Public Safety Committee on Nov. 28th, 2024

[Prabjot Singh]

This is something that was addressed by my colleagues who appeared earlier as well. It's our position that any federal party leader or any official who is able to get that access should get security clearance to be able to access information regarding the nature of the intelligence that Canadian agencies have about Indian foreign interference, because, as we discussed, it's incredibly pervasive; it's elusive, and it's at all levels of government for all parties. The only way to effectively combat that is to increase our situational awareness and even increase public awareness.

I would actually go even further than the security clearance for leaders by taking active steps to inform the broader public about the nature of Indian interference. The only way to combat it is if you're actually informed as well as you possibly can be to identify and note where those threats exist, so that you can take active steps to counter them and make sure they're not undermining Canadian institutions or targeting the community.

[George Chahal, Liberal, Calgary Skyview, AB]

Mr. Elcock, I'm going to ask you the same question.

Do you believe that party leaders here in Canada should get their security clearance?

[Ward Elcock]

I think there are advantages for a party leader to have a clearance, clearly, for managing their own party and the members of their own party. I think that is probably a necessity. I certainly would recommend it.

Having said that, whether all party leaders require a clearance or not...I'm not sure that is a necessity.

[George Chahal, Liberal, Calgary Skyview, AB]

If it were offered to a party leader, should they get it?

Mr. Poilievre has not received a security clearance. He is not aware of the actions of his members, on whom security agencies might have information that could be provided in those documents.

Do you think he should get a security clearance?

[Ward Elcock]

I can't understand, frankly, why the honourable Leader of the Opposition would choose not to get a clearance, given that there appears to be information about members of his party. However, at the end of the day, I can't read the honourable Leader of the Opposition's mind, so I don't know why he would choose not to.

[George Chahal, Liberal, Calgary Skyview, AB]

Would the reason be that he doesn't want to know the truth of what's in those documents so he doesn't have to take action on members of the Conservative Party of Canada? Do you think that might be a reason?

[Ward Elcock]

That would just be speculation on my part. I have no contact with the Leader of the Opposition. I can't really comment on his motivations one way or the other.

[The Chair, Liberal, Iqwinder Gaheer]

Thank you, Mr. Chahal.

Next is Madame Michaud.

You have the floor for ten minutes.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In light of the questions so far, in the context of this study—which I think is essential—I find it unfortunate that parties are turning this into a partisan issue and taking advantage of the witnesses' presence to ask them whether or not a party leader should have security clearance. I think there are far more important questions to ask.

Mr. Elcock, you mentioned that you were the head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service from 1994 to 2004, if I'm not mistaken. You didn't make an opening statement, so I'd like to give you a chance to tell us about that experience.

Several witnesses told us that there was foreign interference in elections by agents of the Government of India and that criminal activities had taken place on Canadian soil. I don't know how many years ago that was, but when you were in that position, was that something you were starting to see?

What difference do you see today? Has the situation gained momentum? We're seeing criminal activity, and the RCMP is holding press conferences to reveal certain aspects of ongoing investigations. It's almost unheard of.

Can you tell us about your experience and how you see things?

[Ward Elcock]

I think the answer to that question, frankly, is that there is more than there was when I was the director of CSIS, but it would be wrong to say that there was no foreign interference, or no evidence of foreign interference, at that time. There was foreign interference. There has always been foreign interference. It is, in effect, a result of our being a country of immigration. There has been foreign interference in many communities across the country over the years for a variety of reasons, either because foreign countries are concerned about the actions of their former citizens or because they see advantages in taking advantage of their former citizens in Canada.

There are different reasons for countries to engage in foreign interference, but it is not new. It has happened before. It will likely continue well into the future.

There are things we need to do about foreign interference. There were actions we took in that period, and I'm sure the service has also taken action in some cases to deal with the issues of foreign interference, but clearly it has gotten worse. It has gotten worse with respect to the Chinese and clearly in the case of India as well. India has become much more aggressive in recent years than it was in an earlier time, although they were active even when I was the director of the service.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

I would like you to provide a few more details. Why do you think India is increasingly aggressive in terms of its activities in Canada?

Is it related to the resurgence of the Sikh separatist movement or to attempts at a referendum on Khalistan independence, for example?

I know there's a large community of Indian origin in Canada, and India seems to want Canada to protect Indian diplomats more than Canadian citizens of Indian origin.

What are the reasons for this increased aggression by Indian government agents in recent years?

[Ward Elcock]

The answer to that question, in the case of both China and India, lies in the increasing role both of those countries play in the world and the greater sway they hold across the world. They have both become much more aggressive in terms of their foreign interference.

In the case of India, clearly the Modi government and its strong Hindu agenda has been an increasing challenge. I would, however, also make the comment that there is a history in this country of terrorism in a number of communities, and the Sikh community is one of the communities in which there were terrorist elements or extremist elements. As I said earlier, that does cause countries to have concern about the activities of their former citizens.

Is any of that activity being addressed at this point, properly or not? I really can't say, because, obviously, I no longer see secret intelligence, so I have no idea whether, in fact, there are still extremist activities within the Sikh community in Canada. Even if there were, none of that would justify the actions the Indians have taken in the last few years.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Iqwinder Gaheer]

Thank you, Ms. Michaud.

Mr. MacGregor, go ahead for six minutes.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to echo my colleagues and thank both of our witnesses for coming before our committee. Your testimony is quite valuable in dealing with this very sensitive and timely subject.

Mr. Elcock, I'd like to start with you. You were quoted last month in an iPolitics article, saying that “there was no reasonable justification for [the leader of the Conservative Party] not to pursue the security clearance”, especially if it is being offered. We often hear his excuses that he doesn't want to be subject to a gag order. I personally think that's a red herring and a distraction.

From your perspective, and based on the expertise you have, could you offer this committee some insight on what a security clearance allows a federal party leader to do in terms of caucus management and in terms of ensuring that the sanctity of their own internal political party process is really taken care of? Can you offer some insights on the actions a leader could take?

[Ward Elcock]

I can't speak to the exact actions that the Conservative leader, the Leader of the Opposition, could take.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

What could any leader, theoretically or hypothetically, do with that information?

[Ward Elcock]

Clearly, that information, once provided, would not be information that the leader could provide, really, to anybody else who was not similarly cleared. Having said that, it could influence their actions and cause them to make choices they might not otherwise be able to make if they did not have access to the information.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Okay, I appreciate that.

Mr. Singh, we have learned a lot about how Indian intelligence agencies' operations in Canada are often in partnership with criminal organizations. The Bishnoi gang is one that has been mentioned.

I was wondering if you could offer this committee any insights on what your community has noticed in terms of that relationship. I know we have to address Indian intelligence activities, but could you maybe provide a bit more testimony on the organized criminal aspect of that relationship?

[Prabjot Singh]

I think at the outset it's important to understand, as I spoke about at the beginning, that India's objective is to criminalize Sikh advocates for Khalistan or other critics of the Indian government, particularly using this narrative of extremism and terrorism that has been unsubstantiated and baseless. Based on CSIS's own accounts and their submissions before the foreign interference commission, India does not differentiate between individuals engaged in lawful advocacy, protests and freedom of expression and those who may be believed to be engaging in or using force in the pursuit of Khalistan. India tries to use this national security construct to clamp down on political activism. That's something that's been echoed by the RCMP as well as Global Affairs.

When you bring in this element of organized crime, it's very shocking for a lot of Canadians, but it's important to understand that this has been the standard MO of Indian security agencies in using state-sanctioned and -facilitated criminals to do their bidding, whether that's to manufacture evidence or whether that's to intimidate folks. Particularly when we talk about disinformation, in the last several years we've seen a concerted effort by the Government of India to try to tar Khalistani activists in the Sikh community with this allegation of being interconnected with organized crime, and using gangsters themselves.

In reality, when we look at the case in the U.S. of the attempted assassination of Gurpatwant Singh and what took place here in Canada, India has been using those organized crime networks to do its own bidding. At the same time, in terms of disinformation, we've seen and heard from the RCMP that a number of homicides took place in Canada in addition to the assassination of Bhai Hardeep Singh in June. There was also the murder of an individual named Sukhdool Singh in Winnipeg around that time. When you look at Indian media outlets, it was pretty much plastered, in every headline and in every outlet, that Sukhdool Singh was somehow related to Khalistani activism and was killed because he was a political activist. When you actually engage with communities on the ground, there is little to no familiarity with who this individual was in the first place.

I think this goes to something that CSIS spoke to in front of the foreign interference commission. India is seeking to increase its cyber capabilities and move beyond just disinformation campaigns to something called cognitive warfare. That's using neuroscience, technology and the Internet to not just confuse people with wrong information but actually engage in certain forms of aggression that manipulate and shape people's and the public's political opinions, outlooks and behaviours. There's a narrative around organized crime that India alleges against the community, for which there is no basis, and the orchestration of violence, such as the homicide of Sukhdool Singh after trying to paint him as Khalistani activist, against a number of other individuals within Canada who are designated as so-called terrorists and who in reality don't actually have any interactions with the community.

[The Chair, Liberal, Iqwinder Gaheer]

Thank you.

That completes the first round. We'll move on to the second round.

Mr. Genuis, you have five minutes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Singh, you mentioned, and it's been reported elsewhere, that Indian foreign interference networks in Canada have operated for years and were left undeterred as a result of a political choice made by the government not to disrupt those networks. Is it correct that the government had information about these networks as early as 2016? Why did this government choose not to disrupt the activities of these networks?

[Prabjot Singh]

As I said earlier, this is an institutional problem of successive governments for the past four decades. There's been public reporting on this issue since as early as the 1980s, about Indian operatives intimidating community members here in Canada and interfering in media reporting as well as elections over the past 40 years—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I'm sorry. My time is tight. I want to give you the time, but I want to get through a few points.

In the last nine years.... I understand that there's a history here that goes back decades, but specifically there were networks, from what I understand, identified by CSIS in 2016. In 2017 there was a proposal brought to disrupt these networks. According to reporting we've heard from Sam Cooper, the government chose not to disrupt these networks.

Is that correct? Is that consistent with your—

[Prabjot Singh]

That is correct. When CSIS wanted to dismantle these networks, based on that public reporting about NSICOP's actual contents, the government chose not to engage in that action because it would disrupt its export and trade priorities with India and would also potentially jeopardize the Prime Minister's trip to India.

I think that gets to the root issue, which is that successive governments have failed to take action against India because they have looked at a marginalized visible minority that isn't seen to be “true Canadians” and that may have interests that are not the interests of the establishment, the state or that political party. There's also the prioritizing of foreign policy over the domestic harms. That's something we've seen consistently. That's been reported by NSICOP as well.