Thank you very much, Chair and members of the committee.
I'm going to do two things today. I will go to specific proposed sections of the legislation that I think warrant a further look and potential amendment. Then I will talk about a practical policy tool to encourage compliance. I'm going to propose a cybersecurity investment tax credit for Canadian businesses. We have a once-in-a-generation nation-building moment here, and I think a tax credit is the way to go.
My colleagues who preceded me did a good job, but I want to go through a couple of things.
Proposed subsection 15.1(3) and proposed subsection 15.2(5) are non-disclosure provisions that allow the Governor in Council or the minister to impose secrecy around orders without any guiding criteria. That's the point I want to come back to. Secrecy must be the exception, not the default. I think you should impose statutory criteria that need to be considered when determining whether or not to render an order secret.
I would propose the following if it were up to me: the degree to which disclosure could reasonably be expected to compromise the effectiveness of the order or jeopardize national security; the availability of less restrictive means, including partial or delayed publication to achieve the same objective; the impact of non-disclosure on the transparency and accountability of government decision-making; the necessity of non-disclosure in light of a threat's urgency, nature and duration; and any representations made by affected telecommunications service providers or regulators surrounding the need for confidentiality.
I'm okay with secrecy and understand the need for it here. I'm just saying that you need some criteria under which to make those determinations. The bill has criteria elsewhere for decision-making, just not around non-disclosure.
Next, I want to talk about proposed subsection 15.1(8) and proposed subsection 15.2(10), and I apologize for being so detailed. I'm a lawyer. It's an occupational hazard.
Here, the Crown would bear no financial responsibility arising out of an order. I think that's sound, but we would end up with a bit of a problem. Pairing the no-compensation rules with the non-disclosure rules would lead us to a situation where publicly traded companies could find themselves in breach of securities law. They could have a material change to their financial books. Suppose a telecommunications provider gets a rip-and-replace order, and it's $25 million. They couldn't disclose that to their shareholders if the order were secret. In that very moment, they would find themselves in breach of their fiduciary duty and the securities regulations. That's something we should consider.
There are ways you can deal with this. I propose that regulations could allow for cost recovery in discrete and exceptional circumstances. You should also create a secure disclosure channel for affected companies so they could make these disclosures to their security regulators and auditors under conditions that would satisfy the safeguards surrounding the classified information.
Somebody was talking about safe harbour earlier. I want to talk about a different safe harbour because, if this proceeds the way it's written, it could function as.... We need a limited form of legal protection for officers and directors of corporations who comply with Bill C-8 on a good-faith basis but who are then exposed to liability under their securities law. We need to make sure there's a safe way for them to do that without finding themselves on the horns of a very pronounced legal dilemma, where they cannot simultaneously comply with both obligations.
In proposed subsection 15.21(1) and proposed subsection 15.81(1), there is duplication of reporting. There are two proposed subsections that would require the minister to report to Parliament three months after the annual report. I think it's just a drafting error. You could easily clean that up. It's the same thing.
More pronounced, proposed section 15.4 would compel information. This would let the minister compel information from any person. This isn't important for compliance, but you're going to run into section 7 and section 11(c) challenges under the charter if the material is used for the purpose of prosecution down the road. Add an explicit immunity-use clause modelled after the Competition Act. This would make sure the information is only used for regulatory purposes, not criminal prosecution. That would preserve your confidentiality without weakening enforcement. That is present in the Competition Act.
Regarding proposed section 15.9 and judicial review, there's an issue there too. The judge would have to give back any irrelevant information the minister provided. There is a problem because, when a judge reviews something on a JR, they're looking at whether all the information the minister relied on is relevant. Judges could find themselves in an awkward spot, where they are not allowed to look at all the material they need to for the purpose of determining relevancy. That's something you will want to look at. It's a bit like putting a hockey player on the ice with one skate and no stick. You have to make sure the judge has all the information they need, and I think a simple amendment could solve that.
Moving to proposed section 142 under the CCSPA and proposed subsection 73(3.3) of the Telecommunications Act, I don't know if this was done on purpose, but under the Telecommunications Act the company is only liable if the employee who committed the offence was acting within the scope of their job or authority, while under the CCSPA that qualifier is missing. This means that two companies could face different standards of liability. I think that's worth a second look too.
Thank you very much.
