Thank you for inviting me to address the committee today.
I am Sharon Polsky. I'm the president of the Privacy and Access Council of Canada, an independent, non-profit, non-partisan organization that is not funded by government or industry.
Since launching 30-some years ago, the Internet has infiltrated our lives. I spent those years consulting to governments and to small, medium-sized and Fortune 100 businesses, seeing how they apply the law and policy and identifying practical risks invariably caused by human nature and, increasingly, the Internet itself.
MP Caputo asked for some specifics, and I hope to oblige. The preamble says that the bill is to protect telco providers and critical systems and provides the minister with great power to order them to do anything or to refrain from doing anything to protect the Canadian telco system. That's laudable, but it lacks adequate safeguards to prevent abuse or ideological attack. This new law to add the promotion of the security of the Canadian telecommunications system as a policy objective tells companies to plug the holes that were built into their systems, something they should have done long ago to comply with privacy and other laws.
Rephrasing the request isn't going to change much, even with AMPs. I'll speak more on that in a minute.
Under proposed section 7 of part 2, a class of operators can be declared and any person or organization declared a member of that class. The bill applies to enterprises within the legislative authority of Parliament, and proposed subsection 9(1) ensnares the rest, the businesses and people whose products or services are in support of federally regulated enterprises.
On accountability, the Auditor General noted that “Gaps in cyber security defences undermine the ability to protect critical information and manage cyber security risks.” Those gaps will remain even if this bill becomes law.
The standards, laws and frameworks already in place—the privacy, security and risk assessments now done or supposed to be done—cannot prevent outages like we saw last week that took down half the Internet and again yesterday that took down another half of the Internet, each time grinding services around the globe to a halt, thanks to a single technical problem. That's all it took, because accountability requirements are inadequate.
What accountability can there be when even the existence of orders can be ordered to be kept secret and when the Governor in Council can direct that orders not be published? Doing that leaves everybody in the dark and speaks to an undemocratic lack of transparency and a shield against accountability.
Proposed section 15.21 requires the minister to reveal how many times in the previous year secret orders were made and other details, but statistics are cold comfort, especially given the broad information collection and sharing powers in the bill.
Part 2 of Bill C-8 allows any service or system to be designated a vital service or system and requires designated operators “mitigate supply-chain and third-party risks”. It doesn't, but it should specify what risks are to be mitigated.
Proposed subsection 20(6) of the CCSPA prohibits a designated operator or class of operators from intercepting communications, but third parties that support critical services aren't included. That could easily be operationalized as encryption-busting back doors. This and other governments have worked mightily over the years to circumvent encryption. Bill C-8 needs clear language to ensure that its broad powers cannot be used in any way by anyone to undermine or circumvent encryption, a ban even more urgent considering that Bill C-2's vague language would grant sweeping ministerial powers to order changes in Canada's telecommunication networks.
The bill says AMPs are only intended to promote compliance and not intended to be punitive. They will benefit the largest providers that can recoup the cost from their broad customer base, further solidify their dominant position and still evade accountability. Meantime, others will be bankrupted.
Implementation must be monitored, measured and mandatory with Sarbanes-Oxley-like penalties imposed, including personal—not corporate—liability to make accountability inescapable so they do the right thing from the beginning.
How will a Canadian regulator be able to monitor compliance, I wonder, when Rogers just announced that it will be running its wireless network from India?
Orders may be made about any threat, including that of interference and manipulation. We know that elections have been swayed by social media content. AI for news often misrepresents the story. Will that be deemed manipulative or a threat and the platform subject to being silenced?
I wonder by what objective standard and by what calculation one measures the gravity of manipulation. The bill must be clear.
Finally, ordering that someone be denied Internet access because the minister considers something they’ve done or said to be a threat or to be manipulative will mean cutting them off from phone service, which is now Internet-based. Everyone in your house will be blocked from talking to friends, from calling adaptive transport, from phoning 911 or from applying to university. This is unjust and disproportionate, and this is what Bill C-8 allows.
Bill C-8 must be changed, or we will relive what my grandparents fled a hundred years ago, after the Russian revolution: people placed in isolation for their views and this being conflated with the stuff of good government.
