Public Safety Committee on April 23rd, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Good afternoon, everyone.

I call this meeting to order.

In a few moments, I'll introduce the witness in the room and the two witnesses participating by video conference in meeting number 34 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. As you know, this meeting is about the role of the Canada Border Services Agency in the H2O highway corridor and port clearance practices.

We would like to welcome the three witnesses who are appearing in the first hour of our meeting.

I'll start by introducing the witness in the room. We're joined by Serge Auclair, vice‑president of commercial and external relations for the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation.

We're also joined by video conference by Neil Dubord, a retired chief of police and an officer of the Order of Merit of the Police Forces; and Jean‑Paul Rodrigue, a professor at Texas A&M University.

I would like to welcome the three of you.

You each have five minutes for your opening remarks. We'll start with you, Mr. Dubord.

[Neil Dubord, Chief of Police (Retired), Officer of the Order of Merit of the Police Forces, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Honourable senators, members of the committee and fellow Canadians, I've spent 37 years in public safety leadership. As I reflect on the legacy we are leaving to the next generation, I see that the legacy we're handing down is a sovereign nation that is unwittingly surrendering its economic gateways to transnational organized crime.

Our national port system handles roughly 6.1 million shipping containers a year. It's a brilliant logistical engine, but it has been weaponized.

Let me paint a picture of what is flowing through these arteries.

Inbound, we are facing an epidemic of grief. We recently saw border officers intercept 6,330 kilograms of methamphetamine hidden in canola oil jugs. That's about $1.5 billion of misery destined for overseas markets. We're not just consuming drugs anymore; we're now manufacturing and exporting them. Meanwhile, the precursor chemicals for fentanyl flow into our ports, fuelling a crisis that has claimed over 50,000 Canadian lives since 2016. The victims are not just statistics. They are infants born into the agony of withdrawal, their tiny bodies shaking in hospital beds because the chemicals destroying our communities passed unchecked through our federally regulated docks.

Outbound, we're bleeding private property and subsidizing gang violence. Last year, 57,000 vehicles were stolen across Canada. Border agents intercepted under 3% of them. Of the 57,000 vehicles, we expect that somewhere in the area of 60% are sent overseas.

Consider a tourist who parked his Honda on a residential street in Montreal. It vanished overnight. Three weeks later, police found it being loaded into a shipping container at a local warehouse. The criminals packed it behind stacks of old mattresses. They loaded it on to a cargo ship at the port of Montreal, bound for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They literally hid a family vehicle behind garbage and shipped it across the Atlantic Ocean with complete impunity.

They are using our children to do it. Cartels are recruiting kids as young as 15 to steal these cars. We've heard explicit police testimony that these young recruits are tortured if they fail. The profits from these stolen cars then buy the illegal firearms that are terrorizing our streets.

We cannot blame the dedicated officers of the Canadian Border Service Agency or the RCMP. They are trapped in a system designed for mathematical failure. The sheer velocity of global trade means that they can physically inspect only 1% or 2% of the outbound containers.

Worse still is the insider threat. In greater Vancouver alone, 30,000 people hold access cards to the ports, but only a fraction of them require federal security clearances. Fully patched members of outlaw motorcycle gangs are walking through the gates, operating the cranes and managing digital manifests. A physical fence is entirely useless when organized crime holds the key to the front gate.

We must act, and we must act today. I submit four actionable, innovative recommendations to reclaim our borders.

First, we must deploy a permanent integrated task force. We need to eliminate jurisdictional silos and adopt a multijurisdictional policing model. We need a highly visible uniformed presence on the docks backed by elite plainclothes investigators who can track a cartel from a local rail yard straight to the ocean.

Second, we must embrace private sector augmentation. We must empower trusted private companies to use advanced screening technology and analytics to pre-screen cargo. The government must retain all authority to arrest and seize, but we desperately need the private sector to act as a force multiplier to identify these threats. We need their innovation to turn the odds in our favour.

Third, we must mandate universal security clearances for all our port workers. If you work on a Canadian dock, you must be thoroughly vetted. We must mirror the rigorous credentials used by the United States to purge gang members from our logistical network.

Fourth and finally, we must fund this defence sustainably through a five-dollar sea can levy. Applying a tiny, five-dollar fee to each and every container is economically invisible. It is less than one-fiftieth of 1% of an average cargo value, yet applied across our entire shipping volume, it will generate over $30 million annually. This money must be strictly protected by legislation to fully fund our integrated police forces and our new technology.

The absence of visible deterrence is an open invitation. We have the data. We have the blueprint. We have the funding mechanism. It is time to secure the sovereign gateway of this great nation and leave a legacy of safety and strength.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, Mr. Dubord.

Now let's turn to Mr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue.

He's appearing by video conference.

You have the floor for five minutes, Mr. Rodrigue.

[Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Professor, Texas A&M University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to talk about a view from south of the border, from the United States.

I was born in Montreal. I'm a Canadian who has lived in the United States for about 28 years. I've been dealing with the issues of container shipping, international trade and logistics.

For the next few minutes, I'll tell you what I am aware of with the cross-border mechanisms for container transportation and with the current predicament of the stagnation of the Canadian container port systems on the east coast. The figures do not look very good.

I'll discuss those two points in more detail, and there are a few observations.

First, we can talk about what's been working very well. Many of you are keenly aware of the customs pre-clearance system for air transportation with the United States. It has been in place for quite a long time. It's effective. It's one of the most comprehensive in the world. Millions of travellers use it each year.

However, the pre-clearance system is based on a few preconditions. These involve designing areas for airports that are a form of extraterritoriality over which U.S. Customs and Border Protection has a form of jurisdiction in terms of admission. That's the first aspect. When this takes place, it allows Canadians to travel quite effectively through multiple airports within the United States. This is very well known.

What is less well known is that this agreement was expanded recently to involve cargo also, although it's not being used at this time, as far as I can tell. There have been a few pilot studies involving Prince Rupert and Montreal, but the mechanisms are in place to allow more effective movement of containers across the Canada-U.S. border. That's fair enough. That's good.

When I looked at the east coast system—or you could say the St. Lawrence system—all the way to Halifax, I noticed quite a few challenges.

The first one is strategically worrying. Based on my investigation, the most dynamic ports in North America require a draft of at least 45 feet. At the threshold of 45 feet, you start to have a significant level of container activity. Unfortunately, on the St. Lawrence, Montreal is below that threshold, so it creates a challenge. There are constraints in terms of the potential to use the east coast of Canada as a gateway to access the United States with cross-border arrangements. There might be a reluctance to invest in a system because of that.

The second point is that there is a complete divergence of the growth dynamics between Canada and the United States for the last 15 years or so. Growth rates in Canada have been at about 18% for a period of 10 years or so. In the United States, they are well above double that. There has been a divergence taking place between the dynamics of the U.S. container port systems and the Canadian ones. When this happens, the market share of Canadian ports with access to the United States gradually becomes eroded.

All the ports on the east coast, including Montreal and Halifax in particular, are declining in terms of their peak. Montreal peaked in 2019, and it has not recovered. As far as I can see, there's virtually no growth observed on the eastern seaboard. That creates a conundrum.

As far as I can calculate—this is subject to a lot of revision because the share's declining—something like 18% or 19% of the containers handled by Canadian ports are bound for the United States. Of course, it varies substantially. Prince Rupert is a very important gateway because it's a direct corridor to Chicago. It has around 65% of the volume, which are American imports, but the rest has been gradually declining for a variety of reasons.

In conclusion, what we call “cleared once, accepted twice” will have quite a few challenges. This means that once a container has cleared Canadian customs, it may be allowed to enter the United States without a second inspection.

The first challenge is that Canadian growth on the east coast is stagnant, as far as containerized traffic is concerned. There's not much of an incentive to look it up.

The second one is that the pre-clearance system we have in place underlines that you need customized facilities with personnel who are there to inspect. This means that for the container ports in Canada on the east coast, technically you will need a custom-bounded area—effectively, a foreign trade zone over which the United States will exert a form of authority, or at least a right of inspection. Again, we have a precursor to that. It's the system we have with air transportation. It will be an adaptation. Otherwise, I don't think this will be very effective, to say the least.

As well, the geopolitics are not very good in terms of the U.S.-Canada relationship—

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

I'm sorry to interrupt, Mr. Rodrigue.

[Jean-Paul Rodrigue]

Okay. That's fair enough.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Fortunately, we'll hear more from you in a couple of minutes.

Let me turn now to Mr. Auclair.

You have five minutes, please.

[Serge Auclair, Vice-President, Commercial and External Relations, St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation]

Thank you very much.

Good afternoon.

My name is Serge Auclair. I am the vice-president of commercial and external relations for the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation, a not-for-profit corporation under a long-term agreement with the Government of Canada to operate and maintain the Canadian assets of the seaway, a system of locks and canals between Montreal and Lake Erie.

There are 13 Canadian and two U.S. locks. In 2025, 37 million pounds of goods passed through the seaway to domestic and international markets. Key commodities include grain, sugar, fertilizer, iron ore, steel, aluminum, road salt and liquid bulk.

The St. Lawrence Seaway has the capacity to immediately double its volume, given that its capacity stands at only 50%. Container transportation is currently an option, since the seaway's current traffic is almost exclusively bulk goods.

We're pleased with the Port of Montreal's Contrecœur project. However, this project is designed for ocean shipping, not short‑sea shipping.

Providing options to the shipping industry—particularly by means of short‑sea shipping through ports such as Quebec City, Hamilton, Valleyfield and Thunder Bay—would, in turn, give shippers more options.

To this end, we need to see the Canada Border Services Agency as a driver of economic development.

We welcome the commitment by the Government of Canada in budget 2025 mandating that the Canada Border Services Agency, Public Safety, Transport Canada and Global Affairs Canada identify additional ports for container import and export designation, particularly in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence region, such as Quebec City and Hamilton.

Moving containerized goods on the water through the seaway can help ease congestion on busy highways and rail networks across Quebec, Ontario and the rest of Canada. One Seawaymax vessel carries the equivalent of 300 railcars and close to 1,000 trucks. The seaway is part of a larger binational H2O highway network that includes Great Lakes and St. Lawrence ports. Altogether, the system generates $66 billion in economic activity by moving 252 million tonnes of cargo worth $157 billion. It supports more than 350,000 jobs and creates $23 billion in wages.

Another recent study, commissioned by the Chamber of Marine Commerce, shows that enabling containerized traffic at Great Lakes and St. Lawrence ports could bring significant economic and environmental benefits while improving supply chain efficiency and resilience, diversifying trade and reducing infrastructure costs. Mayors from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative have also publicly called for the removal of barriers to trade and for the extension of CBSA container-clearing capacity at inland ports.

Currently, there are Great Lakes ports on the U.S. side of the network that already have, or soon will have, container-clearing capacity. These include the ports of Cleveland, Duluth-Superior, Monroe and Indiana-Burns Harbor.

Canada can leverage this type of trade‑enabling infrastructure and the support of the Canada Border Services Agency in order to move more high‑value containerized goods through its vast corridor.

The St. Lawrence Seaway is one of the original nation-building projects. We have a deep history and a future filled with possibilities. If we increase winter resiliency and expand container and energy movements, the St. Lawrence Seaway will bring added value to the economy of Canada.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, Mr. Auclair.

We can now move on to questions from the members.

We'll start with you, Mr. Caputo. You have the floor for six minutes.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome to all the witnesses. Thank you very much for being here. I found all of your comments interesting.

I want to focus on and begin with Dr. Dubord.

Dr. Dubord, I found your comments particularly interesting, because I was thinking about the role of organized crime in our ports before you started speaking. I've spent most of my adult life in the justice system, and I think this is widely known among law enforcement circles but is not widely discussed.

You talked about members of outlaw motorcycle gangs wearing patches on one day and then working in our ports of entry. Can you elaborate on that, please?

[Neil Dubord]

Absolutely. I certainly appreciate your comments.

My experience comes from working as the chief of police in Delta for nine and a half years and, of course, from having a larger container port in Canada at the Deltaport. That's where my experience mainly comes from: in first-hand intelligence and practical experience from there.

We know very well that the outlaw motorcycle gangs are heavily involved in the port system and in the ports union as well. We know they have all kinds of roles, right up to senior managers' roles, throughout the ports. Unfortunately, our system is quite different from what we see south of the border. The security clearances of people entering our ports are not maintained. Under 20% of the people working in our ports have a security clearance. That's a mandatory requirement for most in the United States. There are people with criminal records. There are people with all kinds of criminal activities and associations who are working in our ports and doing their job. As I mentioned, an exterior perimeter fence exists, but unfortunately they're already inside the fence and it becomes that much more difficult.

We are also aware of transnational organized crime being heavily involved in the fentanyl trade, in my experience, in the port of Vancouver and the Deltaport specifically. We know that ships come mainly from South America and Mexico directly into the port and deliver all kinds of different materials and contraband. We become not only an importer, then, but an exporter of that once it's manufactured and sent out to other countries.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

What I find most interesting about this is that it's not as though it's a secret. You're the chief of Delta. I used to work in British Columbia, so I'm very familiar with that jurisdiction. This is all very well known. It might not be well reported or publicly discussed, but it's something that I think most people in all facets of the port system or the justice system know about.

I think I know the answer to this, but is there any requirement to have a security clearance? For instance, if you work in a lot of roles, a clearance is required. You couldn't be a correctional officer, for instance, or work for CBSA if you had ties to the outlaw gangs that you were just describing. I'm mindful that they're government.

This isn't government, but access is the key. We often mandate requirements for people who have access to infrastructure, wherein criminality can flourish literally right under our noses. Do you know of any requirements for people, despite having such access, not to be involved in overt criminal behaviour?

[Neil Dubord]

Mr. Caputo, no, there is no requirement.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

I don't mean to pontificate. It's just that if we know people are engaged in crime and we're allowing them into a place where crime flourishes, what do we expect?

All of you can weigh in on that. I know it's a rhetorical question, but I would imagine that this is quite frustrating to law enforcement.

[Neil Dubord]

When you look at airports or other major infrastructure, you can see the level of security required by employees there. You can think about just the pilots, who have to go through airports all the time. They require significant security clearance. It's unfortunate that a port isn't viewed in the same manner.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Yes, I would agree wholeheartedly.

I know my time is just about up.

We have bills that come through here. To me, this is a very non-partisan issue. I'm not sure if it can be tackled by way of a private member's bill. I have one that's being debated on Monday already. I apologize.

I encourage my government colleagues and everybody here to listen very well to this. One per cent of containers are being checked at the ports. I was at Deltaport, and it was a mechanism of, “Well, we do risk-based intervention.” That is the way I would put it. Anybody with any idea of how things work knows exactly what the risk factors are. If you hang out there for three months, you will know those risk factors.

It's not working. I think we need more random searches.

I don't know if we have time, but any of you can comment on that, please.

Does no one think we have random searches?

[Jean-Paul Rodrigue]

Yes, if you wish, I can tell you.

In the United States, ports are considered, I would say, very secure facilities. You need a TWIC card, a transportation worker identification card, which is subject to review by the Department of Homeland Security.

About 1% of our containers, I would say, are inspected, but there are very good detection mechanisms in terms of bills of lading and scanning technologies, which allow us to fast-track the process. It doesn't seem to be too much of an issue as far as south of the border is concerned.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, Mr. Caputo.

Mr. Ramsay, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Dubord, unfortunately, I don't have time to ask you any questions. However, you did say a number of noteworthy things about the use of private companies and a special fund for technologies and automation. I would like you to send us a more detailed written description of the mechanism that you're referring to. The committee will certainly be able to look into all this.

I now have a question for Mr. Rodrigue.

You said that 18% to 19% of containers or goods brought into Canada are bound for the United States. However, you seem to believe that growth would be generated by using this mechanism to ship to the United States.

Don't you remember that 81% to 82% of trade is bound for Canada?

[Jean-Paul Rodrigue]

Please note that, when I say 18% of containers, I'm talking about containers imported from abroad. They go through the port and then on to the United States. I'm saying this to clarify your point of view. It's obviously part of the cross‑border trade between Canada and the United States, but it's only a small part. As I said, it's an 18% share for the ports.

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Okay.

To increase the activity at Canadian ports, should we consider that some of this growth will be secondary to the United States, or should we focus instead on growth within the country?

[Jean-Paul Rodrigue]

As I said before, the macroeconomic conditions in Canada have low multiplier effects on container volume compared with the United States, unfortunately. The United States, using the same processes, has twice the container growth rate as Canada.

Saying that we have the best access to American ports may be an alternative way to increase container capacity in Canada. It could generate traffic. However, on the east coast, it won't work well. The latest generation of ships go through the New York and Hampton Roads ports. That's where they enter Canada. The process is being reversed.

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

You did mention Chicago. I guess Chicago doesn't have a 45-foot draft either, because the ships go through locks. That doesn't prevent the Port of Chicago from developing.

[Jean-Paul Rodrigue]

Again, there's always a niche market, if not for containers. It's very problematic for the St. Lawrence when it comes to containers.

We were talking about Cleveland, where there is a project, but it's a mixed ship. It's not a container ship. It's a ship that carries other goods at the same time.

Obviously, Mr. Auclair from the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation could talk a bit more about all that. That said, even in the United States, there is no movement of containerized goods on rivers.

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Mr. Auclair, we're talking about 250 million tonnes of goods and the possibility of doubling that.

Currently, how much of the 250 million tonnes of goods goes to the U.S. market and how much goes to the Canadian market?