Evidence of meeting #36 for Public Safety and National Security in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was metadata.
A video is available from Parliament.
Liberal
Gary Anandasangaree Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON
—but my view is that companies that are operating in Canada are good corporate citizens. Five Eyes countries do not necessarily pay—
Conservative
Dane Lloyd Conservative Parkland, AB
That's very different from the answer you gave in the House.
In what situations do you think compensation could be provided?
Liberal
Gary Anandasangaree Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON
At this point, I don't anticipate any particular situation. If there were extenuating circumstances where a company's financial position may be limiting, that would be a one-off consideration, but by and large, we do not anticipate compensation will be provided.
Liberal
Liberal
Sima Acan Liberal Oakville West, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to share some technical considerations regarding metadata for my colleagues to consider before proposing amendments that could significantly impact the effectiveness of this bill.
Modern criminal investigations, especially those involving child exploitation, human trafficking, extortion, organized crime and cybercrime, rely heavily on digital metadata to reconstruct events, identify suspects and map complex networks. These cases are often reported long after they occur, making historical data essential for establishing timelines and connections that are not immediately obvious.
It is therefore potentially risky to narrow the types of data retained. Different metadata types serve different investigative and IT functions: attribution, communication mapping and cross-platform activity reconstruction. If key categories are excluded, it can break the chain of evidence and limit the ability to link activity across systems and jurisdictions. From an investigative and digital forensic perspective, missing metadata reduces the ability to conduct pattern and network analysis, which is central to modern intelligence-led policing and cyber investigations. It can also weaken evidentiary completeness in court. Many serious crimes are reported long after they occur. If certain metadata categories were never stored in the first place, they cannot be recovered later, even with a warrant or a court order.
Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to please refer to this transcript of my remarks when considering any amendments related to narrowing the types of metadata or limiting the retention periods, as these changes could significantly weaken the effectiveness of lawful access.
My colleague Mr. Caputo raised concerns regarding not only the types of metadata but also the 12-month data retention framework outlined in part 2.
During my meetings with law enforcement officials, they clarified the general parameters. There remains a practical challenge when it comes to complex investigations. Many serious cases, such as child exploitation, human trafficking, organized crime and extortion, are inherently time-intensive and often extend well beyond six or even nine months due to their cross-jurisdictional and digital nature.
Could CSIS or the RCMP elaborate on the operational importance of data retention in supporting these types of complex investigations? Also, significantly, how does the availability and duration of retained data impact the ability of law enforcement to conduct timely and effective investigations in the digital context?
Thank you.
Nicole Giles Deputy Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
The ministers are gesturing to me, so I'll take that as my cue.
I can give two examples, perhaps. One example could be that CSIS is trying to determine the movements of a terrorist group, and we've received a warrant to track a person of interest's cellphone. The electronic service provider did not have the necessary capabilities to track the device, so we're out of luck if there are not the capabilities to track the device. That is one of the key capabilities that would be provided under part 2, because it would require ESPs to develop and maintain location tracking capabilities, which are, quite frankly, standard in Five Eyes and European countries.
Another example could be that we receive information from a foreign partner who is carrying out an investigation outside of Canada where a few of the subjects of the investigation are associated with a Canadian phone number, and the foreign partner has further highlighted that the threat looks like it's about to move into Canada. We're able to confirm that the phone numbers were obtained through a reseller, but the reseller, quite frequently, neither maintains records of its sales nor tracks its clients' activities. Part 2 would bring that into play by having the resellers brought into the process, which would allow us to respond to those types of requests.
Liberal
Sima Acan Liberal Oakville West, ON
Okay.
Bill C-22 makes an important legislative change clarifying that....
Actually, it's not going to be enough, Mr. Chair. I'm okay with that.
Liberal
Sean Fraser Liberal Central Nova, NS
If I can just add, these are not fictional crimes. If you actually talk to law enforcement officials, particularly on the second example.... A lot of people don't appreciate this, but law enforcement in Canada is receiving an ungodly number of tips about potential threats, including child sexual exploitation. The application of the law is inconsistent between provinces, because it's unclear about the regime of how we actually use digital evidence to investigate and prevent crime.
These are real threats to—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
I'm sorry to have to cut off a ministerial colleague, but it's over, unfortunately.
Thank you to the ministers for taking the time to prepare and travel to join us today.
Thank you to all the officials for doing the needed work.
We will now adjourn, and we'll see you on Thursday for other business.