Evidence of meeting #3 for Public Safety and National Security in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was plan.
Assistant Deputy Minister, Canada’s Fight Against Fentanyl, Privy Council Office
I apologize, I tried to use the earpiece, but I didn’t hear the question.
Liberal
Abdelhaq Sari Liberal Bourassa, QC
I can ask the question in English, if you want.
I can repeat it in French, too.
Regarding information integration and exchange with our southern neighbours, the United States, you said that the efforts we made were commended.
Do you also exchange performance indicators, which you could also share with us today?
Assistant Deputy Minister, Canada’s Fight Against Fentanyl, Privy Council Office
One of the important aspects of the work of the fentanyl czar is to look at all the various silos and to consider performance indicators that cross different parts of the federal government. We do that. Similarly, in the United States, the Office of National Drug Control Policy runs an exercise in which it does that on a comprehensive basis for all the various federal organizations. That will include things like the help aspects, the demand side, the enforcement, the anti-money laundering, all the various components in the fight against fentanyl that my colleagues are active in.
We have exchanged the methodology that's used in the United States and the methodology that we use, to make sure we're speaking the same language, of course. Speaking the same language in terms of data is important if we are going to collectively manage the process.
Liberal
Abdelhaq Sari Liberal Bourassa, QC
On another topic, we sometimes notice that the methods used by criminals unfortunately change more quickly than the tools available to fight crime, whether it be car theft or fentanyl trafficking, for example. In other words, in many cases, criminals are much more agile than the organizations that fight crime. The Montreal Police Service has experienced this phenomenon.
Can you tell us about the agility levels of all the stakeholders here in this regard?
Assistant Deputy Minister, Canada’s Fight Against Fentanyl, Privy Council Office
I'll be very quick.
The main way in which fentanyl is delivered is by taking precursor chemicals, combining them into fentanyl and then selling that. Organized crime is constantly changing the chemicals and the formulation of different analogues.
Important investments being undertaken by Health Canada will include the Canadian drug analysis centre that is being stood up. It will look at that and be able to produce some of the forensic evidence that was asked about earlier. It will be much more responsive and nimble in terms of tracking organized crime.
As well, some of the important measures in Bill C-2 related to the regulation of controlled substances will add flexibility for the minister. It will add responsiveness. We will have the Minister of Public Safety talking to the Minister of Health in working together to try to keep pace with organized crime.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
Thank you, Mr. Sari.
I'll suspend for five minutes so that we can stretch. For those who want some food, you can do that.
When we come back, I will turn to Madame DeBellefeuille, and then MP Gill.
Thank you.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
We will now resume the meeting.
Mrs. DeBellefeuille, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.
Bloc
Claude DeBellefeuille Bloc Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC
Given the limited time available, I would be grateful if witnesses could provide brief answers.
Ms. Lutfallah, I would like to understand something. Under an agreement with the United States, we are required to clear the cargo of ships that dock at a municipal port or a port that is not a port of entry if their cargo is mixed, that is, if there are both bulk and containerized goods. What I don’t understand is how it was possible to bring large quantities of drugs into Canada in automobiles that arrived here by train. As we know, border officials do not inspect rail cars coming from Mexico that transit through the United States to Quebec.
How can you explain this disparity in container inspection requirements?
Vice-President, Commercial and Trade Branch, Canada Border Services Agency
You have a number of questions in there. I'll try my best to answer all of them.
With respect to the agreement with the United States, after 9/11 there was an agreement signed by Canada and the U.S. that ships coming into our ports have to be subject to radiation detection. That is why CBSA mandates container ships to pass through certain ports of entry. These are called first ports of entry.
I'm not sure what you're referring to with respect to—
Bloc
Claude DeBellefeuille Bloc Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC
Let me clarify my question.
In fact, I already know everything you have said. What I want you to clarify for me is why this requirement only applies to ships docking at ports that are not ports of entry.
Are railway companies subject to the same requirement to scan the contents of rail cars arriving in Canada from abroad?
Let’s take the example of a shipment of cars filled with drugs from Mexico transiting through the United States to Canada. Does that mean that the contents of rail cars arriving from international destinations have not been scanned?
Vice-President, Commercial and Trade Branch, Canada Border Services Agency
That's not completely accurate. Train cars that are coming from Mexico are scanned by U.S. CBP. They're generally in transit as they approach the Canadian border, so they have been scanned by U.S. CBP.
I agree with you that there may be very few instances where material could be onloaded in the United States, but that is the reason our intelligence officers get advance information to subject every railcar and every conveyance coming into Canada to a risk assessment. We perform targeting activities, and depending on the risk that's identified, we subject those cargo containers or railcars or whatever in your examples to certain types of intervention by BSOs.
If a very high risk is identified—let's say there's a shipment of cocaine in a particular cargo container—our officers generally will de-stuff the entire container, or we could subject it to some type of imaging process to see where the drugs are, and obviously that would help our officers determine where they should be looking. This is all risk-based.
I don't agree with the assertion that they are not scanned. They are scanned by U.S. CBP, and it has been agreed—sorry, I don't know the particular name of the MOU—that we operate on the principle that the United States has scanned it. It's in transit. It's coming to our border. We assess the risk. We get advance information, and we take appropriate action.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
That’s very good, thank you. Both the question and the answer are very useful to us.
Mr. Gill, you have the floor for five minutes.
Conservative
Sukhman Gill Conservative Abbotsford—South Langley, BC
I want to start by saying thank you to everybody who has come to act as a witness today and answer questions.
My first question is with respect to the Vancouver port and containers that offload there. From what I know, only 1% of the total containers are being scanned or checked there. What measures have you guys taken to strengthen the process of checking containers there? What have you guys done?
Vice-President, Intelligence and Enforcement, Canada Border Services Agency
About 1.5 million containers come into Canada each year. Each and every one of them is assessed by our national targeting centre. We get advance commercial information that allows us to look in that haystack of 1.5 million containers and identify which ones we think need additional examination. We identify those, and we provide that information to our colleagues in the field, who will then do an examination of those containers, either manually or using technology. That's where Jennifer's team takes over, in terms of doing those examinations.
I would argue that every container coming into the country is assessed, but to me it's like a RIDE program. A RIDE program stops everybody, but it doesn't give a breathalyzer to everybody. The police officer will do an assessment based on indicators and behaviours about whether or not a breathalyzer test is required. We assess every container coming into the country, and on that basis we will do a deeper examination of those.
Conservative
Sukhman Gill Conservative Abbotsford—South Langley, BC
Are you saying that every container is being checked when it lands in Vancouver?
Vice-President, Intelligence and Enforcement, Canada Border Services Agency
Every container is being assessed before it lands in Vancouver. We're assessing those containers on their way to Vancouver, so that when they arrive they can be checked.
Vice-President, Commercial and Trade Branch, Canada Border Services Agency
Yes. If our targeting identifies a high risk, then the commercial officers will undertake intervention. As I indicated to the previous member, that could include de-stuffing a container or subjecting it to some type of imaging or a visual or manual intervention by our officers, but it's predominantly based on risk.
Conservative
Sukhman Gill Conservative Abbotsford—South Langley, BC
Okay.
Have you guys taken any new measures to add scanners or more accessibility or more technology to make sure that we can make it more efficient?
Vice-President, Commercial and Trade Branch, Canada Border Services Agency
The border action plan provided us, I believe, with over $300 million to enhance our detection technology capability. Based on that investment from the government, we are going to be increasing our overall inventory by 25%.
Conservative
Vice-President, Commercial and Trade Branch, Canada Border Services Agency
It's over a five-year period. This year, we are deploying a number of imaging technologies, and this will go until 2029-30.
Conservative
Sukhman Gill Conservative Abbotsford—South Langley, BC
All right.
My next question is for Mr. Peets.
I'm from the rural riding of Abbotsford—South Langley, B.C., where a fentanyl super lab was seized that was capable of producing multiple kilograms weekly.
I want to know the measures that you have taken to prevent the creation of super labs like those that were found in my riding.
Assistant Deputy Minister, Canada’s Fight Against Fentanyl, Privy Council Office
This is a question that I'll ask others to jump in on.
As part of the border action plan, a number of investments have been made to ensure that there are domestic enforcement measures, such as joint intelligence work and co-operation among law enforcement agencies, not only on the intelligence side but on the enforcement side.
I would invite my RCMP colleagues to talk about that a bit more.
Executive Director, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Thank you, Mr. Peets, and thank you for the question.
We're actively involved in our organized crime investigations. We have federal teams across the country that are dedicated specifically to looking at the illicit drug trade. The lab that you mentioned is an example of something that we are coming across more and more often across the country. It's predominantly isolated to British Columbia and, to a certain extent, Alberta, and we're seeing some of these labs in Ontario and Quebec.