Mr. Chairman and honourable members, thank you very much for the kind invitation to share my views on Bill C-22.
I'm a partner at the law firm McInnes Cooper in Halifax, where, among other things, I advise clients who are on the receiving end of orders for customer information. I also teach at the Dalhousie law school. I'm appearing in my personal capacity with my own views, and I'm not speaking on behalf of any of my clients.
I have to commend the government for its comprehensive consultation with stakeholders since Bill C-2, to which I contributed, but I still have a number of concerns and recommendations. I'll note that, in particular, part 2 of Bill C-22 is very problematic. I can't cover all my concerns in five minutes, so I look forward to the rest of our discussion.
First, I agree with my colleagues. We need to narrow the scope of subscriber information production orders or raise the bar up to reasonable belief. The bill lowers the threshold for police to obtain a production order for subscriber information—which they can get today—from “reasonable grounds to believe” to merely “reasonable grounds to suspect”.
The organizations that could be on the receiving end of these orders are any that provide services to the public, which include banks, hospitals, grocery stores and hotels. We're well beyond telcos here. Even though the definition is narrowed from ones in previous bills, police could still demand all the subscriber information that a service provider holds. This would go beyond name and address, as my colleagues pointed out. It would include the types of services provided and device identifiers, like the serial number of the CPAP machine from your doctor's office. It would compel Apple to hand over the digital IDs of every single device you have, including your AirTags and iPads. That's too much. I suggest narrowing the scope of these orders or raising the bar to reasonable belief. Otherwise, it will ultimately be found to have violated the charter.
I'll move on to part 2, the supporting authorized access to information act.
Nobody has made a compelling case for anything in part 2. The government has had 20-plus years to build its case, but, as NSICOP observed, it has only anecdotes. We should not be undermining the privacy and safety of every single Canadian based on anecdotes.
Part 2 of the bill targets electronic service providers, but the definition is so broad that it would likely include most businesses in Canada. Everybody deals with digital information. If it proceeds, the bill should include necessary guardrails. Under no circumstances should the government be allowed to require—particularly with a secret order—an electronic service provider to make changes to products or services it provides in the ordinary course, to collect and retain any data beyond what the business requires for its own purposes or to make any changes that would affect functionality, including adding additional functionality for any products or services offered by the business. As the bill is written, the Minister of Public Safety could issue a secret order to turn your Amazon Alexa into a listening device, as in an example given by the previous panel. CSIS has explicitly said, in connection with this bill, that it wants to be able to track every single cell phone in Canada in real time, and that telcos would have to change their services to make every cell phone trackable. That would be disproportionate and, in my view, absurd.
Now, the government says that it doesn't plan to undermine encryption and that there would be no back doors, but you just have to read the words in the bill to see that there's nothing to prevent this. Government officials said at this committee—I think it was on Tuesday—that the bill is “encryption-neutral”, but Canadians are not encryption-neutral. The words of the bill would clearly permit, and certainly would not prohibit, back doors and mandatory decryption. That would be in secret, with no transparency to Canadians and with very little accountability. What the government intends is not relevant. What is relevant is what words end up in the statutes.
Under part 2, the Minister of Public Safety could issue these secret orders to electronic service providers—very broadly defined—that come with mandatory permanent secrecy. Currently, the police and CSIS can apply to a judge for something called an assistance order. This orders a service provider to provide all reasonable assistance to give effect to a judicial warrant. It can be accompanied by a gag order if it's appropriate. That is judicial control. Nobody from law enforcement has offered evidence that assistance orders are inadequate or should be replaced by these secret ministerial orders. The U.K. equivalent of a ministerial order was used by the U.K. government to secretly order Apple to remove encryption on iCloud, globally. Part 2 of Bill C-22 does not contain any guardrails that would prevent such overreach in Canada. Secret ministerial orders have to go.
We also have the issue of metadata retention, which my colleagues already spoke about. This would include your location history. The government could require everyone's cell phone to become a retrospective tracking device going back a full year, without any suspicion of wrongdoing. This will almost certainly be found to have violated the charter. Collected metadata would be sought by Canadian and non-Canadian authorities based on mere suspicion. That would be a record of everyone who sought reproductive health care in Canada, which might be of interest to law enforcement in a Five Eyes partner.
Finally, as legions of cybersecurity experts—
