Public Safety Committee on May 5th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you very much.

Mrs. DeBellefeuille, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Hiegel, the minister told us consultations were held with certain groups between Bill C‑2 and Bill C‑22.

Can you confirm the current chair of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, Ms. Deschamps, was consulted on Bill C‑22?

[Mike McGuire]

I can talk a little bit about the consultations.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

I just need a yes-or-no answer. Do you know if Ms. Deschamps was consulted on Bill C‑22?

[Mike McGuire]

Different types of consultations were held. The minister himself met with certain people, and there were also round tables.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

To your knowledge, was Ms. Deschamps consulted? It's a pretty simple question, Mr. McGuire.

[Mike McGuire]

To my knowledge, she was not part of the round tables we organized.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

This means the current chair of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency wasn't consulted on Bill C‑22, but a former chair was. That's what I understood from my readings.

[Mike McGuire]

For the round tables we organized, yes, but there were other consultations.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Don't you find it a bit odd that the current chair wasn't consulted on a lawful access bill?

When we see what's being done in the countries to which Canada compares itself, and that the agency's counterparts have an important role to play in lawful access legislation, don't you find that a bit odd?

[Mike McGuire]

We took a lot of information into consideration in our analysis. We also held various consultations and received various letters from stakeholders. Different methods were used to establish stakeholders' positions .

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

I'm just surprised, Mr. McGuire, because this is an important office. I'm surprised the agency's current chair wasn't consulted.

Did you consult the Privacy Commissioner?

[Mike McGuire]

Yes, absolutely.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

You chose to consult the Privacy Commissioner, but not the current chair of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency. That's my understanding.

[Mike McGuire]

We consulted the Privacy Commissioner.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

However, you didn't consult the current chair of the agency.

I'm going to ask a question I've asked the Department of Justice team many times in the House. I'm not a lawyer, so I'd like to understand why you chose the lowest threshold for obtaining information.

I think reasonable grounds to “suspect” something seems like a very, very low threshold for obtaining information. Reasonable grounds to “believe” something would be a higher threshold. I don't understand why you chose this one.

Could you give us some examples of what reasonable grounds to suspect something might be? I have a hard time imagining what wouldn't be acceptable. I think any reason to suspect something can be reasonable. That part of the bill worries me. Could you give us tangible examples of what might be reasonable grounds to suspect something?

[Anne-Marie LeBel, Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice]

Thank you for that very good question.

Yes, we can give you some practical examples, and I may turn to my colleague from the RCMP to help out.

Before I do, I can explain why we chose that threshold. This is a legal threshold that already exists in the Criminal Code for other specific production orders, which target specific types of data whose privacy nature is less sensitive than others, including content obtained with a general production order.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Could you tell us what would be reasonable grounds to suspect something so I can clearly see the difference between this threshold and other thresholds and understand what your intention is?

[Anne-Marie LeBel]

Before my colleague gives you a tangible example, I'd like to add that reasonable grounds to suspect something is not just suspicion. There have to be observable facts. A police officer must have notes related to these facts when they decide they have reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will be committed.

In both of our tools, the condition is that there are reasonable grounds to suspect an offence has been or will be committed, but also that the information requested will be useful to the investigation.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Thank you, Ms. Lebel.

I would need that. I'm not a lawyer, and I'd like to get a better understanding, if I could.

I'd like to use the time I have left to understand something else. In part 1 of the bill, it says that “telecommunications service provider has the same meaning as in subsection 2(1) of the Telecommunications Act”, whereas part 2 of the bill talks about an electronic service provider and a core provider. However, there is no definition in the schedule.

I want to understand why this very broad regulatory power is being given in definitions. People are wondering whether they'll be affected. Can you explain why there's no definition, why there's nothing in the schedule and why everything will be decided by regulation?

[Anne-Marie LeBel]

I think the question relates more to part 2, so the new act and schedule. I'll let my colleague answer it.

[Shannon Hiegel]

Yes, that's a question for me.

You're right to say that, in part 2, there's just a definition for an “electronic service provider”.

It's a very broad definition, and that's important, because technology is evolving quickly.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Unfortunately, I have to interrupt you, because the time's already up and I think it might be a long answer. We may come back to that later.

Mr. Lloyd, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

I'm going to start with Mr. McGuire.

Something I find contradictory in this bill—maybe you can explain how it's not contradictory—is that you're requiring electronic service providers and telecoms to create the systems to enable the interception of communications within their networks, yet later you say that nothing in this bill seeks to undermine the integrity of encryption networks. That seems very contradictory to me.

In light of the Salt Typhoon hack we saw in the United States.... It was later found that it was exactly the vulnerabilities created by the requirements under U.S. law to create these encryption back doors that allowed hackers to access this information.

Can you explain what this contradiction appears to be?

[Mike McGuire]

I'll start quickly and then turn it over to Ms. Hiegel.

The intent of part 2 is to ensure that electronic service providers have the technical capabilities to respond to lawful access requests that are authorized for law enforcement and for CSIS.

Shannon, do you want to add anything?