Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the role of CBSA in the H2O highway corridor.
To save time, I've provided a bio of my experience.
I appear before you today to offer a clear and candid assessment of where the current system is failing and where meaningful improvement is both possible and necessary.
The reality is straightforward. The system is not working, and the data is unequivocal. In 2024, CBSA intercepted approximately 2,200 stolen vehicles, which is roughly 4% of the more than 57,000 vehicles that were stolen nationally that year. In 2025, that interception rate fell below 3%. This decline persists, despite prior testimony before this committee indicating that 60% of the stolen vehicles are destined for export primarily through the port of Montreal .
Organized crime exploits predictable weaknesses in the export control system. Vehicles are falsely declared as household goods or electronics. Containers are loaded inland and blended in with legitimate cargo. Export documentation can be altered after vessels depart.
Most critically, many stolen vehicles are revinned with VINs that are cloned or altered. They cannot be detected by X-ray scanners. Only physical inspections and document verification can identify them, yet such inspections occur far too infrequently.
CBSA relies upon a risk-based inspection model. However, physical examinations are conducted on fewer than 4% of the outbound containers—often less. Past audits have indicated that many high-risk electronic lookouts are not referred to secondary inspection. These are systemic vulnerabilities that organized crime and criminal networks have learned to exploit.
As a result, Canada's ports are increasingly being used as criminal gateways. The port of Montreal, for example, processes roughly 70% of Canada's legitimate vehicle exports but remains the epicentre for stolen vehicle activity. However, the problem is no longer confined to a single port. Halifax has experienced a sharp rise in vehicle-related financial fraud. Container traffic through Saint John has more than doubled. Vancouver, which is Canada's largest container port, physically inspects a small fraction of the outbound shipments.
The pattern is unmistakable. Where enforcement presence is limited or inconsistent, criminal exploitation exists and thrives. The absence of a visible deterrent becomes the invitation. These risks are accelerating as Canada's port network expands and global trade patterns are shifting.
To be clear, CBSA faces genuine operational and legal constraints. It cannot inspect every container. Current scanning technology cannot verify VIN integrity. Export data sharing remains limited. Training standards and investigative tools have not kept pace with the sophistication of modern criminal networks.
This is not a failure of CBSA officers by any means, but it is a failure of the system design. The private sector can play a constructive role, but only if it's done correctly.
Let me be unequivocal. Under current laws, private companies cannot and should not exercise enforcement authority in the ports. The outsourcing of enforcement functions risks legal challenges, charter violations and compromised prosecutions. These are real concerns that have been raised with CBSA.
However, there is a viable alternative option. Qualified private sector partners can augment CBSA capacity through expertise and technology scale, provided that the enforcement authority remains firmly with CBSA and governance is clearly defined. Elements of this approach already do exist. That model, however, carries legal risk, lacks scalability and transparency, and has resulted in limited and inequitable access to government-derived data.
With proper oversight, the model can be modernized. Trusted private sector partners can support CBSA through advanced analytics, AI-driven targeting of pre-screening, standardized national training support, and most critically, scalable vehicle examinations across all ports—not just at the port of Montreal.
This is not privatization. It is force multiplication. When criminals believe detection is likely at any port, their behaviour will change. It is possible to reduce random inspections and trade delays and increase capacity without major new infrastructure. VIN fraud is detected more efficiently. Public confidence improves with transparency and measurable outcomes.
In closing, I respectfully offer to the committee five recommendations for your consideration.
First, mandate a national standardized training model for CBSA officers that is focused on consistent, defensible, risk-based targeting.
Second, fully implement the mandatory 72-hour advance export filing to finally close off the post-departure documentation loophole.
Third, expand VIN data sharing, under strict governance, to additional trusted private sector partners for anti-fraud purposes.
Fourth, establish fair and transparent service-level agreements for inspection facilities—including qualified vehicle examinations—to standardize timelines, costs and accountability.
Finally, create the conditions to pilot a private sector augmentation model focused on VIN examinations to significantly increase capacity without transferring authority.
Stolen vehicles continue to leave Canada, not because the CBSA lacks commitment, but because the system lacks scale, transparency, modern tools and consistency. To be clear, the process urgently needs to adapt.
With those comments, I'll close. Thank you. I welcome your questions.