Public Safety Committee on June 13th, 2023

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here and sharing their expertise. I do have a few opening questions for the two investigative units from Saskatchewan and Manitoba.

As we've been going through this Bill C-20 review process, there has been a bit of a reoccurring question theme about the pros and cons of the current model that the RCMP uses with the complaints commission and of more independent models—as, perhaps, I'll describe them—like your own, which we see at the provincial level. We are looking at whether Bill C-20 is taking the right approach, and those discussions will continue as we move forward.

I'll go Mr. Tessler first, and then Mr. Gudelot can weigh in as well.

In short, can you provide some insight on the pros and cons of the way that your board is set up? What are the benefits of having a more independent model?

[Zane Tessler]

I think what's key at the outset is that we have a very defined mandate. Our primary purpose is to investigate “all serious incidents” as defined in our legislation. All of the provincial agencies have virtually identical types of mandates in that we are dealing with deaths, serious injuries—as defined—or, for most of the provinces, Criminal Code allegations against officers.

Speaking for myself—Greg can chime in when he's able—I can say that our legislation does not deal only with the municipal police services created in the province of Manitoba. We are also specifically mandated to deal with all involvements of the RCMP within the province of Manitoba. That, in itself, has required us to ensure that there is consistency in the approach between the various provinces, given that most of us—particularly those in western Canada—will be dealing with the RCMP. There needs to be a standardized approach so that officers stationed in one province know what they are facing if they are transferred to another province for their service.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you.

You can go right ahead and wrap up. Then we have just a few minutes left for Mr. Gudelot to weigh in as well.

Again, I know we saw this with the Nova Scotia mass killing a few years ago. Their SIRT was triggered, obviously, to review the goings-on there.

When the RCMP union rep came here, he did flag that there are some challenges with having the RCMP investigate itself with regard to other complaints that don't involve the Criminal Code and issues that would go to you. Officers investigating each other does not necessarily invoke public confidence. It also is not great for morale in a small office when officers are having to investigate each other for complaints.

With that background, you can wrap up with a final comment, and then we'll go to Mr. Gudelot to weigh in on that.

[Zane Tessler]

Actually, I'm going to defer to Mr. Gudelot. His office will involve both the conduct and serious incident involvements.

In Manitoba, we've been very successful in providing the necessary independent oversight expected in the investigation of all serious incidents involving all police agencies within the province.

[Greg Gudelot]

Thanks, Zane.

I suppose in terms of the pros and cons, or the issues with police investigating police, there will always be an issue with the acceptance of that investigation, no matter how well it's done. The goal of these investigations and the goal of building an independent oversight unit is to enhance public confidence in policing and to give the public confidence that, if a police officer is cleared following an incident, they were cleared following a fulsome investigation, or if charges result, the charges are prosecutable and, again, properly investigated.

That can only come when the public fully trusts the investigative process, and one of the difficulties with the direct involvement of police officers in that process is perhaps a diminished ability of the public to accept the results of those investigations.

I think the other issue that you referred to, in terms of the morale issue, is a real one as well. Not every police officer signed up to investigate their colleagues. I think there is a morale issue there, or there is at least a perception of the willingness to engage in that type of investigation.

The advantage to independent investigative agencies, even when those agencies make use of seconded police resources, as some across Canada do, is that every member of that agency, every investigator at that agency, has made a conscious decision or has made a decision to willingly be part of an investigative team that is primarily focused on the investigation of police-involved incidents.

In terms of the other question, the pros and cons of the legislation or the makeup of my individual team, I think the pros from the legislation that we have.... I'm speaking specifically of the SIRT legislation, and there is a distinction between our complaints investigation body and our serious incident investigation body. In terms specifically of the SIRT legislation, I think the biggest pro for me, or the biggest advantage, that we have baked into that legislation is the flexibility in terms of engagement. SIRT has a number of options in terms of how it engages in a serious incident investigation, so once something has been deemed within the mandate or within the scope of SIRT's authority, we have a number of ways we can engage on that investigation.

The first is obviously to investigate that ourselves and to take the lead investigative role in that matter. We're also able to review those matters, oversee an investigation conducted by someone else, observe an investigation conducted by someone else, assist or conduct a collaborative investigation, or simply monitor it to ensure if further involvement is needed. That gives us the ability to match our resources and match the needs of an individual file to the capabilities of the team and to what's required to achieve public confidence in that particular case.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir. I'm going to have to cut you off there.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you very much to both of you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Ms. Dancho.

Ms. Damoff, please go ahead for six minutes.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Dr. Leuprecht, I'm going to start with you. First, I'd like to thank you for the input you've provided this committee for a great many years on various pieces of legislation and on studies that we've done. I know when you testified on systemic racism, some of the recommendations you made to us at the time were around putting together the CRCC. I just want to sincerely thank you for the input and advice that you've provided.

I don't know if you were listening to the previous panel. One of the recommendations from NCCM was that the new commission also look at incidents that would normally go to NSIRA. I'm just wondering what your thoughts are, given your experience, research and expertise on this matter.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

My hunch is that, the way the division of labour has been shaking out between NSICOP and NSIRA, NSIRA does the more operational pieces and NSICOP does the broader strategic pieces.

Here, I think we have an opportunity with the PCRC to focus more on the tactical items. I think NSICOP, with 16 agencies and departments plus the Department of National Defence, has plenty of work already.

We also want to make sure that people don't try to double-dip or triple-dip in the system. We want to have a clear direction for what types of complaints go where and a mechanism for, if something ends up with NSIRA, then NSIRA has some direction as to what then gets pushed, for instance, to the PCRC to investigate.

You probably have a broader and a much more diverse skill set with NSIRA than you might have in the PCRC, but I feel that the PCRC would have the opportunity to contract in order to coordinate with other departments for skill sets or to contract those skill sets themselves. I'm not sure that NSIRA would necessarily be in a position to better do the work that is intended for the PCRC, but ultimately this is for the committee to deconflict.

As you saw, I raised other deconfliction issues. I think this is just a matter of providing clear directions because it's resource-intensive.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

I have another quick question for you.

When Mel Cappe was here, he said that “you have to keep the responsibility for doing these investigations on the agency.” As you know, he did a lot of work prior to the legislation being brought in.

What are your thoughts? We have heard a lot about police investigating police. Should these investigations start within the agency before they go to the PCRC?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

The provincial agencies tend to have a streaming mechanism as to what conduct investigations are done by the local forces and what investigations fall within the remit of the provincial agency. I think there's probably an opportunity here for perhaps lower-level conduct investigations to be done within the agency. They might be more effective and efficient if it stays within the agency.

At the same time, as you likely know, CBSA has been preparing for quite some time for the PCRC, not just in terms of its processes but also in terms of the institutional culture. I think there's not going to be significant push-back either way in terms of the decisions that you make, but I think here's an opportunity to provide and get advice.

I think what this does hint at—and we got this with Ms. Dancho's question as well—is that one key issue is the transparency of what happens when agencies investigate themselves. I do think, by and large, that these investigations are very well done, but there's very little transparency on what happens on the results of these, even for the complainants. If it's done internally, there needs to be public transparency as to the outcome to legitimize the process.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

I'm going to turn to the Saskatchewan SIRT. It's very impressive what you're doing in Saskatchewan, I have to say.

I want to keep on that same theme because you do serious incident response. How do you differentiate between what we were talking about with conduct...?

One thing we heard when the chair was here—and others have testified about this—was that most of these investigations get dealt with within the agency. Someone's had more minor interactions, as I would classify them. When it gets to you, how do you differentiate between those that are not serious incidents that go to you...?

[Greg Gudelot]

The key—as I think Zane alluded to earlier—is a well-defined mandate: death; serious injury, with serious injury outlined in our regulations down to specific injuries or specific components that will qualify for inclusion under the term “serious injury”; as well as sexual assault; interpersonal violence.... Then there is a somewhat seldom used catch-all for matters of significant public interest.

That clearly outlines what falls within the SIRT side. There will be some crossover between the two sides.

Part of the trick of running an agency that covers both complaints and the serious incident side is the appropriate separation and staging of those incidents. On a certain matter that might also constitute a complaint or might also constitute something with some disciplinary jeopardy to a member, we have the option to park that complaint or park the consideration of disciplinary jeopardy until the conclusion of the serious incident investigation.

At the conclusion of a serious incident investigation, our act allows me to either direct the matter over to the PCC side for further investigation if necessary, or direct it to the head of a police agency for the imposition of major or minor discipline, if necessary.

That approach allows us to appropriately stage the investigation and to conclude the serious incident investigation, which is the criminal investigation, first, before any consideration is necessary on the disciplinary side. There are also some companion protections for the members in there to allow the police officers involved the decision to participate in one of those investigations without necessarily providing a statement in the other investigation, because there are differences in terms of the compelled or voluntary statements that are required in each of those investigations.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

Thank you, Ms. Damoff.

I now give the floor to Ms. Michaud for six minutes.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for being here.

Mr. Leuprecht, you unfortunately ran out of time during your opening statement. You had some proposals for the study of Bill C‑20. I gather you're in favour of it.

You talked a lot about accountability and reporting, as well as how important it is for this future entity to be independent, so it can do the work we're asking of it.

I would like you to tell us more about the proposals you had for us. As I was saying earlier to another witness, we are a bit pressed for time. We are drafting our amendments and will start clause-by-clause study next week.

If you have any proposals to make to improve this bill as much as possible, we will take them. I give you the floor.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Thank you, Madam, for offering me the opportunity.

The bill contains disciplinary measures for members of the CBSA and RCMP. It seems to me that disciplinary measures for members of the RCMP, even the most severe ones, are still too lenient. You risk creating frustration among the general public. There will be some very good investigations, but weak disciplinary measures imposed on some members will frustrate the public. We know that the RCMP Civilian Review and Complaints Commission investigated certain members several times. That might require some looking into.

Another problem stems from the fact that staff members under investigation still get their salary during the process. Ontario and other jurisdictions have now implemented certain measures, according to which a member cannot receive their salary during an investigation. Indeed, it does not bode well for discipline when a member targeted by severe sanctions during a criminal investigation receives their salary for years at a time. I would therefore propose a measure according to which, if a staff member is found guilty, taxpayers can reclaim the salary, which is often paid out for years. Furthermore, staff members often get retirement benefits. Some measures are therefore required.

It's the issue of special constables, which is currently under debate in Ontario as to whether special constables do or do not fall under the regime and under what measures within that regime. I think that is also something that perhaps might need to be clarified either in law or in regulation.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

When you talk about special constables, are you referring to RCMP reservists, who aren't affected by this bill?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Exactly. It includes everyone who wears a uniform and is not a regular member of the RCMP or CBSA.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

What you said is a comment we've heard already, specifically from a representative of an Indigenous community. They said that, in their community, it's almost all reservists. If there can't be any accountability, as long as there's no way to file a complaint against reservists stationed there, the public loses some trust in the system. We therefore understand the urgent need to act on this matter.

Earlier, you talked about national security with Ms. Damoff. In the briefing from the Canadian Bar Association, or CBA, I read that in certain sections, it includes activities "related" to national security. Other sections include activities "closely related" to national security. Sometimes, it's about the particulars of the French language. In French, this could be two very different things. I will be sure to ask the analysts and law clerks what they think of it.

We heard from some groups that it might be necessary to define national security and what it could include within the framework of this bill.

Do you have an opinion on the matter? The content of the bill is rather technical. However, when it comes to national security, it's necessary to thoroughly understand the ins and outs.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Regarding your comments on special constables, we must keep in mind that the RCMP is overrepresented in small communities where minority community members in Canada are often underrepresented. This bill could lead to very real impacts on this issue.

When it comes to national security, we have to look at the activities included in the RCMP's mandates, which include federal policing and national policing services, instead of the mandates from the RCMP's various contracts. I believe the distinction is in the type of activities the police service is carrying out at the time.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Madam.

We'll go to Mr. Julian, please, for six minutes. Everyone else has had almost seven, except for Kristina, so maybe take six and a half, and it will probably stretch to seven.

Go ahead, please.

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I also thank the witnesses.

Mr. Leuprecht, I'd like to come back to the answers you just gave in response to Ms. Michaud's questions.

You said—this is important—that the public could feel frustrated by the outcome of a founded complaint if it leads to minimal consequences. You raised the possibility that, if an officer gets their salary while being investigated for failing to respect the public, it could be taken from them afterwards.

Can you give examples of other countries where review and complaints commissions do this type of thing, that is to say, impose financial penalties by taking back the salary of a public safety officer who fails to uphold the position's standards and values?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

To my knowledge, the only jurisdiction to actually do so is Ontario. Ontario spent a lot of time discussing conditions to make it happen. It's a matter of deciding if a suspension without salary can happen from the very beginning, or when a certain threshold is reached, or if taxpayers will have to collect the salary payments made during the process.

Disciplinary procedures can take several years. However, it seems to me that nothing encourages people to behave better when they know that, even if their behaviour is grossly inappropriate, they will still get their salary for years at a time. So, it's a difficult topic, but currently, I think the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act does not reinforce trust from the general public.