Thank you very much.
My remarks are prefaced on the assumption that Russia is a persistent threat and that we need to think about North America's security posture, not simply Canada's. Since 1938, a threat to either the U.S. or Canada is a threat to the other, and they are indivisible with respect to Russia. Likewise, the individual requirements of both states cannot be separated.
I will speak to my research area of expertise, which is continental defence, but there are wider implications. Part of the continental defence relationship is binational, as embodied in NORAD's functional responsibility for aerospace and maritime warning and aerospace control. The remaining parts to continental defence are bilateral and include civilian agencies, private companies and citizens.
We have the makings of a dangerous and reinforcing feedback loop, assuming the status quo. Russia has come to believe it can exploit our continental defence vulnerabilities, thus emboldening it to undertake a regional challenge by threatening actions to deter an overseas response. North America recognizes its vulnerability, as well as those vital to overseas allies, and is unwilling to respond effectively, being forced to fall back on deterrence by punishment, which we cannot allow to happen. This in turn further emboldens Russia to undertake further challenges, which raises doubts among overseas allies that the U.S. can defend North America, let alone other allies. In essence, it is the situation we face now with Russia and Ukraine.
We have been warned for nearly a decade by successive NORAD and USNORTHCOM commanders that North America has multiple simultaneous challenges and that threats emanate from multiple domains and axes. Russia is an acute threat to North America, while China is the longer-term peer challenger to the U.S.'s waning hegemony. To be defended is no longer the exclusive purview of the Canadian and U.S. militaries, but requires whole-of-government and whole-of-population efforts.
North America has four priorities. First is deterrence, especially by denial. Second are kinetic and non-kinetic defeat options, the latter being most likely. Third is readiness and fourth is resilience.
Meanwhile, our adversaries have two strategies with respect to North America. First is bombarding us with cyber-disinformation and disruptive attacks, and second is using an anti-access area denial strategy to deny the U.S. and allies freedom of movement around the world and increasingly in all domains.
The U.S. and NATO allies have depended on deterrence by punishment for decades. It is the idea that we promise a cost so high to adversaries that they wouldn't dare attack us. Dependence on punishment alone risks uncontrollable escalation and narrows our response options considerably.
The focus needs to shift to deterrence by denial, which means taking advantage of the fact that we have allies and partners. We need to ensure that North America and our allies have all-domain awareness, are resilient to a variety of attacks, especially below the threshold of use of force, and ensure that attacks are identified and addressed quickly to prevent escalation. In other words, we need to change Russia's calculus to strip away the benefits of attacks on North America, rather than focusing solely on increasing the costs.
Deterrence by denial means North America needs to ensure there are no command seams that can be exploited or, conversely, that constrain us. We need particular capabilities, especially sensors for radar's digital transformation, and the means to create common operating pictures that can be shared efficiently and appropriately. We need to integrate data and information from all domains, working with a range of allies and partners, including with civilian agencies and private companies.
My analysis counsels the importance of modernizing continental defence, with a primary focus on NORAD and deterrence by denial. It is vital that the structural changes to the North American deterrence posture are made to alter adversarial perceptions so that North America cannot be held hostage. Beyond the need to modernize NORAD's early warning and defence control capabilities is the need for both countries to rethink fundamentally what it means to defend the continent. It is a whole-of-society effort, not simply a military-only endeavour.
Thank you.