Several of the powers in the bill have been more appropriately tailored to the needs of law enforcement and to the privacy interests at stake, but I would like to highlight and briefly walk the committee through what I believe are three significant weaknesses with the bill that remain.
The first is the new production orders for subscriber information to be added to the Criminal Code. The government's charter statement defends this power on the basis that subscriber info is not particularly sensitive, since it reveals only the name and address of a person obtaining a service from an entity like Rogers, but the power as drafted would disclose much more than this. Police can obtain not only a name and address tied to an account, but also the types of services a person subscribes to, the tiers or channels associated with those services and the identifiers of every device associated with the account.
It also applies to any person who provides a service, not just companies like Rogers. All of this certainly allows for capturing sensitive information like, for example, what cable packages a person subscribes to or what medical services they receive. A power to obtain this shouldn't rest on reasonable suspicion alone. The scope of the power should be narrowed. As it stands, I think it would likely be struck down under section 8.
A second concern I would like to raise is the definition of “systemic vulnerability”. I understand that Professor West dealt with this earlier, but I'll try to target my remarks here. There is a definition, and that's good, but it remains too narrow in two ways.
The test for what constitutes a vulnerability here is defined to be one “that creates a substantial risk that secure information could be accessed by a person” without authorization. That's too high a threshold. Developments with AI in recent weeks reveal its far greater power for hacking, so even a remote or theoretical vulnerability now could be readily exploited.
The definition also applies only to vulnerabilities in the electronic protections of an electronic service. It may not extend the definition to the operating systems of devices, so a ministerial order could, in principle, require Apple or Google to build extraction capabilities into an operating system without engaging the safeguard, even if the practical effect would be to undermine end-to-end encryption.
The third concern with the bill is, in my view, the most serious, which is the metadata preservation power that the committee spent time on a few minutes ago. This would require core providers to retain transmission data for every communication for up to a year. That's when and where we used our phones and the coordinates of who we were in touch with, when and where.
The charter statement doesn't address this at all. Its position appears to be that compelling a provider to preserve metadata is not itself an interference with privacy, because police still need a warrant or other authority to access the data. It implies that it is not a seizure and does not engage section 8, but this is not so.
We know from ample case law that metadata is private, and under these provisions, when the minister compels Shaw or Telus to preserve our metadata, the company is doing so on behalf of the state and for a law enforcement purpose. Those are the basic elements of a seizure under section 8.
It's worth noting that Parliament assumed precisely this 12 years ago when it added to the Criminal Code the power to make a preservation demand or order, which requires individualized suspicion, reasonable suspicion or a warrant, depending on the case. This is key: It makes it a criminal offence to hold data, if you're Shaw or Telus, etc., beyond whatever the period at issue is. Why would Parliament have assumed authority was needed to preserve data if it didn't engage section 8?
Nothing here changes, in my view, in light of the fact that police are saying they won't look at it unless they go get a warrant. That's also true right now. In order to see the things they demand to be preserved, they need a warrant, but even preserving it is—
