Public Safety Committee on Nov. 1st, 2023

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

It is a motion that has been placed before the committee. Notice was given a couple of weeks ago.

I'll read the motion:

That, given that CSIS Director David Vigneault told our Five Eyes allies that the dictatorship in Beijing is targeting Canadian universities, saying, “Everything that they're doing in our universities and in new technology, it's going back into a system very organized to create dual-use applications for the military”, the committee invite the Director of CSIS to brief the committee on his efforts to set up a Research Security Centre.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Mr. Chair, on a point of order, although notice of the motion was given, we're not in committee business and it's not relevant to the topic. I would suggest that this motion is out of order at this time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

Unfortunately, I did recognize Mr. Motz and notice was given, so it doesn't have to relate to the business at hand.

Mr. Motz can continue with his motion at this time.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I think it's important for the committee to start looking at some of the work Canadians expect us to do. It is topics like what's in the motion, about the universities and the security threat that China is to this country, that protect Canadians from the real and present threats that are out there in the world and that are at the doorsteps of Canadians.

While this government continues to ram through bad legislation, the director of CSIS, who is Canada's top spy, and our Five Eyes partners, which we have basically ignored and abandoned in the last eight years, have sounded the alarms and are imploring us to do our jobs as politicians.

Chair, I've heard the director of CSIS inform us of how important it is that we let the NDP and Liberals ram through legislation, but he also says that dictatorships in Beijing are targeting Canadian universities. He said, “Everything that they're doing in [those] universities and in new technology is going back into a system very organized to create dual-use applications for the military.”

That should make the hair on the back of our necks stand on end, Mr. Chair. It's time that this committee starts taking its role seriously and starts listening to Canadians.

When it comes to what this country needs, I think it's important that Canadians help us decide that—not necessarily the PMO. I think that having the director of CSIS come to this committee, have an opportunity to use this place as a non-partisan tool to protect democracy and explain the fears he has, and inform us of how we can better act to protect all Canadians would be a necessary part of the work of this committee.

Chair, the fear of foreign espionage, foreign interference and targeting is not new. It is also not the first time the director has tried to make us aware of the problems we face as a country.

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, in 2019, in “Chapter 2: The Government Response to Foreign Interference—Part II”, made reference to this, specifically on the point of interference with academic institutions.

For the benefit of the committee I am going to read a couple of sections of that report.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Ms. Michaud, go ahead on a point of order, please.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

I know that you ruled Mr. Motz's motion to be in order.

Am I to understand that he is now discussing it? If so, could he tell us how long it will take? I see that he has a large pile of paper in front of him and that we are approaching the end of Bill C‑20.

I am therefore wondering whether we'll be able to get back to the bill within the next few minutes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I suspect that we are not going to get back to Bill C-20 tonight.

In that regard, I wonder if it's the will of the committee to invite our witnesses to withdraw.

[Some hon. members]

No.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

That being said, Mr. Motz, carry on. You have the floor.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you.

Again, this is the annual report from 2019, where NSICOP spoke specifically about interference with academic institutions.

They say, in paragraph 171, the following:

Some states carry out foreign interference activities on Canadian postsecondary education campuses. They seek to utilize the open and innovative features of these institutions to further their own objectives, which include interference activities but also other actions with hostile intent (e.g., espionage and intellectual property theft). Foreign interference activity seeks to influence public opinion and debate, thereby obstructing fundamental freedoms such as speech and assembly, and the independence of academic institutions. In trying to influence public debate at academic institutions, foreign states may sponsor specific events to shape discussion rather than engage in free debate and dialogue. They may also directly or indirectly attempt to disrupt public events or other activities perceived as problematic.

They go on to say in paragraph 173:

As CSIS noted, the [Chinese Students and Scholars Associations] are an important support mechanism for international students studying abroad and “provide a social and professional network for students...they are not nefarious in and of themselves.” However, there is growing public concern about the relationship between the [Chinese Students and Scholars Associations] and the PRC's embassies and consulates as the [Chinese Students and Scholars Associations] are “one of the main means the Chinese authorities use to guide Chinese students and scholars on short-term study abroad.” In the United States, [Chinese Students and Scholars Associations] are “mobilized to protest campus events that threatened to show China in a negative light.... Though ties with the Chinese government vary from chapter to chapter, there is reportedly 'growing ideological pressure from the embassy and consulates'. Some CSSAs already mandate loyalty to the Party—

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

Do we have any printed copies available?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Of the motion?

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Yes.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Yes, we should have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I believe they were distributed by email.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

They were. I would just like to see if it's the same motion that was read into the record, so if we have printed copies....

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

The clerk says that he can get us some printed copies in a couple of minutes.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

That's perfect. Thank you.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you.

Though ties with the Chinese government vary from chapter to chapter, there is reportedly 'growing ideological pressure from the embassy and consulates'. Some CSSAs already mandate loyalty to the Party line.” CSSA behaviour may also pose a threat to freedom of speech and assembly. For example, a media report discussed a Toronto-based chapter of the CSSA that immediately informed the Chinese consulate and publicly condemned a presentation at McMaster University by Rukiye Turdush, a critic of the PRC's internment of Uyghurs.

Chair, if we want to suspend until we get that motion printed off for everybody....

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

No. That's fine.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

That's excellent.

As part of the PRC's cultural influence efforts abroad, the Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes that “teach Chinese language and culture, including calligraphy, food and dance.” For example, there are now more Confucius Institutes in Africa than the number of cultural centres of any other government except France. In Canada, these institutes are typically affiliated with postsecondary education institutes and K-12 schools. CSIS notes that New Brunswick recently shut down a Confucius Institute due to community complaints related to foreign interference. In the United States, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs recently completed a review of these institutes in a report entitled “China's Impact on the U.S. Education System.” The report noted that,

“Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can compromise academic freedom. The Chinese government approves all teachers, events, and speakers. some U.S. schools contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws will apply.... The Chinese teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government pledging they will not damage the national interests of China. Such limitations attempt to export China's censorship of political debate and prevent discussion of potentially politically sensitive topics.”

Recent Canadian media reports have highlighted similar concerns, including a January 2019 article that discussed the rejection of a Confucius Institute agreement by a Toronto school board.

Further on, it states:

The Committee believes—

This is NSICOP.

—there is ample evidence...that Canada is the target of significant and sustained foreign interference activities...the PRC, the Russian Federation...other states.... The committee believes that these states target Canada for a variety of reasons, but all seek to exploit the openness of our society and penetrate our fundamental institutions to meet their objectives. They target ethnocultural communities, seek to corrupt the political process, manipulate the media, and attempt to curate debate on postsecondary campuses. Each of these activities poses a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of Canadians and to the country's sovereignty: they are a clear threat to the security of Canada.

Canada is not alone in facing this threat. Its closest security and intelligence allies, including those within the Five Eyes and NATO, are targeted by many of the same foreign states using many of the same techniques. Like terrorism, the threat of foreign interference is increasingly seen by states as a growing threat requiring a common response.

Chair, I would like to turn the committee's attention to the NSICOP report from 2020—the last one was from 2019—submitted to the Prime Minister in December 2020. Although I know the members of the committee would like me to read the entire 60-page report, I will not, but I will read the sections of the report that directly speak to the content of the motion that I presented:

In 2018, the Committee—

Again, this is from the report on espionage and foreign interference from NSICOP.

—identified espionage and foreign interference as growing threats that will likely require a more significant response in the years ahead. Espionage and foreign interference threaten Canada's sovereignty, prosperity and national interests. These threats target communities, governments, businesses, universities and technology. In 2019, the Committee reviewed the government's response to foreign interference and found that foreign interference activities pose a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada's fundamental institutions—

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

On a point of order, Mr. Chair, there is so much conversation on that side of the room that I can barely hear my colleague just two microphones away.

[An hon. member]

[Inaudible—Editor]

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Let's not have crosstalk.