Thank you.
Electricity Canada is the national voice for electricity in the country. Our members generate, transmit and distribute electricity in every province and territory.
Thank you very much for inviting me to testify on Bill C‑8. Last December, I testified before a committee of the other chamber about Bill C‑26.
The new cybersecurity obligations in Bill C‑8 apply to certain critical infrastructure under federal jurisdiction. In our sector, it's mostly international and interprovincial transmission lines, as well as nuclear power plants. Like several other witnesses, we recognize that there is a legislative gap in Canada's approach to cybersecurity. We therefore support the overall objectives of the bill. However, we do have some concerns, and we are proposing some amendments to better protect existing partnerships with federal agencies and enhance the security of our sector.
First, we recommend that Bill C-8 be amended to introduce clear protections and safe harbour provisions for organizations that voluntarily disclose cyber-incidents or vulnerabilities to the government. These protections should ensure that information shared in good faith by organizations is not used to initiate lawsuits or regulatory penalties. In our view, the absence of such protections is a major gap. Without them, operators will likely receive legal advice to share only the minimum information required to comply with the act, and nothing more.
As I discussed with regard to Bill C-26 on the same issue, this would result in a chilling effect on information sharing. This would be a missed opportunity to foster open collaboration and information sharing with government, both of which are essential to strengthening our collective resiliency.
A second concern relates to the potential risks Bill C-8 poses to the partnerships that critical infrastructure operators currently maintain with CSE's cyber centre. Today, our sector benefits from a collaborative relationship with the cyber centre, grounded in the confidence that information shared with it is not disclosed to regulators, enforcement bodies or other departments.
Bill C-8 could change this. It would require that CSE share incident reports with regulators, provide advice or services to regulators on operators' compliance with supply chain risk mitigation, and authorize CSE staff to share information with other government entities for the purposes of issuing cybersecurity directions. These new rules and responsibilities risk creating, as I said, a chilling effect, as operators may now hesitate to share information with the cyber centre if they fear it could later be used for regulatory enforcement.
To protect these vital partnerships, we recommend that Bill C-8 better define expected information sharing between CSE and the rest of government and protect information shared voluntarily with the cyber centre from being disclosed. A clear separation between the cyber centre's collaborative functions and CSE's new obligations could be adopted.
We can draw inspiration from a similar model that already exists in our sector between the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, or NERC, and the electricity information-sharing and analysis centre, or the E-ISAC. Although the E-ISAC is operated by NERC, it is kept organizationally isolated from enforcement activities, which preserves confidentiality and encourages open information exchange with electricity operators.
Finally, we're concerned that Bill C-8 could create a duplicative regulatory framework for cybersecurity in the electricity sector, which is already regulated through NERC standards and provincial regulators. The electricity sector is unique in that it adheres to NERC's critical infrastructure protection standards, which are adopted, enforced and audited by provincial bodies. These standards already ensure strong and comprehensive measures to secure the grid. Introducing new, potentially conflicting, federal requirements risks creating ambiguity, additional compliance burdens and regulatory misalignment, all of which could undermine the bill's objective of enhancing security.
To mitigate this risk, we propose including provisions that allow the federal regulator to recognize and accept compliance with equivalent frameworks, such as NERC's CIP. We'll also be ready to work with the government during the regulatory development process to ensure alignment and harmonization with existing frameworks.
While there are many other aspects of the bill that also deserve attention, that's all the time I have today—
