Public Safety Committee on June 6th, 2024

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

That's fair enough.

If I can turn to CSIS, I think I'm sympathetic to some of the arguments made, like releasing the names and needing openness and transparency. However, we've seen individuals' names leaked in the past through the media with no context added. I'm thinking of the Arar case, which is going back probably 20 years.

What are the consequences of sending names out into the ether without any context behind it?

[David Vigneault]

I think the example the member is using is quite different from what we're talking about here, to be precise. The issue here is releasing classified information without context and without the ability to protect the information. A lot of this information comes from very sensitive sources. The ability to protect Canada is about being able to collect intelligence.

Releasing information can damage the reputation of individuals who have no ability to defend themselves. It can also damage the ability of the agencies, including CSIS, to do their work in the future. That would therefore damage Canada's national security.

I think unauthorized disclosure always has very significant negative consequences.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Bittle.

It's Mr. Villemure's turn now.

You have six minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

When I look at Bill C‑70, the three words that come to mind are very positive: “trust”, “transparency” and “exemplarity”. If we try to compare this bill to the situation my colleagues are discussing this morning, the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, we find a paradox, the paradox between the need for secrecy and the need for transparency.

Ms. Drouin, how do you reconcile the two elements of this paradox?

[Nathalie Drouin]

There are a number of ways to reconcile them.

We started working very hard on that. Employees of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and those of the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, will increasingly meet with various stakeholders and will make public documents to increase Canadians' awareness, to ensure that they understand the various mechanisms used by foreign actors. Therefore, transparency depends a lot on knowing what schemes are being used and how to equip yourself to deal with them. Being transparent does not necessarily mean disclosing all the details, such as names, specific incidents; rather, it is explaining to Canadians what the risks are, what the threat is, what the schemes and processes are.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I believe that transparency is a tool to build trust, and trust is what we're looking for, isn't it? Right.

If Bill C‑70 were in effect today, as it stands, could something be done differently in response to the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians?

[Nathalie Drouin]

There are a number of small elements that would make significant changes.

One is the ability of CSIS to engage with different levels of government and universities. Being able to provide more information to these various stakeholders will lead to better defence of all our Canadian institutions.

Then, the various criminal offences that Bill C‑70 adds could capture the kind of information that can be read in the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. This provides more clarification, which will facilitate the work of police forces and criminal prosecution.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Okay. I wouldn't say it wouldn't have happened, but it could be treated differently. Is that correct?

[Nathalie Drouin]

There has always been foreign interference. Unfortunately, there always will be some. The objective is to be able to detect it.

Furthermore, we know very well that as we refine our legislative processes, foreign actors, on the other hand, refine their methodology. That's why the work you're doing in connection with Bill C‑70 is absolutely fantastic and necessary.

This is a first step, but we'll always have to continue working on this together to keep our body of legislation modern and effective.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

My next question is for both you and Mr. Vigneault.

I participated in the committee's work analyzing the report on the Winnipeg lab. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service was asked to conduct background checks on this file. If we took that situation as it existed at the time, with scientists in the lab, would Bill C‑70 make it possible to do things differently from what was done at the time?

[Nathalie Drouin]

In terms of information sharing and being able to communicate more with universities in Canada, for example, the provisions in Bill C‑70 would really go further to help us prevent situations like that. The same is true of exchanges with our leading scientists.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I believe that, even before your intervention, we could observe some delinquency with regard to the internal processes at that lab.

[Nathalie Drouin]

What's also important to say, which is a very difficult paradox for our scientists, is that science is based on global collaboration. The culture of scientists is one of collaboration. This collaboration must not be undermined, but it must be done in an informed manner.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I think the culture of collaboration will have to coexist with the culture of foreign interference.

Mr. Bilodeau, as you know, I love asking you questions.

I heard your plea earlier about the independence of the commissioner. We talked about this the other day, and you repeated the explanation that it was simpler that way, because the infrastructure was already in place.

Either we're independent or we're not. It's that simple. I understand independence of action, but accountability to the Department of Public Safety reinforces the importance of trust, transparency, and exemplarity, three values I mentioned earlier. In addition, it seems to me that, in the government's interest, that independence should be real and perceived, rather than a form of independence.

[Richard Bilodeau]

Mr. Chair, thank you for the question.

I would add that this model already exists in the federal government. I'm thinking, for example, of the Commissioner of the Competition Bureau, who acts independently in enforcing the act. The act also provides for consultations with parliamentarians, either in the House of Commons or the Senate. Lastly, ultimately, once a Governor in Council appointment is made, the commissioner may only be removed from his or her position for a valid reason. So there's a certain obligation to be accountable.

However, we understand that Bill C‑70 can be amended. We can discuss the amendments and analyze them, and it will be up to you to decide. However, we believe that it provides for a great deal of independence in the commissioner's key work. That independence is also reflected in his reports to Parliament, which are not sent to the minister for approval; rather, they are sent to the minister for tabling in the House.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir.

We'll go now to Mr. MacGregor for six minutes.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Vigneault, I note your comments from earlier. It's a real struggle that you have from your position, and I think democracies around the world have the same struggle. They may have different systems of government, but there's always an effort by the legislative branch to put a measure of transparency and accountability over intelligence agencies.

In the United States, Congress is a separate but equal level of government. It is a highly partisan atmosphere down in the United States, but they have Democrats and Republicans on the House side and the Senate side, which have full oversight of the CIA's activities, the FBI's activities and so on. It is a struggle.

In my caucus, not only is our leader cleared for these briefings, but so is Mr. Davies, who is a member of NSICOP. Of course, they are not able to tell us any details, but from our caucus's perspective, knowing that they know these things gives us a certain level of comfort. They have been able to say that the issue is serious and that the intelligence community is seized with it and regards it as a very important thing.

From your perspective as a member of the intelligence community, how important is it that we have key members of both the House and the Senate in the know, even if they are not able to publicly talk about this? It seems to me that this is such a serious issue that it should go above and beyond the partisan dealings we see in the House. We may not be able to speak publicly about it, but how important is it from your perspective to at least have key members on all sides of the House in the know?

[David Vigneault]

I think this is one of the most fundamental questions we can talk about. The world is getting more and more complex. The threat environment is making Canada less safe and less prosperous than before. We need different tools and different mindsets when approaching threats to national security.

In a democracy, it's fundamental that elected members of the House and members of the Senate, in an organized way, have access to the right information to inform themselves, hold the government to account and hold agencies to account through NSICOP, for example. My colleagues and I have had to appear many times in front of NSICOP to speak at the top secret level, to share details and to be questioned and challenged on this issue, and I believe it's fundamental in a democratic environment to do that.

There is one line in the NSICOP report that I think is very important, which is the challenge of intelligence and evidence. It's about the ability to use the intelligence collected by CSIS, by CSE and by other partners, or shared with us by international partners, in a judicial proceeding that will hold people accountable. That is extremely complex. There are some improvements through Bill C-70, and the government has spoken to the need to do more, but if you're not able to find accountability and create an element of deterrence through a judicial process, then there are the other mechanisms that have been referred to, including for leaders to have information and make decisions. It's not going to be a judicial process. It's not going to be someone charged by a court of law. It's someone who may not be allowed to run or may not be allowed to sit in a caucus because of the classified information being used.

We absolutely need to find better ways of using intelligence in judicial processes, but it also needs to be used for other types of decision-making. One of the most important elements for foreign actors when they look at us is to see whether there are enough consequences for their activities. If there are not, they will be emboldened to do more. I think your question is critical.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

I think that's a great segue to the RCMP.

Deputy Commissioner Flynn, we have heard the theme of intelligence versus evidence, but more broadly speaking, from the RCMP's perspective, can you inform the committee of some of the challenges that exist when you are in receipt of intelligence? What challenges exist for the RCMP to take action on that intelligence? You have to make considerations as to whether it is going to stand up in a court of law and whether a case can be made out of it. Can you inform the committee about some of those challenges?

[D/Commr Mark Flynn]

Absolutely.

Much of what you've spoken about and what the director just spoke about is our reality every day. We work very closely and collaboratively with CSIS. Frequently we are exposed to intelligence information that we cannot use in judicial processes, in charges or even in our investigations because of caveats and restrictions on its use. What that does for us is make sure that we are aware of the environment we're operating in. It allows us to look for opportunities that we can exploit to gather information in a manner that can be used in our judicial processes. Even more importantly, it informs us about the situation and allows us to take steps that are not just focused on prosecution. I think sometimes we get caught in a prosecutorial route or process and we have to look at what our mandate is. Our mandate is public safety. There are many steps we can take that enable us to do things to ensure public safety but that may not necessarily lead to a prosecution.

Many of the amendments you are studying and proposing in this legislation give us additional powers. They eliminate some of the challenges we've had in the past with the ability to prosecute individuals for some behaviours. What I would categorize as the outcome of some of the work you're doing is that you are defining what is acceptable and what is illegal in a way that is different from what has been done in the past. That will be very beneficial for us.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

We'll start our second round with Mr. Cooper for five minutes.

Go ahead, please.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Director Vigneault, what is the highest level of security clearance that a member of Parliament might obtain?

[David Vigneault]

There is only one mechanism that exists so far. It is the process connected with being a member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, NSICOP. That's a top secret clearance. Leaders of opposition parties have also been offered that.

Essentially, we have two processes that exist. One is very new. The highest level is top secret, and then depending on the nature of the situation, there might be other compartments added to that.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

I want to ask Madame Drouin a question.

It was reported in The Globe and Mail on May 23 that the Prime Minister and cabinet were withholding documents from Madam Justice Hogue, the commissioner of the inquiry on foreign interference. The article stated that the PCO, the Prime Minister's department—that's you—told The Globe and Mail, “nearly 10 per cent of cabinet documents provided to the inquiry have been redacted. An undisclosed number of other secret cabinet documents have been completely withheld.”

How many documents is the Prime Minister's department, the PCO, withholding from Madam Justice Hogue?