Evidence of meeting #24 for Public Safety and National Security in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was csis.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Marie-Hélène Chayer  Executive Director, Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Cherie Henderson  Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Lesley Soper  Director General, National Security Policy, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
Commissioner Michael Duheme  Deputy Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Richard Fadden  As an Individual
Vivek Krishnamurthy  Samuelson-Glushko Professor of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

11 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Jim Carr

I'd like to call this meeting to order. Welcome to meeting number 24 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

I'd like to start by acknowledging that we are meeting on the traditional unceded territory of the Algonquin peoples.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, as you all know, pursuant to the House order of November 25, 2021. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application. You know that you have the choice of the floor, English or French translation that you can control.

Today, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motions adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 17, 2022, the committee is resuming its study of the rise of ideologically motivated violent extremism in Canada.

With us today, from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Marie-Hélène Chayer, executive director, integrated terrorism assessment centre, and Cherie Henderson, assistant director, requirements. From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Robert Burley, senior director, Canada centre for community engagement and prevention of violence, and Lesley Soper, director general, national security policy. We also have, from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Deputy Commissioner Michael Duheme.

Welcome, everybody.

There will be five-minute opening statements by each of our guests or combinations of our guests.

I would now invite Ms. Marie-Hélène Chayer to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Whenever you're ready, the floor is yours.

11 a.m.

Marie-Hélène Chayer Executive Director, Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Thank you very much.

Hello, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

As mentioned, my name is Marie-Hélène Chayer.

I am the executive director of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre.

The centre's mandate is to analyze terrorism-related intelligence collected by various organizations and to share our assessments, notably with our national security partners.

One of our main priorities is to analyze the threats posed by ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, which, as you know, is complex and fluid and has been evolving over the years.

As you have heard in previous testimony during your studies, many of the ideologically motivated extremists who produce and disseminate violent and threatening rhetoric do not intend to carry out physical attacks themselves; however, they may sway and have swayed other individuals to mobilize and cause acts of serious violence.

These individuals, who may be susceptible to IMVE narratives because of their personal grievances or extremist beliefs, may not belong to known groups or associations. They can galvanize around a number of issues, including public health measures, authority or gender-related concerns. As such, IMVE attacks conducted by lone actors are quite difficult to predict. They do not necessarily require a lot of planning, coordination or capabilities, and they can be directed at various targets, depending on the perpetrator's specific grievances and extremist views. Such targets could include government facilities, health care workers, politicians and women.

The sense of uncertainty generated by the pandemic and by conspiracy theories provide fertile ground for ideological extremism. Furthermore, the relative normalization of using violent threats to express disagreement, in addition to the spread of disinformation, undermines social resilience. All of this contributes to favourable conditions for actors to mobilize to violence.

I will stop here and would be very happy to answer your questions.

I will turn it over to my colleague Cherie Henderson.

Thank you.

11 a.m.

Cherie Henderson Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Thank you, Madam Chayer.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I understand that the committee has voted to include the remarks that Tim Hahlweg, my predecessor, delivered to you last year on the same topic. Since I'm sharing my time with ITAC's executive director, I'll do my best to be succinct.

Let me begin by saying that the threat that ideologically motivated violence extremism, or IMVE, poses remains a high priority for CSIS.

CSIS has the mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, to advise the government on these threats, and to take steps to reduce them.

However, it is not illegal to be hateful, racist or misogynist. Freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, and while the Internet is filled with bigoted and misogynistic language and narratives, much of it falls under the category of “awful but lawful”.

As we explained in our annual public report released last week, IMVE is a complex and constantly evolving threat, and Canada is not immune to its impact. That is why we have been dedicating increased resources to investigate and counter this threat.

In total, there have been seven attacks and three disrupted plots in the Canadian IMVE space since 2014. These attacks have killed 26 people and wounded 40 others on Canadian soil, more than any other form of terrorism.

Most recently, in June 2021, an attack in London, Ontario, killed four individuals and seriously injured another.

In October 2021, a former Canadian Armed Forces reservist was sentenced to nine years in a U.S. prison for plotting serious violence with members of The Base, a neo-Nazi group that is a listed terrorist entity in Canada.

Overall, since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, IMVE activity has been fuelled by an increase in extreme anti-authority and anti-government rhetoric, often rooted in the weaponization of conspiracy theories.

In that context, CSIS has observed a marked increase in violent threats to elected officials and government representatives during the past two years.

On the 2022 “freedom convoy”, as the director explained earlier this week to the Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency, “CSIS is specifically prohibited from investigating lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, except when it is carried out in conjunction with activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada”. CSIS closely monitored for opportunities the protest could have presented to IMVE threat actors to promote or engage in serious acts of violence in Canada.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that the people of CSIS are committed to fulfilling our mandate to protect Canada, working closely with communities and our partners across the country to keep all Canadians safe.

With that, I will turn it over to Public Safety.

Thank you.

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Jim Carr

Yes, we will do just that.

I will now call upon Mr. Robert Burley or Ms. Lesley Soper to make a statement of up to five minutes, please.

Whenever you're ready, the floor is yours.

11:05 a.m.

Lesley Soper Director General, National Security Policy, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Thank you.

Good morning, committee members. I'm very happy to be here today with my colleague from Public Safety's Canada Centre for Community and Engagement and Prevention of Violence, Mr. Robert Burley, as well as my colleagues from CSIS and RCMP.

The opportunity to speak before this committee on ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, as we call it, is a welcome one. My team and I at Public Safety have been following this study for the last several weeks. We have watched with interest the quality of witnesses who have come forward and offered their views and expertise, and we're pleased to be able to add to it today.

By way of context, Public Safety Canada's national security mandate is to coordinate the activities of federal departments and agencies representing the Canadian security and intelligence community, or, as we refer to it, the S and I community. In this role, it is the responsibility of Public Safety Canada to develop and provide policy advice to the Minister of Public Safety on national security matters in support of the many operational activities undertaken by the S and I community every day in service to Canada. This includes functioning as a centralized hub for coordinating work on a number of national security issues, including cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, countering foreign interference and, of course, counterterrorism and ideologically motivated violent extremism.

On this last point, I wish to highlight that Public Safety is also responsible for terrorist listings. It is worth noting that in 2021, Canada added 17 new groups to the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities, including six IMVE groups and one individual, raising the total IMVE-specific listings to nine. In fact, just last week, the RCMP charged a suspected member of the international neo-Nazi terrorist network, Atomwaffen Division, in Windsor Ontario. Atomwaffen Division is one of those six groups listed in 2021.

With respect to IMVE, in December 2021, the Minister of Public Safety received his mandate letter from the Prime Minister. In that letter, the minister was instructed to bring forward measures to counter IMVE and strengthen the capacity of police and prosecutors to bring terrorist suspects to justice to the fullest extent of the law.

We in Public Safety Canada, along with others in the S and I community, are actively working to support this commitment now and over the longer term, both internationally as well as domestically. We know that it will require significant effort and will not be resolved overnight. IMVE is a complex, ever-evolving threat, as this committee is well aware.

Internationally, the rise of IMVE is an issue that Canada's closest allies are equally grappling with. For example, countering terrorism and violent extremism in all forms was a key commitment in the road map for a renewed U.S.-Canada partnership signed by the Prime Minister and the President of the United States in February of 2021.

Countering IMVE is also a growing area of collaboration with our Five Eyes—U.K., U.S., Australia, New Zealand—and G7 partners, and is a subject of other multilateral efforts of which Canada is an active participant. The most notable among these would be under the Christchurch call to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.

I raise this point only to highlight that countering the rise of IMVE is not a uniquely Canadian issue, and that concerted international co-operation and dialogue will continue to be needed to effectively address it.

Domestically, we at Public Safety are aware of the need to be open and transparent with Canadians when it comes to making and sustaining progress to counter IMVE here at home. This means, in practice, engagement with civil society, academia, industry, provincial and territorial partners, and others in trying to understand Canadians' expectations of the federal government in this space, and to ensure Canada's approach is a whole-of-society one.

I also wish to underline that we recognize it will be highly important to hear from vulnerable and racialized communities, and ensure that their views and experiences are heard. We are highly attuned to the need for engagement that is respectful and reassures all Canadians of our understanding of IMVE for what it is, which is a serious threat confronted by Canada today.

In this vein, it is important to highlight the role of prevention as an essential component of a whole-of-government and a whole-of-society response. Prevention is key to countering—

11:10 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Jim Carr

You have 10 seconds left.

11:10 a.m.

Director General, National Security Policy, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Lesley Soper

The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence is leading efforts in this space, and my colleague Rob Burley is available to answer any questions in relation to that work.

Thank you.

11:10 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Jim Carr

Thank you very much.

Now I would call upon Deputy Commissioner Michael Duheme. Sir, you have up to five minutes to make an opening statement.

It's over to you.

11:10 a.m.

Deputy Commissioner Michael Duheme Deputy Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Good morning, Mr. Chair and committee members.

It is a beautiful day indeed.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to continue answering questions about IMVE.

As a quick refresher, I'm Mike Duheme, deputy commissioner of the RCMP in federal policing. This includes the national security portfolio that falls under my responsibility.

Over the past months, my team has been following the work being conducted by this committee. We commend you for bringing forward such a diverse and knowledgeable list of experts on the subject, as well as the key service providers and industry professionals who need to be part of the solution going forward. Throughout these appearances, you have been given a great deal of information, some of which has no doubt raised concerns about Canada's ability to effectively combat the growing threat around IMVE threat actors.

For the most part, the calls for concern that you have heard are real. We know the IMVE threat environment is rapidly evolving and complex, and is increasingly fuelled by misinformation and hostile rhetoric surrounding a host of grievances, many of which focus on the government's response to COVID-19 and other matters. This has sewn distrust in government institutions, including law enforcement, and has augmented the ability for extremist groups to both recruit new members and increasingly foster hostility.

For you and the majority of Canadians, this hostility has manifested itself in the daily news and social media. For many RCMP officers and our fellow law enforcement partners it has manifested itself in all too real confrontation, both during the occupation in Ottawa and the numerous border crossing blockades.

Since the onset of the pandemic, the RCMP has seen a marked increase in the number of instances of ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, occurrences, the majority of which come from threat actors who have no clear group affiliation, who are motivated by highly personalized and nuanced ideologies that lead them to incite and/or mobilize to violence.

During my last appearance, I described the scope of the problem the RCMP is facing. My appearance today will focus on what the RCMP is doing about it. Before answering that question, it must be made clear that the RCMP's Federal Policing Program is one part of the solution. Our enforcement actions are the thin edge of the wedge when it comes to a broader Government of Canada response. The bulk of our collective response needs to be focused on proactive measures, steps that can be taken before frustrations can be moulded into hate and violence.

Further, it is important to remember that the RCMP Federal Policing Program is specifically responsible for threats that cross into the national security space, which means criminality that meets the criteria laid out in section 2 of the CSIS Act. Police of jurisdiction maintain responsibility for investigating hate motivated criminal activity, which make up the vast majority of occurrences.

With that said, for the past year or so, the RCMP has taken concrete steps to get its own house in order. It began by talking to our investigators in the field in our various national security focused units, because these are the people who deal with IMVE threats on the front lines. We then met with the support teams at national headquarters who assist with and provide intelligence information to those officers. In both cases, we identified the real-life gaps and challenges that are being faced when trying to identify and take action on potential IMVE threat actors.

From that, the RCMP has developed a comprehensive strategy that will seek to address those gaps and challenges over the next three years. This will mean revamping everything from the training that our officers receive to reallocating resources to better fit the current threat picture. It will mean rethinking how we share information with key partners, as well as aligning federal policing resources to undertake what needs to be done to give our officers the tools they need to address this threat effectively and efficiently.

Like any broad approach to dealing with complex problems, the RCMP strategy also focuses on shifting from being largely reactive to being proactive. This will improve our relationships with key partners in the community and the respective local law enforcement bodies so that we can identify threats before they cross the national security threshold. It will be done by improving information sharing and building up our own intelligence capacity, specifically in the online space. By doing this, we will be in a better position to identify individuals and groups who pose a threat before they are motivated to violence.

In addition, the RCMP will continue to use all the tools that it has at its disposal when IMVE threats are identified. This would include the use of peace bonds, listing regime, revocation of passports, the use of the Secure Air Travel Act, the no-fly list and other tools that will disrupt the imminent. However, make no mistake. As several of the academics have informed this committee—

11:15 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Jim Carr

You have 10 seconds, please.

11:15 a.m.

D/Commr Michael Duheme

—there is no one thing that can eliminate the IMVE threat.

Finally, over the coming months we will remain ready to support public safety and security partners to develop a broader whole-of-government approach to address the growing threat.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

11:15 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Jim Carr

Thank you very much.

I will now open the floor to a round of questioning from members of our committee.

To begin, I will call upon Mr. Lloyd.

It's over to you, sir, for six minutes.

11:15 a.m.

Conservative

Dane Lloyd Conservative Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for you, Ms. Soper. Are you aware that over 30 churches were burned down in Canada in 2021?

11:15 a.m.

Director General, National Security Policy, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Lesley Soper

Yes, I am.

11:15 a.m.

Conservative

Dane Lloyd Conservative Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB

Is Public Safety currently investigating the burning of over 30 churches in Canada last year?

11:15 a.m.

Director General, National Security Policy, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Lesley Soper

Public Safety does not have an investigative mandate. That might be better directed towards the RCMP.

11:15 a.m.

Conservative

Dane Lloyd Conservative Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB

But you said in your testimony that you were given a mandate by this government in 2021 to bring IMVE perpetrators to justice. Now you're saying that you don't have a mandate to investigate?

11:20 a.m.

Director General, National Security Policy, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Lesley Soper

We are not the police of jurisdiction for investigations into IMVE. I might defer that question to my colleagues on the policing side.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Dane Lloyd Conservative Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB

So if you're not doing an investigation, are you doing anything about the 30 churches that were burned down in 2021?

11:20 a.m.

Director General, National Security Policy, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Lesley Soper

Again, I can't speak to the nature of any investigation that might be occurring in relation to those horrible events. I would defer the question to RCMP, who may be the police of jurisdiction in relation to some of those burnings.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Dane Lloyd Conservative Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB

Thank you.

I'll move on to CSIS and Ms. Chayer. I have a copy of your 2021 CSIS report. It lists off a lot of ideologically motivated violent extremist examples, but there's not one example of 30 churches being burned down in Canada last year. Why has that not been included in your CSIS public report?

11:20 a.m.

Executive Director, Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Marie-Hélène Chayer

Thank you very much for the question. However, my organization is the integrated threat assessment centre. I think your question is probably more for my colleague Ms. Henderson.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Dane Lloyd Conservative Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB

Okay, but are you saying that it's not a threat that 30 churches were burned down in Canada last year, that this isn't your purview, that this isn't a terrorist attack?

11:20 a.m.

Executive Director, Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Marie-Hélène Chayer

Sir, perhaps you'll allow me to explain just a little bit the mandate of my organization and how we come up with threat assessments.

ITAC is responsible for evaluating the threat. We do that according to a very detailed methodology. We look at the intent, the opportunities and the capabilities of potential threat actors. We do that according to—

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Dane Lloyd Conservative Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB

So you don't believe these 30 church burnings posed a threat.