Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As a recent arrival in Canada, I'd first like to say that it is a great honour to be invited to speak before this committee, and I'm grateful for the opportunity.
This committee has so far heard witnesses who have focused on a variety of near-term threats to Canada's security. As an expert on Russia's domestic politics and more broadly on nationalism and authoritarianism, I'd like to take this opportunity to explain why we need to think about this war as a long-term concern and what this means for Canada.
First, we should not expect any political change to emerge from within Russia's elite that would end the war. Russia is a personalist autocracy, meaning power is exercised through clientelist networks that pervade both the state and the economy. Autocratic rule is sustained by granting subordinates access to jobs, resources, wealth or status. In turn, subordinates compete to demonstrate their loyalty and value to their superiors.
Today Putin has no real political challengers. Members of the elite initially appeared dismayed by the decision to go to war, which does not appear to have been shared widely among Putin’s inner circle. Nevertheless, they have doubled down on Putin’s war as they attempt to outbid one another in demonstrating their patriotic credentials. As sanctions and the cost of war continue to squeeze Russia’s economy, elites are thus more likely to turn on one another rather than turning on Putin.
Second, we should not underestimate the power of nationalism and disinformation as sources of popular support for the war. The Kremlin has promoted a Soviet style of patriotic education since the early 2000s, which dovetails with neo-imperial visions of Russia as a civilizational power in Eurasia. This form of patriotism was fused with anti-westernism, especially following electoral revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, which the Kremlin viewed as the machinations of western intelligence agencies.
In 2014, the annexation of Crimea stimulated a burst of patriotic sentiment that saw Putin’s approval ratings soaring upwards of 80%. In my own research in Russia between 2014 and 2016, I found that many ordinary Russians understood official patriotism to mean loyalty to the Kremlin, and loyalty, in turn, was associated with being ethnically Russian. Putin has combined this ethnicized patriotism with anti-westernism and dreams of Soviet power to forge a neo-imperial form of nationalism, culminating today in the claim that Ukraine is not Ukraine and Ukrainians are not Ukrainians.
The domestic information environment is a big part of popular support for Russia’s war. I am currently tracking Russia’s war narratives on broadcast media, and they are aswirl with western conspiracies and enemy images of inhuman fascists. Domestic disinformation emboldens opportunists to attack critics of the war, and it leads ordinary Russians to disregard information about the war, to dissimulate and to disengage. While more than 15,000 brave Russians have been arrested for anti-war protests so far, this is just 1/100 of 1% of Russia’s total population.
In sum, Russia’s war is here to stay. There is little reason to expect that there will be any significant movement for regime change arising either from Russia’s elite or the masses.
In preparing for a long war, I would suggest two ways that Canada can enhance its security.
First, this is the time to build expertise in the region. Canada is already regarded as a global hub for Ukrainian studies. The longer Russia remains a closed regime that threatens its neighbours, the more important area expertise will become for international security. Canada can take the lead now in decolonizing and bridging between expert communities in Russian studies in the United Kingdom and in the United States.
Second, Canada can provide refuge for scholars, journalists and activists who are persecuted for opposing Russia’s war. We know from experience that the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada played a key role in shaping Ukraine’s independence and its democratic development. Today we need the Russian diaspora as allies rather than bystanders, and we can advance that cause by providing shelter for Russia’s moral and intellectual leaders.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.