, we are wondering what might happen. Could you give us a bit of an overview of what might happen?

In fact, we have the impression that, in the past, people have been a little slow to react. We don't want to say it like that, but we almost felt that there was avoidance, whether it was by the special rapporteur or because certain documents weren't shared with the Hogue commission.

Given the importance of this issue, which you highlighted in your opening remarks, and knowing that you can't pass on the information, what's going to happen?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

That's an excellent question.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Excuse me for interrupting, but there's no interpretation on the Zoom application.

One moment, please.

It looks like we're good to go.

You may continue, Mr. Villemure.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Mr. LeBlanc, how would you answer my question?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Thank you for the question, Mr. Villemure.

I also want to thank you for the work you and your party are doing to support and improve the bill. I understand your question very well, and I know that you are asking it sincerely. I assure you that we want to get things right.

Having said that, you're right. You talked about why it wasn't possible to magically give a list of names. You're right that it's important to reassure Canadians. Democratic institutions and our country's highest democratic institution, the House of Commons, where we are privileged to sit, are immune from foreign interference to the greatest extent possible. Those who choose to participate in such scenarios must be held accountable.

As Minister of Public Safety, I had the privilege of seeing the work of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or RCMP, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, up close. I have no doubt that those who choose to break the law and act against Canada's interests will be held accountable. In the context of elections, the Canada Elections Act comes to mind. There are a number of mechanisms at play.

You referred to the Hogue commission, and rightly so. I was pleased to work with Mr. Therrien, the House leader of your party, last summer to create the Hogue commission. I have full confidence in its work, and I look forward to seeing the commissioner's recommendations. We had a report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians this week as well as the report from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

I hope the will of Parliament is to improve the bill and get it passed. It's up to you to decide whether amendments should be proposed to improve it. However, the idea is to reassure Canadians and to strengthen national security institutions and agencies so as to counter interference.

We're awaiting the recommendations that will come out of the Hogue commission at the end of the year, and we're looking closely at the recommendations of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. We can work together next winter to improve the bill or introduce a new one.

We're on the lookout, and we're trying to do everything we can to reassure Canadians. I think it's important not to give the impression that there are members of Parliament who aren't subject to the act. Everyone is subject to it. I'm sure that the process will be done properly.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you for your answer.

In the past, solutions have sometimes been a long time in coming, which has undermined public confidence. I think Bill C‑70 can be summed up in three words: trust, transparency and exemplarity. That's what we're looking for.

I'm going to ask you a question that's more related to the bill. Oddly enough, the bill doesn't seem to define foreign interference. There are a few occurrences in a part where it can be inferred, but it isn't defined at the outset. What isn't defined doesn't exist.

What are your comments on that?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

You're right.

The same question seemed reasonable to me in my discussions with my colleagues from the department or security agencies.

There will obviously be prosecutions and criminal prosecutions as the years go on. The courts will properly define the elements of a criminal offence. That's how the law in Canada evolves, and it is entirely appropriate. There are also new tactics. The threat is literally changing month by month, year by year, because of technology.

A definition would have been a way to limit the ability to interfere, but I understand the concern of some if it's not defined. It can go in two directions. I have full confidence in the courts, in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in our national security agencies.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Virani, I'm not an expert in criminal law, and few are. Yesterday, we heard testimony from a criminal lawyer who told us to be careful. For example, in her view, section 20.4 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and section 52.1 of the Criminal Code, among other things, were too important and too imprecise to be dealt with so quickly.

I must admit that, as a member of the committee who is not a criminal lawyer, I'm uncomfortable with the idea of making such amendments to the Criminal Code at such a pace. I can't argue about each of the clauses, but the concern yesterday was related to the fact that there were vagueness and generalities and that unintended consequences could materialize.

What could you do to help us do our job properly? Personally, I think that, in this case, haste is a poor guide.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Thank you for the question, Mr. Villemure.

I'll mention a few things.

First, as a result of the change we made to the act in 2016, I believe, it's necessary to table a statement in the House concerning any bill that contains an aspect that affects the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. So that statement has already been tabled in the House.

In that document, you can see a context where certain rights and freedoms, protected by the charter, are at stake. In terms of the criminal law protections, I think this bill reflects a lot of the consultations we had. We're in a rather delicate situation, but it's important. This is a priority for Canada, but it's also a priority if we want to modernize aspects of the act, particularly with respect to the offence of sabotage.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Don't you think that's a bit quick for parliamentarians to be able to properly assess these elements?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, gentlemen.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Virani.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I'm sorry.

That finishes our first round. We will start our second.

I'm sorry. I'm way ahead of myself.

Mr. MacGregor, please go ahead for six minutes.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

The consequence of these new, long table set-ups is that I get lost in the mix.

Thank you to our witnesses for joining us and helping guide the committee through this really important study.

Minister Virani, I'd like to start with you. I have some questions about the amendments to the Security of Information Act, otherwise known as SOIA.

In the existing SOIA, under section 24, it says “No prosecution shall be commenced for an offence against this Act without the consent of the Attorney General”—meaning you. There are some very consequential amendments to the SOIA in this bill, particularly proposed section 20.4, which is going to be added under “Political Interference for a Foreign Entity”.

I'm just looking ahead. The position of Attorney General is filled by an elected member of Parliament. Would it not be safe to remove the requirement for the consent of the Attorney General given that you're dealing here with offences that are of a political nature? Would it not be better to leave that to a senior civil servant? Do you have any thoughts on that?

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

I do. Thank you, Mr. MacGregor. It's an important point. I'll say a couple of things.

One is that AG consent is in various places throughout the Criminal Code. We can talk about the context of a prosecution for some of the hate propaganda offences, for example. It's in the code for specific reasons, but primarily as a safeguard. When we express an understanding, we want the code to reflect the understanding that the interests in play are very significant. When you're talking about potential restraints of charter rights in the context of something that might have been orchestrated by a foreign nation, you're talking about very serious crimes, as opposed to a simple break and enter or uttering threats.

I appreciate your point. We had a pretty extensive analysis of the division between the roles of AG and the Minister of Justice. That was done by a former attorney general, Anne McLellan. She talked about how the system we have can continue to work.

Having somebody—such as a person in my role right now—reflecting on this is important, since when we're dealing with foreign interference, we're potentially dealing with very sensitive information of the type described by Minister LeBlanc. It deals with sensitive state relation matters, both with the state at issue and with other states that may have been co-operating with us to provide us intelligence. Given that aspect, I think it's very important for somebody who has a political lens to provide input as to whether a prosecution should or should not proceed.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you for that.

I have another question dealing with the same clause in the bill, clause 53. It's a very big clause. The amendment to section 20 of the SOIA talks about intimidation, threats or violence. We have the word “intimidation” inserted in there.

I've heard concerns from some groups that intimidation is not defined in the SOIA. That could be hugely problematic because it could be open to interpretation. For example, if you have two groups that have foreign association but are at different ends of the political spectrum, is there not a danger that governments of differing political natures may see those two groups in different lights? How do you define intimidation? Is it problematic not to narrow it down further?

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

To reflect on the previous question, I want to underscore that AG consent can always be delegated down, as is done in some provinces, to what's called the director of public prosecutions.

To your second question, we're guided by intimidation case law, as it's been interpreted by the courts. It's a term used in the Criminal Code and entrenched in the Criminal Code.

You raise a really important point, Mr. MacGregor, which is the idea of ensuring that lawful dissent and protest, including labour work stoppages at an important piece of infrastructure, are protected and remain protected. That's why the language has been deliberately inserted into the bill. We don't want this to turn into a situation where ideology motivates whether people come under the penumbra of prosecution initiatives. It is always when there is an element of foreign interference and something is not proper lawful dissent and protest, but transfers into something more reprehensible that's trying to influence Canada and subvert Canadian interests.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

I think I have time to get one more question in.

When I read through Bill C-70, there's obviously a thematic nature to most of the amendments. We have important amendments to the CSIS Act, the SOIA and the Canada Evidence Act, and, of course, it enacts a new act to deal with a foreign registry. What seems to stick out, though, are the amendments to the Criminal Code, particularly as they relate to sabotage. I'm wondering if you could provide some rationale to this committee as to why it seems so important to update the definition of “sabotage” in the Criminal Code in a bill that's primarily dealing with foreign interference.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

With frankness, Mr. MacGregor, it's reflective of what we heard in consultations and where we are as a nation. It troubles me that the sabotage provision hasn't been amended in 75 years, since 1951. That is a tremendously long time to not update an important definitional provision in our laws. It's also reflective of what we're seeing in the work you guys are doing at this committee, what we're seeing from NSICOP and what we've seen from Madam Justice Hogue's inquiry.

What we're learning is that foreign interference is very present, and it affects essential infrastructure. It affects various levels of influence and various components of Canadian society. I think modernizing the sabotage offence is what we need to do to make sure we're being responsive to the threats we're facing and to ensure that Canadians have confidence in the approach we're taking to what is a very pernicious issue.