That's excellent.
As part of the PRC's cultural influence efforts abroad, the Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes that “teach Chinese language and culture, including calligraphy, food and dance.” For example, there are now more Confucius Institutes in Africa than the number of cultural centres of any other government except France. In Canada, these institutes are typically affiliated with postsecondary education institutes and K-12 schools. CSIS notes that New Brunswick recently shut down a Confucius Institute due to community complaints related to foreign interference. In the United States, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs recently completed a review of these institutes in a report entitled “China's Impact on the U.S. Education System.” The report noted that,
“Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can compromise academic freedom. The Chinese government approves all teachers, events, and speakers. some U.S. schools contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws will apply.... The Chinese teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government pledging they will not damage the national interests of China. Such limitations attempt to export China's censorship of political debate and prevent discussion of potentially politically sensitive topics.”
Recent Canadian media reports have highlighted similar concerns, including a January 2019 article that discussed the rejection of a Confucius Institute agreement by a Toronto school board.
Further on, it states:
The Committee believes—
This is NSICOP.
—there is ample evidence...that Canada is the target of significant and sustained foreign interference activities...the PRC, the Russian Federation...other states.... The committee believes that these states target Canada for a variety of reasons, but all seek to exploit the openness of our society and penetrate our fundamental institutions to meet their objectives. They target ethnocultural communities, seek to corrupt the political process, manipulate the media, and attempt to curate debate on postsecondary campuses. Each of these activities poses a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of Canadians and to the country's sovereignty: they are a clear threat to the security of Canada.
Canada is not alone in facing this threat. Its closest security and intelligence allies, including those within the Five Eyes and NATO, are targeted by many of the same foreign states using many of the same techniques. Like terrorism, the threat of foreign interference is increasingly seen by states as a growing threat requiring a common response.
Chair, I would like to turn the committee's attention to the NSICOP report from 2020—the last one was from 2019—submitted to the Prime Minister in December 2020. Although I know the members of the committee would like me to read the entire 60-page report, I will not, but I will read the sections of the report that directly speak to the content of the motion that I presented:
In 2018, the Committee—
Again, this is from the report on espionage and foreign interference from NSICOP.
—identified espionage and foreign interference as growing threats that will likely require a more significant response in the years ahead. Espionage and foreign interference threaten Canada's sovereignty, prosperity and national interests. These threats target communities, governments, businesses, universities and technology. In 2019, the Committee reviewed the government's response to foreign interference and found that foreign interference activities pose a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada's fundamental institutions—