Evidence of meeting #25 for Public Safety and National Security in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russia.
A recording is available from Parliament.
11:50 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jim Carr
Thank you very much.
Finally, I would like to turn to Mr. MacGregor to take us to the end of this panel with a two-and-a-half-minute block of questions.
Go ahead, Mr. MacGregor.
11:50 a.m.
NDP
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Leuprecht, I think I'll use my last two and a half minutes with you, sir. Thank you for appearing as a witness for both this study and our IMVE study.
This is really on the same subject that Mr. Noormohamed was questioning you on. You have said very clearly that you'd like to see a royal commission established to try to understand what went on. I guess one of the challenges that we identified in our previous study, and that I think is very pertinent to this one, is the role that social media companies play. If there are those vulnerabilities that exist and that potential foreign state actors can exploit to actively sow disinformation, cause discord, and help events like those in Ottawa come to fruition.... As you said, the capital of a G7 country was essentially brought to a standstill for three whole weeks.
Do you have any recommendations on some of the proactive things that we can be recommending? One of the things we've been struggling with as a committee is that line between honouring freedom of expression, a charter-held right, and also holding social media companies accountable for their role in providing a platform for this kind of disinformation to spread. Do you have any recommendations on some of the proactive things our committee can recommend vis-à-vis social media platforms?
11:50 a.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Queen’s University, As an Individual
You might want to look at the current engagement by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada as well as the B.C. information and privacy commissioner with regard to Facebook, which demonstrates the extreme weakness of our privacy legislation and the inability of the Privacy Commissioner to levy real and meaningful fines against companies found to be wilfully violating Canadian law and legislation, even though that law might be decades out of date. There are certainly significant elements that can be done here.
I would also encourage the committee to look at the Australian process of the Richardson review. I recently wrote a whole book on this, Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft. Australia has a five-year review, led by a judge, of its entire national security intelligence architecture. These reports are up to 1,200 pages in length. They are extremely detailed. As a result, Australia is able to engage in precisely the sort of systematic overhaul that we have not seen in Canada.
11:55 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jim Carr
Thank you very much.
Colleagues, this takes us to the end of the panel. On your behalf, and on behalf of all parliamentarians, I would like to thank our witnesses for bringing their decades of experience and expertise to these controversial, timely and very important subjects.
Thank you very much, witnesses.
Colleagues, we will take a very short break in order to swap panels. Then we'll be back for our second hour of deliberations.
Thank you.
Noon
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jim Carr
I call this meeting back to order.
With us this second hour we have William Browder, chief executive officer, Hermitage Capital Management, as an individual; Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff, distinguished research fellow, National Defence University; and Errol Mendes, professor of constitutional and international law, University of Ottawa.
Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions.
Let me begin with Dr. William Browder to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.
Go ahead, sir.
Noon
William Browder Chief Executive Officer, Hermitage Capital Management Ltd, As an Individual
Thank you for inviting me.
One small correction is that I'm not a doctor, but I appreciate the elevation of my status.
Noon
Chief Executive Officer, Hermitage Capital Management Ltd, As an Individual
I am one of the people who spent the last 10 years involved in a man-to-man fight with Vladimir Putin. It originated from my advocacy for the Magnitsky act all over the world. Many of you will know me from the work I've done with many members of Parliament in Canada over this issue.
I've seen the ways in which Putin and his regime go after enemies, people they consider to be the enemies, countries they consider to be enemies and so on. I just wanted to share a few thoughts at the very beginning of this conversation about the state of play with the war in Ukraine, about our reaction to that war, about Putin's reaction to our reaction and about things that might be done to protect ourselves, Canada and the west more generally.
First and foremost, the Government of Canada and the governments of the United States, EU, U.K. and Australia have done a fine job of imposing sanctions as a way of trying to cripple Vladimir Putin's war effort. The sanctions have been more impressive than I would have expected and perhaps even more impressive than I would have asked for. If we look at the number of people and the names of the people sanctioned, it's really something to be proud of.
The problem is—and this is something that's come from my own research—I estimate that the amount of money the criminal regime of Vladimir Putin has stolen from the Russian people since 2000 when Vladimir Putin came to power is about a trillion dollars. He and the top 1,000 people have taken a trillion dollars out of Russia and that money is sitting in the west. As we put sanctions in place to try to restrict their access to that money so they can't use it for the war effort, if we look at what's actually been frozen from those sanctions, it's a tiny, de minimis portion of that money that's been taken out of Russia.
The reason for that is there's been a huge amount of sanctions evasion. When we put a person on the sanctions list, that person may have some assets in their own name, but that person may also be using all sorts of complicated structures—holding companies, etc.—to hold their assets. They also use family members, nominees, custodians and trust companies, etc. That's one of the ways in which they are sort of fighting back and keeping their money hidden.
Another way the Putin regime is reacting to our efforts to cut them off is that they're weaponizing everything that they can weaponize. They're weaponizing the price of wheat by restricting the export of wheat from Ukraine. They're weaponizing the price of oil by pushing up the price of oil. They're weaponizing the price of gas. Those three things will have a very dramatic effect on all democracies going forward. A lot of people are not going to be worried about Ukraine. They're going to be worried about the price of food at home. They're going to worry about putting gas in their car. They're going to be worried about heating their houses.
As we think of how we want to be responding to this weaponization, we have to look very specifically at these three things and figure out if there are ways we can reduce their ability to weaponize these prices.
In the case of oil, Saudi Arabia is the largest oil supplier in the world. Saudi Arabia has the capacity to increase its oil production. If it was to do that—
12:05 p.m.
Chief Executive Officer, Hermitage Capital Management Ltd, As an Individual
Okay, let me finish it there.
Thank you.
12:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jim Carr
Thank you very much.
I would now like to invite Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff, who will have five minutes for an opening statement.
Go ahead, sir, whenever you're ready.
12:05 p.m.
Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff Distinguished Research Fellow, National Defense University, As an Individual
Mr. Chair, members of the committee and fellow panellists, thank you very much.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine represents the continuation of a long-standing effort in Moscow to revise the outcome of the Cold War. Its danger is exacerbated by President Putin's open rejection of Ukrainian nation and statehood. The belief he has expressed that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” implies that Ukrainians don't have a right to determine their own political fate and that they're doomed by history to remain part of a greater Russian nation.
In areas that are occupied by Russian forces, we've seen what this means in practice: the eradication of Ukrainian culture and its bearers; the mass deportation of civilians, including children; widespread sexual assault and other war crimes.
Having failed to arrest Ukraine's westernization through other means, Russia's current war aims at nothing less than the dismantlement of the Ukrainian state and the erasure of Ukrainian identity.
The west is also a target in this conflict, not only because its members continue providing support to Ukraine, but because of what they stand for: That is, a rules-based order built on the foundations of liberalism and democracy, which includes Ukrainians' right to a free and peaceful life in their own state. Even as Russian troops continue their onslaught against Ukraine, Russia is continuing its long-standing efforts to erode Euro-Atlantic solidarity and sow chaos, confusion and corruption within the Euro-Atlantic space. Compared to states on the front line of the conflict, such as Poland, Romania and the Baltic states, Canada, as well as the United States, is somewhat insulated from the worst of Russia's disruptive activities but hardly immune.
Indeed, Russia has a diverse and deep tool kit of disruptive activities that it can employ against current and aspiring members of the NATO alliance. They include techniques such as espionage and the promotion of disinformation, which technology has allowed Russia to amplify. While social media, spyware and other modern digital technologies are instrumental in this campaign of disinformation and disruption, Cold War-era parallels suggest how the west can push back.
The most important steps taken by western leaders to counter Soviet influence during the Cold War centred on addressing the root causes of the societal vulnerability that Moscow exploited. In earlier eras, belief in democracy's vulnerability drove investment in public education, civil rights legislation and the expansion of the welfare state. Similar investments today would go a long way toward shoring up the vulnerabilities that Russia, among other maligned actors, manipulates. We've done this before; we can do it again. Whether we can do so is really a question of priorities and political will.
Of course, Russia has other disruptive tools at its disposal as well, things like sabotage, assassination and the use of non-conventional weapons. Compared to the Cold War, Russia indeed may be more inclined to use at least some of these weapons today because of the relative weakness of its regular military, which we've now all seen on display in Ukraine.
President Putin and his inner circle understand that Russia cannot win a conventional war against NATO. Instead, they've taken to nuclear sabre-rattling as a form of deterrence. Even though the likelihood of nuclear use is low, other kinds of non-conventional attacks are unfortunately possible. Putin's Russia has shown little compunction about conducting sabotage and assassination overseas, including in NATO member states.
Last year, a German court convicted a member of the Russian Federal Security Service of killing a Chechen exile named Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in a Berlin park. Russian agents have also been implicated in two high-profile attacks using banned weapons on British soil: the poisoning of FSB defector, Alexander Litvinenko with polonium; and the the attempted assassination of the double agent, Sergei Skripal, with a nerve agent, Novichok. These attacks show a clear willingness to use not only violence, but also to cross internationally recognized red lines regarding the use of chemical and radiological weapons.
Despite the targeted nature of the attacks against Khangoshvili, Skripal and likely other enemies of the Kremlin, it's not unreasonable for western governments to worry about the possibility of similar attacks, and perhaps attacks on a larger scale. The danger will only grow as the relationship with Moscow deteriorates and Putin grows more desperate as Russian losses in Ukraine mount. Attacks, cyber or kinetic, targeting critical infrastructure, sabotage, false-flag terrorist attacks, and even the use of chemical weapons should be included in the work of defence planners in NATO member states. At the same time, lines of communication to Moscow must be kept open, if only to communicate clearly NATO's determination to prevent, and if necessary, retaliate for any such attacks.
The war in Ukraine has already demonstrated the financial, military and political limits that Putin's Russia faces. As it flounders in Ukraine, Russia, and Putin, may become more aggressive and more reckless. Remaining committed to helping Ukraine defeat the threat to its existence that Putin's Russia poses, the west, NATO, Canada and the United States must all remain alert to the possibility that Russia will cross lines previously thought to be uncrossable. That recognition argues not for timidity, but rather for preparedness and prudence.
We live in dangerous times, but as J. R. R.Tolkien wrote, while we cannot choose the times in which we live, “All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us.”
Thank you.
12:10 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jim Carr
Thank you very much.
I would now like to invite Professor Errol Mendes to take up to five minutes for an opening comment.
Professor, whenever you're ready, please go ahead.
May 17th, 2022 / 12:10 p.m.
Professor Errol Mendes Professor, Constitutional and International Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Thank you very much, Chair and committee members, for the invitation.
I'd like to start by saying that I'm intrigued at how, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the civilized world talked about the massive violations of international law, including humanitarian law. However, when cyber-attacks take place, there's little discussion of what laws are at play there. Let me say up front that in my view that is not a law-free zone. Part of my presentation today is to first of all talk about what's happening and then suggest ways in which we can insert a legal framework for these types of attacks, both domestically and internationally, starting with the present-day attacks and looking at future attacks by Russia.
We saw recently an attack on Global Affairs, which essentially halted several of it operations, and they had to bring in CSE to repair them. What I find intriguing is that just a month before, CSE had put out a bulletin that actually warned that there could be Russian-backed actors involved in many of the attacks, not just in Canada but around the world. I found it really intriguing that in that bulletin CSE was saying that while there had been “intrusions”—and that's the word they used—into critical infrastructure, manufacturing, health care and energy, there was possibly no real attempt to actually create disruptions in those areas unless there were international hostilities.
Well, I'm sure President Putin thinks there are international hostilities between Canada and Russia at the moment. Therefore we should be looking at Russia throwing everything but the kitchen sink at Ukraine, especially in the banking area, and that should give us a warning as to what “kitchen sink” could be coming here to Canada, given what Russia is doing in the Balkans, in Ukraine, etc.
What has been our reaction? Many of the previous presentations have pointed out the need to have proactive measures to stop this. I won't go into those. I think one of the key things we have to do is to start thinking about working with our allies not just to present a warning, in terms of politics or in terms of potential countermeasures, but also to frame it in the context that this is a grave violation of international law, including potentially humanitarian law if those attacks take place at hospitals or on water supplies, for example, which could possibly endanger many lives in grave violation of international humanitarian law.
Finally, before my time runs out, another area I think we should focus on is the grave impact of disinformation. As a recent official of Global Affairs said, the Russian trolls are blanketing Canada with disinformation, especially in those areas in which they think they can create the most massive distrust of government, and most recently those have included vaccines, vaccine mandates and other areas that could potentially result in the distrust of government and therefore, hopefully, distrust of what Canada is doing in supporting Ukraine.
Let me say that while many people may say it's not causing actual damage and so on, we need focus only on what's happened in the United States and in New Zealand, on that type of disinformation, especially the hateful type of disinformation such as the replacement theory, to see that it does cause death and does cause injuries.
One of the things I'm advocating is that in the absence of our having a domestic law dealing with online harms, we should be seriously thinking about how we can link in with, for example, the European Union, which is now putting forward a digital services act that would focus on the platforms themselves and put the onus on the platforms to have annual assessments and independent audits, and ultimately to back those up with a regulatory framework that could potentially have massive fines.
I know there could be lots of problems if we proposed such a law, in terms of, potentially, a massive backlash with respect to freedom of expression, but I think it's time we started looking at what the European Union is suggesting.
Finally, to finish off my presentation, I think we need to now think about working with our allies to present a collective security framework. When any of our allies is attacked, we would present a collective security framework equivalent to article 9 of the NATO Treaty and present that to Russia, to China and to other foreign states to say we will potentially respond with our collective strength and that could very well be the ultimate deterrent to some of these countries.
I'll leave it at that.
12:15 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jim Carr
Thank you very much—and exactly on time.
Now I will open it up to our first round of questions.
We will be led by Mr. Van Popta, who has a six-minute block of questions.
12:15 p.m.
Conservative
Tako Van Popta Conservative Langley—Aldergrove, BC
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to all the witnesses who are with us here this morning to share your wisdom and insights.
Mr. Browder, I'm going to start with you. I read your earlier book, The Red Notice, a couple of years ago and have just downloaded your most recent book and have read a couple of chapters so far. Thank you for them. I would recommend them to all committee members as reading to better understand the corruption that is going on in Russia today under President Putin.
In your book, you talk about your friend and lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, and I want to thank you for sticking to it and encouraging western countries to implement Magnitsky laws and sanctions, which we have done now.
Mr. Browder, here's my question. You appeared before the foreign affairs committee on February 10 of this year, some two weeks before Russia actually invaded Ukraine, and you recommended that we identify 50 of Putin's top oligarchs and that we hit them hard, where it hurts, and that is in their bank accounts.
You suggested that we hit five and then another five, and that if Putin actually invades Ukraine, to hit all the rest of them. You said, “I believe this would stop Putin in his tracks and he wouldn't invade Ukraine.”
Clearly, sir, something went wrong. Either the government didn't take your advice or you underestimated Putin's propensity for recklessness.
It's over to you.
12:15 p.m.
Chief Executive Officer, Hermitage Capital Management Ltd, As an Individual
Thank you for that question. It's a very important question.
In my opinion, Putin didn't believe that we would come up with the sanctions that we came up with when we came up with them.
He had looked at our conduct, and when I say “our”, I mean Canada, the United States, the EU and the U.K. He looked at our conduct after the invasion of Georgia—nothing; after the illegal annexation of Crimea—effectively nothing; after MH17 was shot down—nothing; and, after the Salisbury poisonings—nothing. He was of the opinion that we weren't going to do anything if he invaded Ukraine. He thought we would do some kind of token “seem to be doing something but not doing anything” sanctions. I believe that part of his miscalculation of invading Ukraine was that we didn't do anything.
When I made that proposal on February 10, all we had to do was sanction five oligarchs, not as a major punishment, but as a demonstration that we have the capacity to do this, but we didn't, so he barrelled into Ukraine and, in doing so, he basically started the process. When Putin starts a process, he doesn't ever go back; he only has a forward gear, not a reverse gear.
I think that at this point the sanctions are not for deterrence. They are to bleed him dry of financial resources.
12:20 p.m.
Conservative
Tako Van Popta Conservative Langley—Aldergrove, BC
Good, and thank you for that.
You talk about a trillion dollars being stolen out of the Russian economy by Putin and his friends, which is of course a much bigger number than the $230 million you talked about in your book, but how would you assess Canada's strategic use of the Magnitsky act sanctions today? In your opening comments, you seemed to be somewhat complimentary of Canada's efforts, but perhaps you could expand on that a bit.
12:20 p.m.
Chief Executive Officer, Hermitage Capital Management Ltd, As an Individual
Let me not compliment Canada on your implementation of the Magnitsky act. The Magnitsky act was passed in 2017, unanimously, by both the lower and upper houses of Parliament. Immediately after it was passed, a number of Russians, including those who killed Sergei Magnitsky, were sanctioned, along with the killers of Jamal Khashoggi, and some Venezuelan officials and people from Myanmar. I think there was one other slate of sanctions.
The Magnitsky act has not been used as a piece of legislation since then. All the sanctions have been used under—I can't remember the name of it—the other sanctions act.
The Magnitsky act should be the chief sanctions legislation to be used in Canada, and I would actually suggest and propose that because there has been so little usage of it by the foreign affairs ministry, there should be some type of parliamentary review to understand what the holdup is, what the barrier is, because the Magnitsky act is the main tool to go after human rights violators.
There are a lot of victims out there that are all wanting Canada to join the rest of the coalition of the willing—the United States, the U.K. and the EU—in using the Magnitsky act in all sorts of terrible situations where it hasn't been used so far.
12:20 p.m.
Conservative
Tako Van Popta Conservative Langley—Aldergrove, BC
Sir, could you perhaps give us an assessment of how our allies—the United States, Australia and other countries—are using Magnitsky sanctions in a strategic and beneficial way?
12:20 p.m.
Chief Executive Officer, Hermitage Capital Management Ltd, As an Individual
Is that for me?
12:20 p.m.
Conservative
Tako Van Popta Conservative Langley—Aldergrove, BC
Yes. Are other countries doing a better job than Canada is?
12:20 p.m.
Chief Executive Officer, Hermitage Capital Management Ltd, As an Individual
You can plainly tell by the numbers. If you look at the United States, I believe there are more than 500 individuals and entities sanctioned under their global Magnitsky Act.
12:20 p.m.
Chief Executive Officer, Hermitage Capital Management Ltd, As an Individual
The number for Canada is, I think, 80% less than that.